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CCRC
CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION
1994 to 1996

Dear Governor Wilson and
Members of the California Legislature:
Three years ago, the legislature and the governor agreed that a
fundamental review of California government was imperative.
The result was the creation of the 23-member California
Constitution Revision Commission.
The Commission, consisting of gubernatorial and legislative
appointments and selected state officers, met for the first time in
May 1994. The governor and legislative leaders addressed the
Commission and urged it to be bold and creative and to consider
all relevant issues-however controversial. The Commission's
recommendations reflect those admonitions. Thirty public meetings
were held including four formal public hearings, plus five
workshops and, along with the League of Women Voters, 39
community forums and video conferences. The Commission completed its work and went out of
business on June 30, 1996. During the course of our work, it became very clear that we needed to
change the way state and local governments operate.
For reasons the Commission quickly figured out, the status quo is no longer acceptable. Principal
among the reasons is that the state's population with its varied public service needs continues to
grow while the resources needed to provide services do not grow as fast. Neither the voters nor state
and local officeholders are anxious to raise taxes.
The conclusion is obvious. We must find ways to provide needed services with existing resources.
This means that government must operate more efficiently. The state's governmental system
developed in the nineteenth century will not be adequate for the twenty-first century.
It is well known to each of you that many voters do not believe that their taxes are being used wisely

or efficiently. And, perhaps equally important, it is not clear to our citizens who is responsible for
public decisionmaking. With 7,000 units of local government in the state and at least 15,000 elected
officials, it seems clear that California has considerably more government than it needs.
Accomplishing needed changes will mean upsetting public institutions, many of which were
organized when the state's population was smaller and when public policy issues were far less
complex.
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Naturally, this is not an easy process. The Commission has made a series of recommendations that
would begin this process of change. The advocates for the status quo are more numerous and better
organized than those who will support these needed changes. As a consequence, it will be up to state
and local political leaders to bring about a more workable and efficient system of government that
will be appropriate for the next century.
It is for these reasons that the Commission urges the legislature to begin the process of reviewing our
governmental and finance system and placing these issues before the voters. It is critical that we

begin to require our governmental organizations to work better and more effectively for the citizens
of California.
Sincerely,

William Hauck
Chairman
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Introduction
In a letter to James Warren on April 22, 1776, John Adams wrote, "All great changes are
irksome to the human mind, especially those which are attended with great dangers and
uncertain effects". Today, Californians are seeking change in the way their government
operates. Voter-approved initiatives of the last 20 years show a citizenry frustrated with their
government. Proposing a new way to do things is never easy. The reality we do not like often
looks better than a new way that might bring a better, yet uncertain future.
As we prepare for the next century, it is clear that the public agenda must include a review of
the way our government works. Our current state and local government structure is the
outgrowth of a constitution that was adopted in 1879. At that time, the state's population was
about 800,000. Today, the population tops 32 million, and all of the forecasts show continued
growth. As the state's population continues to grow and become more diverse, the private
sector changes and adjusts to new environments and conditions. But our governmental
structure has not changed. We have basically the same governmental structure we had in the
nineteenth century and that government has grown significantly. Today, California has more
than 7,000 units of government-including school districts, cities, counties and single
purpose agencies-led by more than 15,000 local elected officials.
The year 2000 is approaching quickly. We must prepare for the next millennium and begin
reviewing and revising our governmental institutions to meet modern conditions. This will
not be simple. But despite the uncertainty that change brings, it is clear that changes in
California's system of state and local government are necessary.
In 1994, in an effort to develop reasonable and workable ways to reform our government, the
governor and legislature appointed the 23-member California Constitution Revision
Commission. The Commission was asked to do the following:

• Examine the structure of state government and propose modifications that will increase
accountability.
• Analyze the current configuration of state and local government duties and
responsibilities and review the constraints that interfere with the allocation of state and
local responsibilities.
• Review the state budgetary process, including the appropriate balance of resources and
spending; the fiscal relationship between federal, state, and local governments; and the
constraints and impediments that interfere with an orderly and comprehensive
consideration of fiscal issues.
• Consider the feasibility of integrating community resources in order to reduce
duplication and increase the productivity of local service delivery.
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In May 1994, the California Constitution Revision Commission began holding meetings,
hearings, and community forums across the state. The Commission received comments and
proposals from both the general public and experts with knowledge of specific issues. Those
comments focused on the problems with current government structures and procedures and
possible solutions to alleviate those problems. After eighteen months of hearings and
analysis, the Commission is proposing an agenda for changing the ways in which our state
and local governments operate. The Commission's primary objectives in making these
recommendations are as follows:

• Improve accountability and responsiveness of government at all levels from the state to
the smallest community.
• Eliminate barriers to efficiency and increase flexibility.
• Assure that the state keeps its fiscal house in order by maintaining a balanced budget.

Indeed, change can be irksome, and we cannot completely predict the outcome. But we do
know that the current system is in dire need of change. The Commission believes these
recommendations represent an opportunity for positive change in California's governance
system. Only through major changes can we hope to create a better system and a better state
for all Californians.
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Summary of Recommendations
I. Improving Accountability in State Government:
Knowing Who Is in Charge
California's state government structure is often described as "divided"-split up among a
dozen directly elected public officials with a mixture of authority and few direct lines of
accountability. The primary objective of the organization of executive functions should be to
promote efficiency and responsiveness in the implementation of state policy. California
should review its legislative structure, including the length of legislative terms (which are
too short) and the length of legislative sessions (which are too long).
The authority of the executive and legislative branches is limited by the adoption of
initiatives which are often enacted in response to legislative inaction. The initiative process,
which was originally intended to break the grip of special interests on the legislative
process, has been used in place of the legislature for major public policy decisions. Currently,
there is a process for a public discussion of the legal and technical issues of proposed
initiatives, but there is no formal process for revising qualified initiatives before they are
placed on the ballot.

1. The governor and lieutenant governor should run on
the same ticket and work as a team.

The governor and lieutenant governor should run on the
same ticket at the general election, and the governor
should be authorized to appoint the lieutenant governor
to an executive branch responsibility.

The Executive
Branch: Improving
Responsiveness
and Efficiency

2. The superintendent of public instruction, treasurer,
and insurance commissioner should be appointed by
the governor instead of being elected.

The offices of the superintendent of public instruction, the
state treasurer, and the state insurance commissioner
should be appointed by the governor, rather than being
elective, and should be subject to legislative confirmation.
3. Abolish the Board of Equalization, merge state tax
administration functions, and appoint a tax appeals
board.

The Board of Equalization should be abolished. Its
regulatory and executive functions, along with the
functions of the Franchise Tax Board and other major
revenue agencies should be combined into a Department
of Revenue. Additionally, a state tax appeals body should
Summary of Recommendations - Page 3

----------------------------------~

----------------------------------

be established, appointed by the governor and subject to
senate confirmation.
4. Shorten the terms of the University of California Board
of Regents.

The term of office for members appointed to the
University of California Board of Regents should be
reduced from 12 years to 10 years. Reappointment should
be prohibited unless the appointee has served less than a
full term. The number of appointed members should be
reduced from 18 to 15, and the superintendent of public
instruction should be removed as a member of the board.
5. Shorten the terms and limit the functions of the State
Personnel Board.

The probationary and classification functions of the State
Personnel Board (SPB) should be transferred to the
Department of Personnel Administration (DPA).
Additionally, the terms of SPB members should be
shortened from ten years to six years.

The Legislative
Branch: Improving
Efficiency and
Effectiveness

6. Lengthen the limit on legislative terms of office to
three four-year terms.

Legislative terms should be extended so that members can
serve three four-year terms in each house. The terms
would be staggered so that one-half of each house would
be elected every two years. This provision would be
implemented so that no current member of the legislature
would benefit.
7. Shorten legislative session to six months.

The length of legislative sessions for considering and
acting on bills should be reduced from eight months to six
months per year. Additionally, the legislature should be
able to begin work on a bill ten days after the bill is
introduced.
8. Give the legislature the power to veto administrative
regulations.

The legislature should be given constitutional authority to
review and reject administrative regulations.
Page 4 -Summary of Recommendations

-----------------------------------6 ----------------------------------9. Provide limited retirement benefits to legislators.

Under the revised term limits, legislators would be able to
participate in the regular Public Employee Retirement
System.

10. To provide fuller public review, place constitutional
amendments on the November ballot, except in special
circumstances.

The Initiative
Process: Improving
Public Review

All proposed initiative constitutional amendments should
be placed on the November ballot. Constitutional
amendments proposed by the legislature may be placed
on primary or special election ballots with a two-thirds
vote of the legislature and the approval of the governor.
11. Allow amendment of statutory initiatives after six
years.

Allow the legislature, with gubernatorial approval, to
amend statutory initiatives after they have been in effect
for six years.
12. Allow the legislature to add technical and clarifying
changes to initiatives that have qualified for the ballot.

After an initiative has qualified for the ballot, the
legislature would have a short period of time to hold
hearings on the initiative and to adopt technical or
clarifying amendments. If the proponents of the initiative
agree, the measure would be submitted to the voters as
revised by the legislature.
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II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process:
Developing a Long-term Vision with
Increased Fiscal Discipline
The state's budget process contains few constitutional standards. For example, there is no
constitutional requirement that the state enact or maintain a balanced budget. Once a budget
becomes unbalanced, there is no formal system for rebalancing the budget. An annual budget
provides limited opportunities for establishing and implementing long-term strategic plans.
Such plans would provide more direction for overall spending, facilitate the systematic
evaluation of programs by the public, and increase accountability.

Adopt a Long-term
Vision and Have
the Flexibility to
Respond to
Changing
Conditions

13. Require the governor to submit, and the legislature to
adopt, long-term goals for the state and performance
measures for the budgetary process.

The governor should be required to submit a four-year
strategic plan to the legislature for deliberation and
adoption. The plan would include:
• Policy and fiscal priorities.
• Performance standards to gauge the productivity of
state expenditures.
• A capital facilities and financing plan.
• A description of the programmatic relationship
between the state and local governments.
14. Require a four-year capital outlay plan.

A four-year capital outlay plan should be included in the
state's long-range strategic plan proposed by the governor
and approved by the legislature.
15. Change the fiscal year from one to two years.

The current annual budget process should be replaced
with the enactment of a two-year budget.
16. Provide a budget rebalancing mechanism.

The constitution should provide a rebalancing process for
the state budget. Midway through the fiscal period, the
governor would be required to provide an update on the
state's fiscal condition and recommend budgetary
adjustments to accommodate any changes in revenue or
expenditures.
Page 6 -Summary of Recommendations

17. Require the state's budget to be balanced.

For each fiscal period, expenditures must not exceed
revenue and reserves. After the enactment of the budget
bill, no other bill could be enacted that caused
expenditures to exceed estimated revenue and reserves.

Increase Fiscal
Discipline

18. Require a three percent general fund reserve.

The state budget should include a three percent reserve.
Initially, the reserve would be phased in over several
budget periods.
19. Prohibit borrowing to finance a deficit.

In order to prevent the state from borrowing to finance
deficits, the state should be prohibited from borrowing
from non-governmental resources across fiscal periods.
20. Require a majority vote to enact the budget and
budget-related legislation.

A majority vote should be required for the adoption of the
state budget, the budget implementation bill, and any bill
enacted to rebalance the budget.
21. Allow for multiple subject budget implementation
legislation.

Authorize the legislature to include in a single
implementation bill, any statutory changes needed to
implement the budget bill.
22. Link budget passage to salaries.

The constitution should require the budget to be passed
by the prescribed deadline or the governor and the
legislature forfeit their pay.

Summary of Recommendations- Page 7
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Ill. Changing K-12 Education:
Focusing Accountability at the State and Local Levels
The governance structure of elementary and secondary education is divided among several
state, county, and local authorities. Lines of accountability are blurred. Although elementary
and secondary education are a shared local and state responsibility, local K-12 districts have
little authority to raise taxes to provide additional funds for education. Additionally, cities,
counties, and many special districts provide services that affect a child's education and
health, yet there are few formal incentives for the collaborative delivery of services that
might lead to more efficiency and cost savings.

Identifying Who
Is in Charge

I , <

.•

23. Make the governor responsible for K-12 education.

The governor should appoint the superintendent of public
instruction. The existence, roles, and responsibilities of the
superintendent of public instruction should be outlined in
statute rather than in the constitution. The governor
should be responsible for the state's role in the elementary
and secondary public school system. The office of the
superintendent of public instruction should be made
appointive, rather than elective and subject to senate
confirmation.
24. The role of the state Board of Education should be
determined by statute.

Constitutional references to the state Board of Education
should be deleted. Its roles and responsibilities should be
determined by statute.

25. The role of county superintendents of schools and
county boards of education should be determined
locally or by statute.

Constitutional references to county superintendents of
schools and county boards of education should be deleted.
School districts could organize areawide services in a
manner that most effectively and efficiently meets local
and areawide needs.
26. Establish an accountability system for public schools.

An accountability system including standards for public
schools should be adopted by the legislature.

Page 8- Summary of Recommendations

--------------------------------~

-------------------------------

27. Maintain Proposition 98 and provide additional
flexibility to the legislature and the governor.

The statewide funding guarantee for K-12 education
should be maintained. Additionally, the legislature and
governor should be given greater flexibility in
determining how to appropriate additional funds to K-12
education in excess of the minimum funding guarantee.
Specifically, education spending in excess of the guarantee
would be for one-time purposes, unless the legislature and
the governor chose to increase the base for the funding
guarantee.

28. Increase local control and authority.

Local control and the authority of local school boards
should be increased.
29. Give communities the power to supplement revenue to
local schools.

Enhancing Local
Control in the
Management and
Financing of
K-12 Education

Communities should have the power to raise revenue in
addition to the state guarantee. Unified K-12 districts
could increase the property tax with a two-thirds vote of
approval by the voters. All districts within a county could
raise additional revenue by increasing the sales tax with a
majority vote.
30. Capital outlay planning and development should
involve all local agencies.

School districts should participate with other public
agencies that provide services and infrastructure in the
territory served by the school district. A multi-agency
capital facilities planning process would be established as
part of the Community Charter (see Recommendation 33).
If a proposed project is consistent with a multi-agency
plan, the vote required for general obligation bonds is a
majority of voters.
31. Community colleges should be part of higher
education.

Community colleges should be removed from the
Proposition 98 funding guarantee and be part of the
funding of higher education.
Summary of Recommendations- Page 9

-----------------------------------d ----------------------------------IV. State-Local Relations:
Straightening Out the Responsibilities of
State and Local Government
The assignment of governmental responsibilities between the state and various local
governments, particularly counties, is fragmented and confused. The absence of clearly
assigned responsibilities for operating and financing government services has weakened the
accountability of government officials to the public. Functions that are clearly state (e.g.,
higher education) or clearly local (e.g., library services) are not the problem. Rather, functions
shared by state and local government produce the most confusion. Counties play a dual role:
they are considered local government for providing municipal services outside of cities, and
they are treated as agents of the state for state purposes. Often, a county must use the local
tax base intended to support local services to fund programs over which the county has little
programmatic or operational control. Finding the right mix of program responsibilities and
financing for shared programs must be a high priority for the legislature and the governor.

Changing the StateLocal Relationship:
Knowing Who Is in
Charge

Page 10- Summary of Recommendations

32. Develop and adopt a state-local realignment plan.

The governor would be required to submit a State-Local
Realignment Plan proposing the alignment of state and
local services. A plan must be adopted by the legislature.
The state-local relationship, along with the strategic plan,
would be reviewed and updated at least every four years.
The plan should provide assignment of responsibilities for
program policy authority, administration, and finance.

----------------------------------d --------------------------------V. Strengthening Local Government
The present structure of 7,000 local government bodies (counties, cities, special districts, and
school districts) has resulted in a confusing array of governmental entities. Many of these
entities have overlapping-if not conflicting-duties and responsibilities. While there is a
general public policy interest in improving and streamlining local governance and service
delivery and increasing local accountability, local agencies have few tangible incentives for
reform. The existing local government structure and division of governmental responsibilities
were conceived during a time in the state's history when there were fewer people and fewer
demands for services. Moreover, the current diversity of California's regions makes it difficult
for a uniform approach to local governance to be responsive to every area's needs.

33. Evaluate local governance structures and develop a
community charter.

Each county (or multi-county area) would be required to
initiate a process to examine their current governance
structure, methods of service delivery, and assignment of
responsibilities and powers. From this examination, each
area would develop a Government Services Plan for the
area covered by the charter. The plan could also include
subcounty areas. A Home Rule Community Charter would
then be developed to implement the Government Services
Plan. Citizens in each area would vote on the Home Rule
Community Charter. The countywide charter and/or
sub-county charters would include the following
components:

Strengthening
Local Government:
Clarifying Roles
and Enhancing
Collaboration

• Identify the territory to be covered by the charter.
• Provide methods for reducing the number and cost of
local government.
• Allocate local services and regulatory responsibilities.
• Provide for the organization and reorganization, as
well as the boundaries, of local agencies.
• Develop a collaborative capital improvement program
process for all of the agencies covered by the
community charter.
• Establish a process for the allocation of general
purpose state-authorized local revenue.
The provisions of the Home Rule Community Charter
could not abrogate or interfere with the power provided to
charter cities by the constitution. All local government
agencies will be required to disclose their revenue and
expenditures in a uniform manner as required by statute.

Summary of Recommendations- Page 11
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34. Vote requirements for local taxes and general
obligation bonds.

The authority to raise taxes would be subject to a majority
vote of the governing board and a majority of the voters
unless the charter provided for a higher threshold. This
would apply to all locally levied taxes except the ad
valorem property tax which would continue to be limited
by Proposition 13. Additionally, general obligation bonds
for projects consistent with a multi-agency capital outlay
plan for the area covered by the charter could be
approved by a majority of the voters.
35. Strengthening home rule.

The home rule provisions of the constitution should be
strengthened. One of the benefits for general law cities,
counties, and other local entities to participate in the
Home Rule Community Charter is that home rule powers,
previously limited to charter cities would be extended to
agencies covered by the new charter. This provision will
strengthen local governments' ability to govern local
affairs. Additionally, once the charter for a given area is
adopted, the state would be prohibited from reallocating
the non-school share of the property tax or other general
purpose local taxes allocated by the charter.

Page 12- Summary of Recommendations
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Improving Accountability
in State Government:
Knowing Who Is in Charge
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I. Improving Accountability in State Government:
Knowing Who Is in Charge
California's state government structure is often described as "divided"-split up among a dozen
directly elected public officials with a mixture of authority and few direct lines of accountability.
Executive branch functions should be better organized to promote responsiveness and efficiency in
the implementation of state policy. California should review its legislative structure, including the
length of legislative terms; which are too short, and the length of legislative sessions; which are too
long. The authority of the executive and legislative branches is limited by the adoption of initiatives
which are often enacted in response to legislative inaction. The initiative process should be reformed
to improve public review.

The current organization of the state's executive branch does not
promote responsiveness or efficiency in the execution of state policy.
The executive branch is divided among a dozen directly elected
public officials with few direct lines of accountability. This dispersion
of power creates i11flexibility and fragmentation and reduces
responsiveness and efficiency. There are few lines of
responsibility-limiting the ability of the public to hold officials
accountable for policy decisions. Officials blame each other for public
policy failures. The state's problems go unresolved, and the
electorate cannot determine whom to hold accountable.
Fragmentation exists in every policy area in which an official is
directly elected and his or her role is policymaking in nature rather
than providing a check on the exercise of executive power.
Fragmentation also occurs when executive branch agencies have
overlapping responsibilities. In addition to creating accountability
problems, such fragmentation leads to inefficient operation of the
agencies. 1

The state needs a clearer definition of who is in charge of state
policies and the overall direction of state government. Reform of the
executive branch should reduce fragmentation and provide a balance
between responsiveness and efficiency. Responsiveness and
accountability can be increased by focusing more responsibility for
the state's policy direction with the governor. Efficiency can be
increased by eliminating overlapping and duplicative responsibilities
between executive branch agencies.

The Executive
Branch:
Improving
Responsiveness
and Efficiency
What is the Problem?
• California State Government is divided into too
many parts.
• Administrative, policy
and quasi-judicial
functions are mixed
together.

What Change is
Needed?
• Decrease fragmentation
• Increase responsiveness
• Maintain checks and
balances

Only one state-North Dakota-has as many state-level elected
officials as California. Five other states-Georgia, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Washington have more than nine
elected officials. The trend across the nation is to move away from
electing state regulators and chief education officers. For example,
since 1992, four states have eliminated elected superintendents of
public instruction. Only fifteen states now have elected school
superintendents. 2
Improving Accountability in State Government: Knowing Who Is in Charge - Page 15
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What Does the
Commission
Recommend?
• Elect officials who have
an independent or check
and balance function.
• Appoint officials who are
part of executive branch
policymaking.

In proposing reforms to the Executive Branch, the Commission
sought to achieve the following objectives:
• Decrease fragmentation and duplication of responsibilities.
• Increase responsiveness, accountability, and efficiency.
• Maintain an appropriate level of checks and balances within the
executive branch.
California currently has 12 elected officials responsible for state
government functions:
• Governor
• Lieutenant Governor
• Attorney General
• Secretary of State
• Controller
• Treasurer
• Superintendent of Public Instruction
• Insurance Commissioner
• Four members of the Board of Equalization, elected by district
All of these officials are elected constitutional officers, with the
exception of the insurance commissioner, who is designated by
initiative statute (Proposition 103, November 1988). The lieutenant
governor is elected independently of the governor, and assumes the
duties of the chief executive when the governor is absent from the
state.

OFFICES
HAVING AN
INDEPENDENT
OR
CHECK AND
BALANCE
FUNCTION

OFFICES
HAVING A
POLICY OR
ADMINISTRATIVE
FUNCTION

Governor
Lieutenant
Governor

Treasurer
Superintendent of
Public Instruction

Attorney
General

Insurance
Commissioner
Board of
Equalization
(4 members)

Secretary
of State
Controller

The Commission determined that an executive branch position
should be directly elected if it either:
• Has clearly independent responsibilities, which for policy
reasons should be separate from the general executive functions
of the governor; or,
• Performs independent oversight of the actions of elected
officials and provides a check and balance function to limit the
excessive use of power.
For example, the secretary of state oversees the elections process,
which as a matter of policy should be independent of other executive
functions. The state controller performs financial audits that are a
check on executive power. The attorney general is the chief law
enforcement officer of the state.
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On the other hand, an executive branch position should be a
gubernatorial appointment if the primary responsibility involves
regulatory oversight or policy implementation as set by the
legislature, the governor, and/ or the voters. Additionally, placing
executive authority with the governor will allow more flexibility in
the implementation of policies because the governor-with the
consent of the legislature-will be able to determine the best method
for implementation.
Thus, the Commission concluded that of the state's 12 elective
officers, five should continue to be elected. The remaining officials
should be appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation.

Under current law, Article V of the California Constitution vests
executive power in the governor of the State of California and
requires the governor to see that the law is faithfully executed. The
governor is authorized by statute to assign and reorganize functions
among executive officers (except elective officers) and agencies.
Currently, the lieutenant governor assumes the responsibilities of
chief executive when the governor is absent from the state, serves as
the presiding officer of the senate, voting only in the case of a tie
vote, serves on the three-member State Lands Commission, and
serves on the Board of Regents of the University of California and on
the Board of Trustees of the California State University System.
California's voters have frequently elected a governor and lieutenant
governor from different political parties. At times, the governor and
lieutenant governor have been visibly at odds over various issues. As
now designed, the office of the lieutenant governor lacks substantial
responsibility. In the case of incapacitation or death of a sitting
governor, succession by a lieutenant governor of a different political
party could result in sudden and dramatic changes and
inconsistencies in public policy. Five times in California's history, the
lieutenant governor has succeeded the governor due to the death or
resignation of the governor. In each case, the governor and the
lieutenant governor were of the same political party. 3
The people of California would be better served by a governor and
lieutenant governor who run as, and are elected as, a ticket. Having
a governor and lieutenant governor of the same political party
would improve managerial effectiveness and political legitimacy in
the event that succession is necessary. If the lieutenant governor is of
the same political party as the governor, the governor might be more
willing to appoint the lieutenant governor to an executive branch
function. This would give the lieutenant governor a significantly
greater role in policymaking.

What Does the
Commission
Recommend?

1. The governor and
lieutenant governor
should run on the same
ticket and work as a
team.
The Commission recommends that the governor
aiJdfi~t.~tenal"!t gf:!ve~nc:JI'

run on the same ticket at
the general election; that
the·gt>vernor be authorized
toappoint the lieutf~nanl
governor to executive
branch responsibility; and.
that tbe governor,$ ex.ecu.
five [XIWers nt>t pass to th.e ·
lieutenant governor when
the goVernor leaves .the
state.
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Forty-three states have a lieutenant governor. Only nineteen states
elect governors and lieutenant governors separately. The current
trend is to elect the two officers on the same ticket. Since the 1950s
when only New York elected the governor and lieutenant governor
jointly, the number of states with joint elections has increased to 24. 4
Section 10 of Article V transfers the governor's powers to the
lieutenant governor when the governor leaves the state. The
Commission found that this provision was useful in the nineteenth
century, but it is no longer necessary due to modern transportation
and communications technology. The governor should be able to
retain his or her powers when absent from the state.

2. The superintendent of
public instruction,
treasurer, and insurance
commissioner should
be appointed by the
governor instead of
being elected.

a. Superintendent of
Public Instruction
The Commission recommends that the existence,
roles, and responsibilities
of the superintendent of
public instruction be
outlined in statutes rather
than in the constitution.
The office of the superintendent of public instruction should be appointive,
rather than elective and
subject to senate confirmation. The governor should
be responsible for the
state's role in the elementary and secondary public
school system.

Executive branch officials should be elected if they have either
clearly independent responsibilities which should be separate from
the general executive functions of the governor or if they perform
independent oversight, providing a check and balance function to
limit the excessive use of power. The Commission concluded that the
functions of the superintendent of public instruction, state treasurer,
and state insurance commissioner are administrative and
policymaking and should be the responsibility of the governor.
Therefore, these officials should no longer be elected but should be
appointed by the governor, subject to senate confirmation.

The position of the superintendent of public instruction is vitally
important, but as currently defined, it is organizationally untenable.
Since the duties of the superintendent of public instruction are
policymaking in nature, the office should be part of the executive
branch administrative structure. Only 15 states separately elect a
chief education officer. 5 By giving the responsibilities of the
superintendent to the governor's appointee to head the Department
of Education, the governor will become more accountable for the
public education agenda. Education policy cannot be separated from
education finance. Giving the governor responsibility for education
policy will force him or her to pay more attention to education
policy when making budget decisions. This will clarify for the public
that state-level executive branch authority and responsibility to
change or improve public elementary and secondary education rest
with the governor. This issue is discussed in more detail in the
section dealing with K-12 education.
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The state treasurer provides banking services for the state
government with the goals of minimizing interest and service costs
and maximizing yields on investments. The principal functions of
the treasurer are:
• The custody of all monies and securities belonging to or held in
trust by the state.
• Investing temporarily idle state monies.

b. Treasurer
The Commission recommends that the state
treasurer be appointed by
the governor, rather than
being elected, subject to
senate confirmation.

• Preparing, selling, and redeeming the state's general obligation
and revenue bonds.
The principal job of the treasurer is to manage state debt and
investments. This requires expert knowledge rather than political
responsiveness. All citizens can agree that the state should pay as
little as possible for debt, and earn as much as possible on financial
investments. Making this position appointive will clarify for the
public that the governor bears ultimate responsibility for
management of state debts and investments.

The insurance commissioner is California's most recently created
elected official. Proposition 103, a 1988 initiative statute, provided for
the popular election of an insurance commissioner at gubernatorial
elections. Proposition 103 cites accountability as the principal reason
for having an elected insurance commissioner. Specifically, the
purpose of Proposition 103 is, "to protect consumers from arbitrary
insurance rates and practices, to encourage a competitive insurance
marketplace, to provide for an accountable insurance commissioner,
and to ensure that insurance is fair, available, and affordable for all
Californians." 6

c. Insurance
Commissioner
The Commission recommends that the insurance
commissioner be
appointed by the governor,
rather than being elected,
subject to senate
confirmation.

The insurance commissioner oversees the Department of Insurance.
In addition to the activities mandated by Proposition 103, the
department performs traditional responsibilities that include: 1)
examining and regulating insurance companies and producers to
ensure that operations are consistent with the requirements of the
Insurance Code; 2) reducing insurance fraud; 3) collecting and
transmitting the annual gross premiums tax and retaliatory taxes on
insurers; and, 4) collecting fees, reimbursements, fines, and penalties.
The insurance commissioner differs from other statewide elective
officials who either develop policy or independently review the
activities of other elective officials. The office is primarily regulatory
in nature. The insurance commissioner is most analogous to the
appointed heads of other regulatory bodies such as the Public
Utilities Commission or the State Water Resources Control Board.
These agencies enforce the policies developed by the legislature and
governor rather than acting independently of overall state policy.
Returning the insurance commissioner to an appointed position
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makes for more consistent government. Only eleven states currently
elect an insurance commissioner.
The existence of an elective insurance commissioner blurs
responsibility for policymaking. Voters have difficulty determining
who is accountable for state insurance policies. The primary benefit
of Proposition 103 is that it provided new rules for the regulation of
insurance rates. There do not appear to be any particular benefits
derived from electing an insurance commissioner. Changing the
status of the insurance commissioner from elective to appointive will
not have an impact on insurance legislation and policies, which will
continue to be set by the legislature and governor through statute or
initiative.

3. Abolish the Board of
Equalization, merge tax
administration functions, and appoint a tax
appeals board.
The Commission recommends abolishing the
Board of Equalization and
the Franchise Tax Board
and combining their
regulatory and executive
functions and those of
other major revenue
agencies into a new
Department of Revenue.
Additionally, a'state tax
appeals body should be
established, appointed by
the governor and subject
to senate confirmation.

The Board of Equalization was established in the 1879 constitution.
The BOE is comprised of five board members, including the state
controller and four members who are elected geographically. The
BOE essentially acts as a regulatory and appellate body for a variety
of state tax policies.
In the late 1920s, the state began to examine the growing number of
agencies-including the Board of Equalization-that had a
responsibility for the administration of the tax system. In 1929, the
California Tax Commission recommended: "that the elective State
Board of Equalization be abolished and that in its place a permanent
professional tax commission be established consisting of three
members appointed by the Governor for terms of six years." 7 Since
then, eleven additional studies under six governors have concluded
that the state's tax administration system should be revised. Eight of
these studies called for the elimination of the Board of Equalization.
The Board of Equalization (BOE) and the Franchise Tax Board (FTB)
perform a variety of functions related to collecting major state
and/ or local taxes, including: 1) the quasi-administrative functions
required to operate a program; 2) the quasi-legislative functions
needed to set administrative policies to govern the programs; and,
3) the quasi-judicial functions involved in settling disputes that arise
from carrying out assigned functions.
The board's administrative functions include collecting state and
local sales and use taxes, and business and excise taxes and fees. This
includes taxes and fees levied on gasoline and diesel fuel, insurance,
cigarettes, alcoholic beverages, electricity, and hazardous and solid
wastes. The board also administers taxes on behalf of other agencies,
such as cities, counties, and transit agencies, which are authorized to
levy sales and use taxes. Other administrative duties of the BOE
include assessing public utility property in order to allocate value to
each taxing jurisdiction. The BOE also adopts rules and regulations
for administering business programs and for guiding and directing
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the board's property tax staff, county assessors, boards of supervisors, and local assessment appeals boards in valuing property.
The board's quasi-legislative functions include adopting rules and
regulations
the taxes it administers. Its quasi-judicial functions
include acting as an appellate body for the review of property,
business, and income tax determinations. The BOE also hears
appeals of decisions made by the Franchise Tax Board and resolves
disputes concerning the assessment of property that a city or county
owns outside its boundaries.
The Franchise Tax Board (FIB) has an oversight function that is
primarily administrative. The FIB consists of the Director of Finance,
the Chair of the BOE, and the state controller. The FIB administers
the state's personal income tax, the bank and corporation taxes, the
Homeowners' and Renters' Assistance programs, and the Political
Reform Act audit program. Over the past several years, the FIB has
been given additional tax enforcement and revenue collection duties.
These duties include collecting overdue motor vehicle license in-lieu
taxes, child support payments, and delinquent fines, penalties, and
forfeitures on behalf of any superior, municipal, or justice court.
The Employment Development Department (EDD) is a third agency
that has tax-related responsibilities. The EDD administers the
Unemployment Insurance Fund and the Disability Insurance Fund.
Employers remit insurance premiums to the Department. In 1972,
personal income tax withholding was assigned to EDD since it was
more efficient to have a central place for employers to make
payments of both their insurance premiums and employee
withholding. Much of the work of EDD is tied to federal
requirements associated with unemployment and job training
benefits. The feasibility of including the EDD's revenue functions in
a consolidated revenue agency should be carefully examined.
The existence of the BOE raises two questions. First, should such a
body exist? Certainly the functions of the board are necessary:
regulations describing how to calculate tax liability must be written,
property must be assessed, county property tax assessments must be
reviewed to ensure that assessment practices are consistent
throughout the state, and tax disputes must be adjudicated. The
second question is: Who should perform these functions? In the
federal government and most state governments, a treasury
department is responsible for defining and assessing tax liability, and
a quasi-judicial body and the courts are responsible for resolving
disputes. Only three other states elect any tax official.
California's current system blurs the responsibility of the governor
and legislature for maintaining equity and efficiency in the tax
collection system. Implementation of tax policy is diffused through
several agencies with different governing structures. Moreover,
elections for the BOE are relatively invisible because members are
elected from very large districts and because the office is so
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specialized. As a result, tax implementation matters are removed as
election issues.
An additional problem is that the current tax administration system
is fragmented and lacks accountability. Responsibilities are divided
between the BOE and the FTB. Efficiency and accountability will be
improved by combining the current regulatory and executive
functions of both offices and assigning those functions to a new
Department of Revenue. In addition to the economies of scale
brought about by a consolidation of the administration of the tax
system, private businesses will benefit by the consolidation of audits.
The board's adjudication functions should be assigned to an
independent quasi-judicial body, with members appointed by the
governor and subject to senate confirmation.

4. Shorten the terms of the
University of California
Board of Regents.
The Commission recommends that the term of
office for members
appointed to the University
of California Board of
Regents be reduced from
12 years to 10 years; that
reappointment be prohibited unless the appointee
has served less than a full
term; that the number of
appointed members be
reduced from 18 to 15; and,
that the superintendent of
public instruction be
removed as a member of
the board.

The Regents of the University of California is the existing
corporation established in the late 1800s by Article IX Section 9 and
constitutes a public trust to administer the University of California.
Since March 1, 1976, the term of office for an appointed regent has
been 12 years; prior to that time, the term of office was 16 years. The
terms of two regents expire each March 1, except in the first year of a
four-year gubernatorial term. The regents include seven ex officio
members and eighteen members appointed by the governor and
confirmed by the senate. In addition, the regents may appoint one
faculty representative and one student representative to serve as
regents for a period of not less than one year, with full member
status and powers. The seven ex officio members are: the governor,
the lieutenant governor, the speaker of the assembly, the
superintendent of public instruction, the president and vice president
of the alumni association of the university, and the president of the
university. Each ex officio member serves with full member status
and power.
Reducing the term of office from 12 years to 10 years will increase
the accountability of the regents to meet the executive policies of the
governor and the legislature. By reducing the number of regents
from 18 to 15, three regents will be appointed every even-numbered
year, and a one-term governor would be able to appoint six regents.
Three regents would be appointed in the even-numbered year
following a governor's assumption of office, and three more would
be appointed during a governor's last year of a four-year term. A
two-term governor would be able to appoint 12 of the 15 members.
Since a two-term governor could appoint 80 percent of the regents,
during the campaign for the second term, the governor would be
held accountable for policies concerning the university.
The prohibition against reappointment will increase the
independence of regents. Once they are no longer concerned with
being reappointed, regents will make decisions regarding university
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policies more independently and objectively. Removing the SPI as a
member of the regents will maintain the current ratio of ex officio to
appointive members.

The State Personnel Board (SPB) was created by Proposition 7 in
1934. The board consists of five members appointed by the governor,
with the consent of the state senate, for staggered ten-year terms.
Members can be removed only by a two-thirds vote of each house.
The role of the SPB is to administer the civil service system and to
"enforce the civil service statutes ... prescribe probationary periods
and classifications, adopt rules authorized by statute, and review
disciplinary actions." 8
The advent of collective bargaining in the early 1980s redefined the
employer I employee relationship by requiring personnel rules and
policies to be bilaterally developed. Collective bargaining also
required splitting personnel management duties between the State
Personnel Board and the Department of Personnel Administration.
Framers of the new strategy believed that splitting the duties would
minimize conflict. The DPA would represent the executive branch on
matters such as salaries and benefits and in negotiations with
employee organizations. The SPB would administer classification
proposals, selection programs, probationary periods, and disciplinary
appeals.

5. Shorten the terms and
limit the functions of the
state personnel board.
The Commission recommends that the probationary and classification
functions of the State
Personnel Board (SPB) be
transferred to the Department of Personnel Administration (DPA). Additionally, the terms of SPB
members should be
shortened from ten years
to six years.

An overlap of personnel functions currently exists between the
quasi-judicial State Personnel Board and the Department of
Personnel Administration. The principal redundancy in the
personnel system is in the public employment issues of classifying,
selecting, and disciplining employees. Transferring the
responsibilities for prescribing probationary periods and performing
classification functions from the SPB to the DPA would eliminate
redundancies, and make state government more efficient. The SPB,
acting in its quasi-judicial capacity, would retain its enforcement
powers and its authority to review disciplinary actions.
The Commission also found that the ten-year terms for SPB members
are too long. Shortening the terms of SPB members from ten years to
six years would provide stability for the civil service system and the
state's civil servants, while making it easier for the legislature and
governor to hold SPB members accountable for their actions.
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The legislative
Branch:
Improving
Efficiency and
Effectiveness

The California legislature is comprised of 120 members. The
assembly has 80 members who currently serve a maximum of three
two-year terms. The senate has 40 members who serve a maximum
of two four-year terms. The legislature meets in a two-year session
beginning in December of the year of the statewide general election.
During that time, the legislature is in session for nearly 15 months.
Additionally, the governor can call the legislature into special session
to deal with a specific issue. A special session can run concurrently
with the regular session.
Under the state's current legislative system, each member of the
senate represents about 820,000 people, and each member of the
assembly represents about 410,000. The Commission considered the
problems of ensuring adequate representation for California voters in
light of the state's increasing population and diversity.

What is the Problem?
• Legislative terms of
office are too short.
• Legislative sessions are
too long.
• There is not enough
legislative oversight of
the operations of state
government.

What Change is
Needed?
• Increase stability of the
legislature by lengthening terms of office.
• Enhance the role of the
legislature's investigative
and oversight function.

The Commission determined that California's legislature does not
operate as effectively or efficiently as it might. Term limits have
created instability within the legislature. Rapid turnover has resulted
in large numbers of freshmen legislators who are not knowledgeable
about the complexities of the legislative process. This lack of
experience often results in an inability to deal with complex and
difficult policy issues that involve some amount of history. Additionally, the schedule for legislative sessions is archaic. Although the
legislative session begins in January, the legislature accomplishes
little of consequence until March when budget discussions begin.
This delay occurs because of current laws that dictate the time frame
under which a bill is introduced, printed, and debated.

In its preliminary recommendation, the Commission proposed
converting the state's two-house legislature to a single-house
(unicameral) legislature. However, during the public hearings and
Commission discussions, a number of questions were raised as to
how a single-house system would operate. The answers to many of
those questions were not forthcoming. The Commission determined
that establishing a unicameral legislature simply does not have
sufficient public and legislative support. Most people believe that the
current two-house system is necessary to provide adequate checks
and balances. Each house is seen as preventing inappropriate use of
power by the other. The current system is also deemed necessary to
provide sufficient deliberation to ensure that-on any given
issue-the views of all concerned citizens are heard. Many also
believe that the current two-house system protects the views of
minorities. For these reasons, the Commission decided not to
forward this recommendation to the legislature. If these are valid
reasons for retaining a two-house system, the problem of overly
large districts still remains.
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Legislative branch reforms should create a process in which the
legislature operates more effectively and does its work in a shorter
time period. In keeping with the wishes of California voters, term
limits should be maintained. However, the intent of the voters in
establishing term limits can be honored while extending those limits.
A change in term limits will significantly improve the stability and
effectiveness of the legislature, but will continue to assure voters that
legislators cannot make careers out of service in either house.
Additionally, certain rules governing the introduction and debate on
legislation and the time frame in which the legislature works should
be changed to allow the legislature to work more efficiently.
In evaluating needed reforms to the state's legislative system, the
Commission sought to achieve the following goals:
• Increase the stability of the legislature so that work is done
more effectively.
• Improve the legislative process so that the legislature uses its
time more efficiently and does its work within a shorter period
of time.
• Improve the accountability and productivity of the legislature.

In 1990, California voters enacted Proposition 140, which amended
the state's constitution to limit the number of terms that legislators
can serve. Under the provisions of Proposition 140, members of the
assembly serve three two-year terms, and members of the senate
serve two four-year terms.

What Does the
Commission
Recommend?

In the past decade, establishing legislative term limits has been a
nationwide phenomenon. Since 1990, 22 states have enacted
measures to limit the terms of state representatives. The tenure of
California's legislators is among the shortest in the nation. 9

6. Lengthen the limit on
legislative terms of office
to three four-year terms.

The Commission acknowledges the concerns expressed by
proponents of term limits. But the Commission determined that the
extremely stringent term limits in California have resulted in
significant instability within the legislature and the inability of the
legislature to operate with any consistency. Since senators serve
four-year terms and terms are staggered so that only half of the
senate is elected at any time, senate term limits do not create as
severe a problem. The Commission recommends retaining term
limits, but extending them to provide more stability.

The Commission recommends that legislative
terms be extended so that
members can serve three
four-year terms in each
house. The terms would be
staggered so that one-half
of each house would be
elected every two years.

When a legislator first begins a term in office, he or she requires a
certain amount of time to "learn the ropes." The processes and
operations of the legislature are complex. Members need experience
to develop legislation and develop the coalitions necessary to meet
the state's long-term needs. The state's current term limits do not
provide sufficient time for legislators to develop the expertise
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necessary to effectively perform their responsibilities. Moreover,
under present term limits, the assembly will always have one-third
to one-half of its members serving in their first term. While some
voters may believe this will bring a fresh perspective to the
legislature, the lack of experience and knowledge of the system
impairs the efficient operation of the legislature.
The Commission recommends extending term limits to 12 years in
each house. The recommendation takes advantage of the important
feature of staggered terms. Extending the length of assembly terms
from two years to four years allows for staggered elections that will
alleviate the problems created when a large number of members are
serving their first term. The Commission determined that this
proposal will maintain the intent of Proposition 140 to provide for
frequent turnover and to prevent career politicians from becoming
entrenched in the legislature.
In its discussion of the proposal to lengthen legislative terms, the
Commission considered the positive effect longer terms would have
on both the cost of election campaigns and the amount of time spent
running for office. Under the current system, assembly elections are
held every two years. This means that incumbents seeking reelection
are constantly thinking about the next election and raising funds for
that election. Allowing for assembly elections every four years will
reduce the frequency of elections and the amount of money raised
and spent for this purpose.

7. Shorten legislative
sessions to six months.

The Commission recommends that the constitution
limit the length of legislative sessions to six months
per year and provide for an
expanded "oversight"
function during the remainder of the year. The
Commission also recommends shortening the time
period (from the current 30
days to 10 days) during
which bills must be in print
prior to being considered.

Under this proposat the legislature maintains its two-year session.
However, the session schedule is limited to six months (from January
to July 1). All legislative business is conducted during that six-month
period. Additional session time is available to consider measures
vetoed by the governor. If the need arose, the governor could call a
special session of the legislature to deal with a particular issue.
During the remaining six months, members could be in their districts
staying in touch with constituents.
One of the basic roles of the legislative branch is to provide a public
forum for the oversight and evaluation of state programs. The
second half of the year Ouly to December) will allow time for
legislative policy committees to conduct oversight hearings necessary
to review the effectiveness of statutes or programs to determine if
they are meeting their intended objectives.
The second part of this recommendation is to shorten the length of
time a bill must be in print before it can be debated by the
legislature. Currently, after a bill has been introduced, it may not be
considered, amended, or heard until it has been in print for 30 days.
This requirement was placed in the constitution prior to the advent
of modern transportation and communication systems. The
availability of those systems now permits a bill to be considered
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sooner, while retaining the critical protection that its contents be
available to the public prior to action. The Commission found that 10
days is sufficient for this purpose. The Commission recommends
permitting the house that originates a bill to consider it 10 days after
it has been introduced. This provision only allows a bill to be
considered-not enacted. The bill must be in print for at least 31
days prior to enactment. This recommendation makes it easier for
the legislature to hear and debate issues early in the session.

In 1979, the legislature enacted AB 1111 which created the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL). The OAL provides executive branch
review of all regulations promulgated by state agencies. OAL has
four functions: 1)
new regulations; 2) review informal
regulations
as
guidelines, rules, orders, and
standards; publication of the California Regulatory Notice
Register; and, 4) maintenance of the California Code of Regulations.

8. Give the legislature the
power to veto administrative regulations.
The Commission recommends that the legislature
be given constitutional
authority to review and
reject administrative
regulations.

review
inconsistent with the authorizing legislation.
the legislature increases public awareness
over
administrative activities. The Commission determined
a greater role for the legislature in reviewing regulations will provide
for a legislative remedy in instances where an executive branch
agency oversteps its authority.

With regard to retirement benefits, legislators elected after November
1, 1990 may participate only in the federal Social Security system.
The Commission concluded that since the length of terms being
proposed would allow members of the legislature to be in office for
12 years, some provision for retirement is justified. Under this
proposal, members of the legislature would be eligible to participate
in the Public Employees' Retirement System (PERS).

9. Provide limited retirement benefits to legislators.
The Commission recommends that the constitution
allow legislators to participate in the regular Public
Employee Retirement
System.
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The Initiative
Process:
Improving Public
Review

What is the
Problem?
• The legislative and
initiative processes
are too separate.
• The initiative process
excuses the legislature from not acting
on issues qualified
for the ballot.

The California constitution grants to the people the power to enact
and
constitution by initiative. Proponents
statutory
must obtain signatures equal to
percent
votes cast in the last gubernatorial election.
constitutional
initiatives, signatures must be equal to eight percent of the votes cast
in the last gubernatorial election. Once a measure qualifies, it must
be placed on the next general election ballot.

The Commission identified multiple problems with the current
initiative process. First, the initiative process reduces legislative
accountability because it is designed to be independent of the
legislative process. One of the consequences of the initiative process
is the legislature's reluctance to act if there are initiative measures on
the ballot. Legislators can be held accountable only if they are
involved in the process of developing and enacting state laws and
policies.
The initiative process also reduces the opportunity and incentive for
legislators to participate in the development of initiatives or to enact
laws when a particular issue begins to receive attention from
initiative sponsors. Legislators may find it easier not to take a firm
position on such issues and risk alienating important constituencies.
Instead, they let the public decide. Sometimes legislators sincerely
believe that the public is better suited to decide issues. But in other
instances, legislators may embrace direct democracy out of personal
self-interest or a desire to cultivate multiple constituencies that may
be in opposition on an issue. As a result, some issues are framed in
starker terms as initiatives, and may be more contentious and
divisive in the electorate than in the legislature. In such situations,
the legislature fails to provide a moderating influence and fails to
help find points of agreement and compromise.
Another problem with the initiative process is that it reduces the
flexibility of government laws and programs. Flexibility is the ability
of policymakers to alter legislation that has unintended
consequences, that is poorly written, that ceases to attract popular
support, or that is no longer needed.
Initiative laws often have unintended consequences. The current
initiative process has no mechanism for evaluating the effects of
initiatives and revising them if they are not accomplishing their
intended purpose. Initiative statutes can be amended only by the
legislature placing a proposed change before the voters, by another
initiative, or by courts as they rule on the constitutionality of the
measure. Of the 27 states that provide for some form of initiative
system, California is the only state with no provision for some type
of legislative amendment. 10
Many initiatives are written by citizens' groups with little or no
legislative experience. Unlike other states that provide pre-election
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administrative or judicial
not
in court
reasons, or stripped of some important-but poorly
written-provisions. When this occurs the voters are denied
outcome they tried to achieve at the polls.
A final problem with the initiative process is that when a
constitutional initiative is considered at a primary election, typically
only a small percentage of the state's voters participate.
Constitutional initiatives usually have significant implications for
Californians, and a larger percentage of the state's voters should
decide whether they should be enacted.
From 1912 until 1966, California had two initiative processes
available: the direct and the indirect initiative. The direct initiative
allows the proponents of a policy to bypass the legislature and have
an initiative placed directly on the ballot for voter approval or
rejection. Under the indirect initiative, an initiative statute that
qualified for the ballot could be submitted to the legislature for
action. The legislature had 40 days to enact the proposal without
change or amendment. If the legislature rejected the proposed law,
the secretary of state had to submit it to the voters at the next
general election. If the legislature accepted the measure without
change or amendment, it became law and was not placed on the
ballot.
Since 1912, 798 initiatives have been approved for circulation. Of
these, 779 were direct initiatives and 19 were indirect initiatives. A
total of 242 initiatives qualified for the ballot. Only four were indirect
initiatives, and of those, only one was enacted into law and never
appeared on the ballot. Of the measures that made it to the ballot,
only 75 were approved by the voters; 31 were constitutional
amendments, and 44 were statutory enactments. Since the indirect
initiative was seldom used, the 1962 Constitution Revision
Commission recommended deleting the provision and the voters
agreed, ending the practice in 1966. Although the constitution has
been amended 494 times, all but 33 of the amendments were placed
on the ballot by the legislature.U
The frequent use of initiatives is a relatively new phenomenon. From
the early years of the initiative until1974, the number of measures
that qualified for the ballot was relatively smalL From 1912 to 1974
(with the exception of a nine year period), the number of measures
that qualified was under 10, and the number making it to the ballot
was under three. In some years, no measures qualified. Since 1974,
the average number of initiative measures approved for circulation
has been 25. The number actually making it to the ballot averaged
about four. Of the 76 that have been approved over the last 84 years,
32 or about one-half have been approved in the last 15 years. 12
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During this period, most of the issues placed on the ballot promoted
particular interests, and often involved a battle between opposing
interests. Examples include insurance interests vs. trial lawyers,
insurance industry vs. insurance industry, business vs. labor, and
local government vs. tobacco industry. Table 1 illustrates the growing
use of the initiative process to make public policy choices.
More than eight decades of experience has provided Californians
with ample .opportunity to evaluate the effects of the initiative
process. Initiatives provide the public a way to apply pressure for
solutions to major public problems when the legislature and
governor are unresponsive. Two significant examples include the
coastal protection programs stalled in the legislature during the
late-1960s, which led to Proposition 20 the Coastal Zone Protection
Act; and the need for property tax reform in the mid-1970s, which
led to Proposition 13.
The Growing Use of the Initiative Process

Qualified
Approved

•
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What Change is
Needed?
• Improve accountability
of the voters and the
legislature.
• Improve the writing of
statutory initiatives.

L1

1980-89

1990-96

L1

The initiative process should not exclude the legislature from the
lawmaking process. The legislature is a lawmaking body, and it has
expertise in making laws and considering their outcomes. The
legislature should-at a minimum-have a role in the initiative
process to ensure that initiatives are well-written and meet the
purposes for which they are designed. Additionally, once an
initiative statute is enacted, there should be a mechanism for
evaluating its impact. If an initiative statute is not meeting its
intended purpose, or if it is having unexpected consequences, the
legislature and the governor should be able to revise the law.
In other states, the initiative has been used to enhance, rather than to
undermine, the legislative process. Many states allow or require the
state legislature to hold formal hearings on issues that have qualified
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for the ballot. The legislature may pass amendments to the initiative,
recommend amendments to the initiatives' sponsors, or pass the
measure itself. This review and amendment procedure provides an
opportunity for the legislature to assess public support, research the
issue, listen to interested parties, and enact legislation. Some states
have provisions for the indirect initiative, in which citizens petition
the legislature to consider a proposition. Others allow the legislature
to amend initiatives after they have passed. All of these provisions
allow state legislatures-which have the staff, resources, and
expertise to analyze complex issues-the opportunity to make laws
that reflect both broad public sentiment and the concerns of
interested parties. California is one of ten states that provides for
pre-election legislative review of initiatives, although it is unique in
not allowing pre-election legislative amendments.

The Commission determined that three reforms to the initiative
process will result in a system that more effectively serves the needs
of California's people. In reviewing the initiative process, the
Commission pursued three basic goals:

What Does the
Commission
Recommend?

• Improve accountability and efficiency by providing for greater
voter participation in the process of amending the constitution.
• Increase the accountability of the legislature by involving them
in the initiative process to ensure that initiatives are
well-written.
• Increase the flexibility of the statutory initiative by providing a
mechanism for evaluating effectiveness and changing the laws if
necessary.
One of the objectives of the Commission is to increase voter
participation in the process of amending the constitution. Over the
last 25 years, voter participation in primary and special elections has
declined. Most special and primary elections have less than a
"plurality" participating in the election. The 1993 special election had
a turnout of only 36 percent of registered voters. Since 1984, the
turnout for primary elections has not exceeded 48 percent.
Participation in November elections has remained consistently above
50 percent of registered voters. This proposal will help ensure that a
"public quorum" is present for the consideration of amendments to
the constitution. If the governor and the legislature agree that a
measure is of sufficient significance to warrant placement on a
primary or special election ballot, they could do so by a two-thirds
vote of the legislature and approval of the governor.

10. To provide fuller public
review, place constitutional amendments on
the November ballot
except in special
circumstances.
The Commission recommends that all proposed
initiative constitutional
amendments be placed on
the November ballot.
Constitutional amendments
proposed by the legislature
may be placed on primary
or special election ballots
with a two-thirds vote of
the legislature and the
approval of the governor.
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11. Allow amendment of
statutory initiatives
after six years.
The Commission recommends that the constitution
allow the legislature, with
gubernatorial approval, to
amend statutory initiatives
after they have been in
effect for six years.

Most initiatives establish a state priority or place a limitation on the
actions of government or citizens. One of the major responsibilities
of the legislature is to evaluate such programs. Under the current
system, once a statutory initiative is enacted, the legislature may not
change it, unless the initiative contains a provision allowing such
modification.
The Commission determined that the constitution should provide for
legislative evaluation of statutory initiatives and the programs they
establish to determine whether they are achieving their intended
result. A constitutional provision permitting the legislature and the
governor to evaluate and amend initiatives would allow the state to
change laws and programs in response to changing circumstances
within the state. It also would provide an opportunity to correct any
unintended consequences caused by an initiative.

12. Allow the legislature to
add technical and
clarifying changes to
initiatives that have
qualified for the ballot.

Under the current system, the legislature is required to hold
informational hearings on proposed initiatives. But the legislature
has no role in evaluating initiatives to determine if they are written
correctly and to ensure that they will not have any unanticipated
consequences. Moreover, the legislature has no ability to modify a
measure that has qualified for the ballot.

The Commission recommends that the constitution
establish a process for the
legislature to review and
make clarifying and
technical amendments to
initiatives that have
qualified for the ballot.

Initiatives are often poorly written by citizens' groups and others
who are not regularly involved in the governing process. Initiatives
frequently contain confusing legal requirements. The Commission
found that more legislative involvement in the initiative process
would alleviate the problem of poorly written initiatives.
The Commission recommends that the legislature be given the
constitutional authority to hold public hearings to discuss the
technical and programmatic aspects of initiatives that have qualified
for the ballot. The legislature can then identify the problem the
initiative is designed to remedy and determine whether the initiative
serves its intended purpose. If necessary, the legislature can amend
the initiative to make technical and clarifying changes consistent
with the purpose of the initiative. In order for the legislature's
changes to be included in the initiative, a majority of the proponents
of the initiative must agree to the changes. If a majority of the
proponents do not agree, the initiative would be placed on the ballot
in its original form.
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II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process:
Developing a Long-term Vision with Increased
Fiscal Discipline
The state's budget process contains few constitutional standards such as a requirement that the state
enact or maintain a balanced budget. Once a budget becomes unbalanced there is no formal system
for rebalancing the budget. An annual budget provides limited opportunities for establishing and
implementing long-term strategic plans. Such plans would provide more direction for overall
spending, facilitate the systematic evaluation of programs by the public, and increase accountability.

California's budget and the implementing legislation that
accompanies it contain the most important decisions made each year
by the governor and the legislature. Although there are a variety of
constraints imposed by the constitution and statute, the budget
determines spending and program priorities for critical state
services. Yet, as noted by the California Citizens Budget Commission,
"the process by which the state makes these annual ... decisions is
encumbered with unnecessary procedural obstacles and serious
informational inadequacies." 13
The California Business-Higher Education Forum, a group of
business and higher education leaders has called for a different
approach to making fiscal choices. In "California Fiscal Reform: A
Plan for Action" they found that there must be a process for
establishing clear goals for the state's future. "California needs to
recognize that its past success, measured both economically and by
the level of public confidence in its institutions, depended on a
shared vision and coordinated action between government and
private institutions . . . . No shared vision exists today. It is time for
a change." 14 The California Council on Environmental and Economic
Balance a group of environmental, business, and labor leaders and
many other groups have come to similar conclusions: The state is
likely to experience continued pressure on its resources due to
demands for higher levels of public investment and public services.
Dealing with this dilemma will mean changing the budget process.

What is the Problem?
• There is a lack of longterm vision.
• There is a lack of performance measures to
guide budget decisions.
• There are few constitutional standards for
improving fiscal
discipline.

The process for considering the budget and its associated decisions
has not changed in more than 30 years. For at least the last six to
seven years each house of the legislature annually spends endless
days over a four-month period crafting separate budgets, joining
together in a conference committee to resolve differences between
them, only to surrender their role at the last moment to the governor
and the legislative leadership. All of this happens because the
legislature's budget process is not designed to make the critical
decisions that are necessary to meet the needs of the state within
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available resources. It is widely agreed that the result of this process
the participants or to the people
is not satisfactory to
California.
The budget process begins with executive, judicial, and legislative
branches of state government developing expenditure plans as
overseen by the Department of Finance. The Department of Finance
submits the total expenditure plan to the governor based on an
estimate of state revenue and property tax revenue since a portion of
the property tax is used to finance K-12 education and community
colleges. The governor is constitutionally required to submit an
itemized budget proposal to the legislature by January 10 of each
year. The governor is also required to suggest additional revenue
sources in the event that estimated expenditures exceed revenue
when the budget is introduced. Once the budget bill is introduced,
the Legislative Analyst's Office evaluates the budget and provides
the legislature with recommendations. Legislative committees then
begin discussing the budget in early March. During May, the
governor submits an updated budget proposal. By the end of May,
the budget bill arrives on the floor of both houses for a vote. A
two-house conference committee is organized to resolve the
differences and to take into account the proposals made by the
governor.
The state constitution requires the legislature to enact the budget bill
by a two-thirds vote of each house, no later than June 15. The
governor may veto the entire bill, or strike out or reduce individual
items of expenditure in the budget using the "line-item veto." The
legislature can overturn a line-item veto by a two-thirds vote in each
house. Once the governor signs the budget bill, it becomes law. Even
prior to the enactment of the budget, the budget process for the next
year begins.
The Commission concluded that the current budget process has three
shortcomings. First, there is no organized way to develop and adopt
a long-term vision for the investment of public resources and also be
able to have a budget that can be adjusted to meet changing
economic and social conditions. A sense of shared vision or strategic
direction is missing from the budget process. As Casey Stengel once
observed, "If you don't know where you are going you're sure to
end up somewhere else." The state lacks any process for establishing
a strategic direction to guide programs and funding priorities. Any
such process must not be so rigid that it becomes a barrier to change.
Once the long-term direction is established, the implementation
process must be flexible enough to respond to changing conditions.
Second, the current process is organized and operated to protect the
status quo and, as such, is insulated from change. One of the
primary features of the budget process is that each budget is based
on the programs and activities contained in the last adopted budget.
For members of legislative budget committees or citizens frustrated
Page
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with the operation of state government, making changes to the status
quo is extremely difficult. Try as one might, the natural law that
budget
"You get what you got the prior
growth." Although attention is given to changing caseload
requirements for many programs, limited attention is given to
program evaluation, improving the performance of a program, or
eliminating a program that is no longer needed.
There are a few changes on the budget process horizon that seemed
promising to the Commission. The state has begun several
experiments with the integration of performance measures into the
budget process. Four state departments are involved in a new
budget process that will tie performance to their budget request.
Third, fiscal discipline is not one of the values that governs the
budget process. Fiscal discipline has less political support than
maintaining the status quo. Throughout much of the state's history,
fiscal prudence has been less of a standard than maintaining the
level of state interest in a particular program. In the Great
Depression of the 1930s and the recent recession of the early 1990s,
flexibility in meeting the needs of the state was seen as a higher
value than fiscal discipline. As the state lived through the Great
Depression of the 1930s, the level of spending steadily increased.
Although the state's revenue base was reformed in 1933, producing a
growth in resources, the steady growth in revenue was not sufficient
to keep up with increasing rates of spending. To cover growing
deficits, the state borrowed money and secured the loans with future
years' resources. 15 A similar condition existed during the recession of
1990. The state had major obligations for state and local spending,
particularly K-12 education. The state kept spending flat and
financed year-end deficits with resources from the next fiscal year.
On several occasions external borrowing was used to finance
year-end deficits. 16

The Commission reviewed the current process and concluded that
two basic changes are necessary. First, the budget process must have
a long-term vision and not simply be guided by the status quo. At
the same time, the process needs to be more responsive to changing
economic and social conditions. The state should develop a
long-term vision by:
• Adopting a long-term strategic plan to guide the state.
• Adopting a formal performance-based budgeting system.
• Adopting a two-year budget.
• Providing for a budget "rebalancing" process to meet changing
conditions.

What Change is
Needed?
• Develop a long-term
vision for California.
• Measure the performance of the state budget.
• Balance the state's
checkbook.

--------------------------------~
Second, the governor and the legislature have a basic duty to balance
the state's finances and to ensure that the state's resources are spent
efficiently. Ultimately, the state must return to its traditional role of
organizing and financing state operations and ensuring that
statewide programs are meeting the state's needs. The state should
enhance fiscal integrity by:
• Adopting and maintaining a balanced budget.
• Requiring a reserve to deal with unanticipated emergencies.
• Prohibiting external borrowing to finance deficits.
• Providing for a majority vote for the budget which will limit
special interest groups from leveraging budget negotiations.

What Does the
Commission
Recommend?
Adopt a Long-term
Vision and Have
the Flexibility to
Respond to
Changing Conditions
13. Require the governor
to submit, and the
legislature to adopt,
long-term goals for the
state and performance
measures for the
budgetary process.
The Commission recommends that the governor
be required to submit a
four-year strategic plan to
the legislature for delibera·
tion and adoption.

The state currently has a number of long-range plans that address a
variety of single purpose program areas. Some argue that they
conflict and need resolution. Additionally, California's current
budget process consists of short-term incremental decisions often
made without regard to long-term program objectives and fiscal
trends. Annual solutions to the state's fiscal imperatives have
resulted in long-term budget-balancing problems. The long-term has
simply become a series of short-term decisions laid end to end. The
investments that are needed to meet future state objectives are
debated within the narrow perspective of individual programs,
rather than as part of an overall priority-setting process.
The state needs a strategic plan to have a better sense of where it is
going and how resources should be spent. The existence of a plan is
particularly important when resources are scarce. The planning
process would provide policymakers with projections of future
program costs associated with policy and demographic changes. The
process also would provide a way to focus public policy decisions,
alternatives, and tradeoffs that the governor and legislature need to
make. Once in place, the plan would provide an overall strategy for
providing state services. As part of the strategiC planning process,
performance measures should be established to allow the legislature
to measure program outcomes against concrete standards to
determine if state programs are effective. By focusing on program
outcomes, policymakers can determine what works and redefine
priorities and funding as necessary. The strategic plan should also
establish the program and fiscal relationship between state and local
governments. Once adopted the strategic plan should guide both the
operating budget and the longer term capital outlay budget.
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The strategic plan would include:
• Policy and fiscal priorities.
• Performance standards to gauge the productivity of state
expenditures.
• A capital facilities and financing plan.
• A description of the programmatic relationship between the
state and local governments.
The enactment of the budget is the expression of the public policy
priorities identified in the plan. When the budget is considered, the
legislature can evaluate how each item relates to priorities and
objectives and determine whether a particular spending proposal is
consistent with the strategic plan. Additionally, the legislature can
use the performance measures to determine if programs are effective
and are meeting the goals outlined in the strategic plan.
The Commission's objective in making this recommendation is to
increase the accountability of elected officials by clearly identifying
expectations. These expectations take the form of measurable policy
goals to which officials can be held accountable.

Adequate investment in public facilities is fundamental to the state's
economic productivity and prosperity. One of the hallmarks of
California history is the successful series of long-term investments
that were made during the state's two decades of growth after World
War II. At that time, the state invested in building our infrastructure,
which today provides significant quality-of-life benefits to our
citizens. Examples include: the state's transportation, water, parks,
higher education, and elementary and secondary school system.
Californians have a long tradition of investing for the future. Today,
we take pride in the systems and facilities that were developed in
earlier decades.

14. Require a four-year
capital outlay plan.
The Commission recommends that a four-year
capital outlay plan be
included in the state's
long-range strategic plan
proposed by the governor
and approved by the
legislature.

In recent years, infrastructure investments that are necessary for the
future have been a secondary priority behind meeting the current
needs of the people. But in an era of scarce resources, a capital plan
is critical so that the state can maintain and enhance its premier
public facilities. Adequate investment in public facilities is basic to
the state's economic productivity. Most of the state's capital facility
planning programs are directed toward specific functions such as
transportation, water, higher education, and prisons. However, the
state lacks an integrated, multipurpose capital facilities budgeting
system that will address long-term public facility needs.
The Commission recommends that the governor propose, and the
legislature adopt, a four-year capital outlay plan. The plan would
evaluate state objectives and economic growth to determine the
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overall priorities for building the state's infrastructure. The plan
would: 1) define investment priorities for building public facility
infrastructure; 2) assign responsibilities between levels of
government for implementing the capital outlay plan; and, 3)
determine the financing methods to be used. The plan would
provide the state a framework to build for the future, while also
providing a means for reviewing annual state spending in relation to
current and future needs.

15. Change the fiscal year
from one year to two
years.

Under current law, the governor and legislature consider the state's
fiscal choices on an annual basis. California is one of 31 states that
operates on an annual budget cycle. The remaining 19 operate with a
two-year budget. 17

The Commission recom·
mends that the current
annual budget process be
replaced with the enact·
ment of a two-year budget.

Major state responsibilities, such as education and criminal justice,
require a long planning horizon and a greater level of certainty to
provide for program stability. The current budgetary timetable does
not provide sufficient time for program review, evaluation, and
change, nor does it allow for long-term planning. With a two-year
budget, the legislature will be able to spend more time evaluating
program outcomes and effectiveness. A two-year budget will also
provide the governor and legislature the ability to take a longer view
of the state's financial needs and to adjust to economic and caseload
changes in a more organized manner. As a result, cities, counties,
and schools will be able to do a better job of planning and using
state funds.

16. Provide a budget
rebalancing mechanism.

Failure to maintain a balance of revenue and expenditures often has
led to year-end deficits. Adopting a balanced budget is an important
step in stabilizing financial planning for state services and living
within our means. With the two-year budget period the Commission
recommends, it is vital to have a provision for making mid-course
corrections. Such corrections might be required if caseloads change.
For example, the budget forecast of the number of children estimated
to attend school in the year the budget is adopted is often different
than the actual number who attend. The same is true for the budget
forecast of the economy. Fluctuations in the economy may have an
effect on projected revenue. Under this proposal, if the governor
believes it is necessary to change the budget to keep it in balance, he
or she will submit a rebalancing bill to change appropriations. A
budget implementation bill will also be submitted to make any
statutory changes necessary in the rebalancing bill. As noted in the
section on the vote requirement, the budget rebalancing bill would
require a majority vote of the legislature.

The Commission recommends that the constitution
specify a "rebalancing"
process for the state
budget. Midway through
the fiscal period, the
governor would be required to provide an
update on the state's fiscal
condition and recommend
budgetary adjustments to
accommodate any changes
in revenue or expenditures.
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Increase Fiscal
Discipline

Most states have some form of balanced budget requirement. In 44
states, the governor must submit a balanced budget proposal to the
legislature. In 37 states, the budget adopted by the legislature and
signed by the governor must be balanced. Thirteen states, including
California, do not require an adopted budget to be in balance or be
maintained in balance. 18

17. Require the state's
budget to be balanced.

For most of the state's history, California has relied on fiscal
flexibility to maintain the state's expenditure priorities during
difficult times. For example, from 1932 to 1942-when the budget
was on a two-year schedule-California consistently closed its books
with deficits. Contemporary history is similar. Since 1981, the state
has ended eight out of fifteen fiscal years with operating deficits. In
most cases the deficits were not anticipated. The state has used four
methods to deal with fiscal imbalances; 1) reduce expenditures; 2)
raise taxes; 3) use resources of the following year to bring the budget
into balance; and, 4) shift the cost of a service to some other
agency-either to the federal government or to counties-or shift
resources between entities in order to save resources for other state
programs. As Table 2 illustrates, it is not a simple task to keep the
state's books balanced through changing economic conditions.

The Commission recommends that for each
two-year fiscal period,
expenditures must not
exceed revenue and
reserves. After the enactment of the budget bill, no
other bill could be enacted
that cause expenditures to
exceed estimated revenues
and reserves.

A critical issue for the Commission was the need for fiscal integrity.

The Commission's objective is to prohibit spending in any fiscal
period that will exceed the revenue that will be received. Adopting a
balanced budget requirement will enhance the state's fiscal integrity
and accountability and impede carrying over deficits to the next
fiscal period.

General Fund Condition

(In Billions)

(Source: Legislative Analyst's Office)

Operating
Surplus/Deficit
Year-End Budget
Surplus/Deficit

74-75

79-80

84-85

89-90

93-94
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The Commission's recommendation regarding a balanced budget
applies only to General Fund expenditures, not to Special Funds or
bond funds used for capital projects. General Funds are raised
primarily by the state income tax, sales tax, and bank and
corporations taxes. The state has greater discretion over the use of
these funds. Special Funds are those funds that are earmarked by
law to be used for specific purposes such as gas taxes for
transportation projects. Bond funds finance capital projects such as
school construction, university facilities, prisons, and park
acquisitions.

18. Require a three percent
general fund reserve.
The Commission recommends that the state begin
each two-year budget
period with a three percent
reserve. Initially, the
reserve would be phased in
over several budget
periods.

19. Prohibit borrowing to
finance a deficit.
The Commission recommends that the state be
prohibited from borrowing
from non-governmental
resources across fiscal
periods.

In 1988, California voters enacted a constitutional requirement to
establish a "reasonable and necessary" prudent reserve. However, it
did not specify the amount of the reserve. Failure to provide a
reserve leaves the state vulnerable to small-scale emergencies,
natural disasters, or unexpected economic shocks. The purpose of a
reserve is to have the resources available to respond to normal but
unforeseen changes in the economy, caseloads, or small-scale
emergencies.
The Commission determined that the legislature must set aside a
reserve and that a three percent reserve within each two-year period
is a reasonable amount. Initially, the reserve will be phased in at a
rate of one percent each year. The rules governing the reserve and its
use will be specified in statute. A two-thirds vote of both houses
would be required to spend funds from the reserve. As the reserve is
expended, it must be replenished within two fiscal periods.

Due to the cyclical nature of tax receipts and expenditure allocations
during a fiscal year, the state may have legal spending obligations
that exceed the amount of cash in the treasury at any given time. To
meet these obligations, the state borrows money. Borrowing can be in
two forms; internal and external. Internal borrowing involves using
the money of one state spending area to temporarily pay for another.
Such borrowing is often necessary to deal with fluctuations in when
certain areas of the state receive their revenue. External borrowing
uses the private capital markets to obtain needed funds.
California is one of only 14 states that allow actual deficits to be
carried over into the next fiscal year. It has also been argued that
California has one of the least restrictive provisions protecting the
state from deficit financing. 19
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The constitution does not directly address the state's ability to
borrow money from capital markets to finance deficits. To be
consistent with the requirement for a balanced budget, the
Commission recommends specific language in the constitution to
prohibit the state from borrowing externally to finance a deficit
across a fiscal period. This recommendation does not limit the state's
ability to borrow to meet cash flow needs within a fiscal period.

Currently, all General Fund appropriations, except those for public
schools, must be approved by a two-thirds vote of both houses of the
legislature. This requirement dates back to a 1933 amendment that
required a two-thirds vote on the budget bill if General Fund
appropriations grew by more than five percent. Since budget growth
after 1933 almost always exceeded five percent, the practical effect
was to routinely require a two-thirds vote for passage of budget bills.
A 1962 amendment removed the five percent formula, and simply
required a two-thirds vote on the budget.
Only seven states require some form of a supermajority voting
requirement for legislative passage of revenue or budget bills. Four
states require a supermajority vote for budget approval if the budget
contains emergency clauses or if the final budget exceeds the
governor's original proposal. In Illinois, a majority vote is required
to pass the budget unless the state's budget has not been enacted by
June 30, then the budget bill requires a three-fifths vote. 20

20. Require a majority vote
to enact the budget
and budget-related
legislation.
The Commission recommends that a majority vote
be required for the adoption of the state budget,
the budget implementation
bill, and any bill enacted to
"rebalance" the budget.

In theory a two-thirds vote should force a compromise between the
majority and minority parties. For a number of years, the system
worked in this manner. Recently, however, it has permitted those
who have specific interests, which may or may not be related to the
budget, to delay passage of the budget by leveraging their issue into
the budget debate. The Citizens Budget Commission found that long
budget delays, where a small group of legislators were able to stall
budget adoption, caused higher levels of spending. 21 The
Commission agreed with that finding. Although conventional wisdom indicates otherwise, the two-thirds vote requirement does not
seem to limit higher levels of spending. In practice, it encourages it.
The Commission concluded that requiring a majority vote is the
most equitable way to deal with increasing demand in an era of
scarce resources. The Commission believes that with its
recommendations related to balancing the budget, restricting
borrowing, and requiring a reserve built in to the budget process to
provide more fiscal discipline, a majority vote for enactment of the
budget is appropriate. The majority vote recommendation applies to
enactment of the budget, budget implementation bill, and
rebalancing bill. The Commission recommends maintaining the
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requirement for a two-thirds vote for any tax increase. Therefore,
program expenditures may be adjusted by a majority vote and the
taxpayers maintain their protection of a two-thirds vote on the
imposition of new taxes.

21. Allow for multiple
subject budget implementation legislation.
The Commission recommends that the legislature
be authorized to include. in
a single implementation
bill, any statutory changes
needed to implement the
budget bill.

The budget bill often requires changes in state law in order for the
provisions of the budget to take effect. Legislation needed for those
changes is included in budget trailer bills or budget implementation
bills. But the constitution contains a provision that limits legislation
to a "single subject." All bills, other than the budget bill itself, may
deal with only one subject. Because of the "single subject" rule, the
budget-related changes cannot be combined into one bill.
Consequently, the budget implementation bills must be submitted
and voted on as separate pieces of legislation. To implement changes
in law required by the budget, the legislature frequently must
consider 20 to 30 different bills. Inevitably, one or more of these bills
fails to pass the legislature, and thus throws the budget out of
balance soon after enactment.
In order for the state to have an effective spending plan, the budget
and all the provisions in the budget implementation bills must be
enacted together. Without the implementation bills, the budget bill
cannot operate, and the state does not have an effective spending
plan. This recommendation authorizes multiple subject budget
implementation bills, but does not require them. Allowing the
legislature to pass a single budget implementation bill will protect
the fiscal integrity of the budget by making it easier to pass
legislation essential to keeping the budget balanced. If the budget
implementation bill includes a tax increase, a two-thirds vote would
be required for enactment.

22. Link budget passage to
salaries of legislators
and the governor.
The Commission recommends that the constitution
require the budget to be
passed by the deadline or
the governor and the
legislature forfeit their pay.

Currently, the legislature and the governor are paid even if the
budget is not enacted on time. This is not true for those who rely on
the state for the timely payment of its obligations, including nursing
homes, some state employees, and suppliers who provide services to
the state. The Commission recommends that the governor and
legislators forfeit their pay during any period that the budget is not
enacted following the June 30 deadline.
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Ill. Changing K-12 Education:
Focusing Accountability at the State and Local Levels
The governance structure of elementary and secondary education is divided among several state,
county, and local authorities. Lines of accountability are blurred. Although elementary and secondary
education are a shared local and state responsibility, local K-12 districts have little authority to raise
taxes to provide additional funds for education. Additionally, cities, counties, and many special
districts provide services that affect a child's education and health, yet there are few formal incentives
for the collaborative delivery of services that might lead to more efficiency and cost savings.

Perceptions of how the K-12 education system operates do not
coincide with reality. In fact, several myths exist as to just how
California's education system operates and who bears ultimate
responsibility for K-12 education policies. First, there is a myth that
the superintendent of public instruction is responsible for the state's
education system. The reality is many officials make decisions
concerning the state's education system. The current system provides
education roles for the governor, superintendent, state Board of
Education, county offices and local school district boards,
administrators, and teachers. Citizens have difficulty knowing whom
they should hold accountable for educational quality and results.

What is the Problem?
• At the state level, no one
is in charge.
• There are few standards
to measure performance.
• Local policy and financing authority is limited.

As described in the section on executive branch organization, at the
state level California's public education system is administered by
the Department of Education under the direction of the state Board
of Education and the Superintendent of Public Instruction. Presently,
the superintendent has three roles: 1) Director of the State
Department of Education; 2) Executive Secretary to the State Board
of Education; and, 3) Superintendent of Schools. The primary
responsibilities of the superintendent and the department are to
provide education policy direction to local school districts and to
work with the educational community to improve academic
performance. Any governing or administrative authority over the
schools is derived from state laws and not the constitution.
Conflicts frequently occur over who has jurisdiction in a particular
educational policy area. For example, the 1993 court decision State
Board of Education v. Honig involved a number of issues relating to
the roles and responsibilities of the board and the superintendent.
The California Appellate Court ruled in favor of the board, and the
California Supreme Court let the decision stand. The decision states:
". . . the constitution allows the Legislature to specify roles and
responsibilities for both the board and the superintendent."
Therefore, any lack of clarity of authority rests in legislation.
"The Legislature has delegated certain powers to the board and the
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superintendent. The board shall determine all questions of policy
within its power. The Legislature has delegated to the
superintendent the power to execute, under direction of the state
board, the policies which have been decided upon by the board."
Therefore, each has regulatory authority dependent upon the
assignment of that authority by the Legislature for a particular
program or education function. "Although the superintendent is a
constitutional officer whose office cannot be extinguished by the
Legislature, the powers and duties of that office may, and have been,
increased and diminished by the Legislature under its authority." 22
Another myth concerning California's educational system is that
local communities fund their own schools and that local school
boards operate their schools as they choose. The reality is that the
state provides well over half of all funding for K-12 education (the
remainder of the funds are local property tax revenue) and
prescribes how certain funds must be spent. For the 1996-97 fiscal
year an estimated $28.1 billion will be spent educating 5.4 million
school children. Seventeen billion dollars comes from the state
General Fund, $8.6 billion comes from the local property tax, and the
remaining $2.5 billion comes from the federal government. The state
controls the allocation of state funds as well as the local property tax.
Local school boards make decisions about how to spend their
general purpose state funds and property tax revenue. However, the
state also provides categorical funds and dictates how those funds
must be spent. The Commission concluded that the current K-12
financing system and the lack of opportunity for communities to
raise revenue locally for schools has resulted in people being
disconnected from their local schools.
The Commission found that California has an educational system
that provides no real focal point for responsibility, no flexibility for
local districts, and has widely scattered responsibilities, resulting in
no single official or entity being accountable for the state's education
system either at the state or local level. The system has no organized
method for ensuring that California's pupils are well-educated or
that education funds are spent in the best way for each local area.
STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION

WHO IS IN CHARGE?
COUNTY BOARD OF
EDUCATION
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The Commission found that several reforms are needed to resolve
problems with the state's education system. First, the state must stop
micro-managing local school districts, and must delegate to local
districts responsibility for meeting state education objectives. The
state should ensure access to-and equity of-education and it
should establish academic standards for local districts to meet. Local
school boards should then be empowered to meet those standards
using the methods that work best for their communities. Second, the
state must clarify education roles and define which state official
bears ultimate responsibility for California's educational policies.
In the area of school finance, the Commission concluded that the
current education funding system is too centralized at the state level.
This has fostered a disconnect between citizens and their local
education system. The Commission's recommendations for a shared
state-local school finance system have two basic underpinnings.
Local school boards should be empowered to operate in a manner
that will meet both the state's interest in education and the needs of
their pupils on a local level. School districts should have the
option-with local voter approval-to supplement the funds they
receive from the state and the basic allocation of property tax
revenue. This authority will provide local boards with greater control
and flexibility in meeting the education needs of each community.
Education has been a vital state interest since the first constitution
was adopted in 1849. The 1849 constitution provided that the
legislature should "encourage by all suitable means the promotion of
intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvements," and
should maintain a system of free common schools. During the 1879
convention, considerable debate occurred about education issues.
The general attitude at the convention was one of distrust of the
state government. The delegates gave local governments
considerably more control over the schools than had been previously
enjoyed. Now, 117 years later, it's once again time to shift more
power, authority, and revenue control from the state to local school
districts.

In evaluating needed reforms to the state's elementary and
secondary education system, the Commission established the
following goaJs:

What Change is
Needed?
• Clarify responsibility.
• Focus control of education locally.
• Eliminate barriers to
efficient operation.
• Give communities power
to supplement the state
funding guarantee.

What Does the
Commission
Recommend?

• The state must provide the public with a clear system of
accountability.
• The responsibility for providing elementary and secondary
education services should be shared between the state and local
communities.
• The focus of control of education should be as close to the pupil
as possible.
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• Reforms should eliminate barriers to the efficient operation of
the elementary and secondary school system.
• Communities should have the ability to supplement the
statewide K-12 funding guarantee.

Identifying Who
Is in Charge
23. Make the governor
responsible for K-12
education.
The Commission recommends that the governor
should be responsible for
the state's role in the
elementary and secondary
public school system. The
roles and responsibilities
of the superintendent of
public instruction should
be outlined in statute
rather than in the constitution. The superintendent of
public instruction should
be appointed by the
governor, subject to senate
confirmation.

This requirement was discussed in the section on Executive Branch
reform, and the information bears repeating here. The general public
and many in the education community perceive that the
superintendent of public instruction has more authority over the
schools than actually exists. Although the superintendent has
policymaking authority, the position lacks fiscal and managerial
control. Personnel and practice decisions are made by local boards.
Overall budget control lies with the governor and the legislature, or
often is mandated by initiatives. Decisions about textbooks, testing,
and standards rest with a state board appointed by the governor, of
which the superintendent is the executive secretary, not a voting
member.
Responsibility for the state's education system is further complicated
by the lackof constitutional reference to the authority of the
governor for elementary and secondary education. Despite that, the
historical prominence of the governor in education policy and
budget decisions leads the public to presume a certain level of
gubernatorial responsibility. The dispersion of responsibility within
the education system means that no one has the authority to
implement reforms, and citizens don't know whom to hold
accountable for educational quality and results.
The Commission's goal is to establish efficient and effective
governance for elementary and secondary public education by
clearly defining the power and authority of the governor and locally
elected school boards. To attain this goal, it is necessary to remove
the constitutional status of some offices and boards. If a function is
truly necessary, statutes can establish any offices and entities that are
required to meet specific needs.
Deleting the constitutional status of the superintendent and giving
responsibility for education policy to the governor, would remove a
perceived layer of authority between local school boards and the
governor. It would also clarify that the governor is ultimately
responsible for the state's education policies.
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Currently, the state Board of Education has two constitutional
responsibilities: approval of textbooks for use by pupils through the
eighth grade, and approval of four executive appointments made by
the superintendent of public instruction to the state Department of
Education. All other policy development and regulatory
responsibilities are based in statutes.
The Commission recommends that the governor be given clear
constitutional responsibility for elementary and secondary education.
The governor and the legislature should have the authority to
determine whether a state board is necessary and-if it is
necessary-whether its functions should be advisory or regulatory. If
such a board is needed, its establishment, roles, and responsibilities
should be outlined in statute rather than in the constitution.
Establishing the board in statute will allow for more flexibility in its
duties and will better allow for changes in those duties to meet
current needs. If the constitutional reference is removed, the board's
existing structure and duties could remain or change.

24. The role of the state
Board of Education
should be determined
by statute.
The Commission recommends deleting constitutional references to the
state Board of Education.

This proposal, coupled with the recommendation to delete the
superintendent of public instruction from the constitution, will
remove yet another perceived-and sometimes real-layer of
governance between local school boards and the governor.

County superintendents of schools and county boards of education
are provided for in the constitution but their roles and
responsibilities are spelled out in statute. According to statute,
counties provide many educational programs for pupils. The nature
of these programs is such that they are often better organized and
provided on a regional or areawide basis. This includes programs
such as special education for disabled pupils, vocational/ occupational skills training, and juvenile court schools. In addition to these
programs, statutes require the counties to perform fiscal,
organizational, and attendance functions for school districts.
Existing statutes permit local units of government-in this case
school boards-to form county, regional, or areawide administrative
units and joint powers authorities. Under the Commission's
recommendation, these units could continue existing practices or
cooperative services, or they could establish new arrangements, if
local school boards need such an entity.
If school districts had more local control, they could use their
authority to organize regional or areawide services in a manner that
most effectively and efficiently meets their needs. If the state requires
an intermediate unit to carry out a specific state function, a regional
or county unit could be authorized in statute, or the function could
be performed by an entity created as a unit in the state Department
of Education.

25. The role of county
superintendents of
schools and county
boards of education
should be determined
locally or by statute.
The Commission recommends that constitutional
references to county
superintendents of schools
and county boards of
education be deleted.
School districts could
organize areawide services
in a manner that most
effectively and efficiently
meets their needs.
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This recommendation is not a negative reflection on the programs
and
provided by counties, rather/ it is intended to improve
organization and accountability. The recommendation meets a
Commission goal of placing program operations closest to the local
community and allowing maximum local flexibility for program
governance. Additionally, it removes a layer of bureaucracy-both
perceived and real-between local school boards and the governor.

26. Establish an accountability system for
public schools.
The Commission recommends establishing an
accountability system and
standards for public
schools.

The constitution mentions education accountability only in section
8.5 of Article XVI (added by Proposition 98), and the reference is
very brief. The provision requires school districts to issue
accountability report cards for each school. However/ there is little
statewide uniformity of design for ease of public understanding, and
there are no consequences imbedded in the system. In 1995, the state
enacted a new statute that establishes new pupil testing and
education standards. The legislation created the Commission for the
Establishment of Academic Content and Performance Standards to
develop educational standards and create a testing program for
certain elementary and secondary gradesY The goal is to determine
and describe what pupils should know and be able to do. Local
school districts should then be given authority to decide how to
educate children to accomplish those goals.
Current state law requires school districts to adhere to particular
fiscal controls, but there is no accountability process or requirement
that focuses on pupil achievement or the non-fiscal aspects of school
district operations. State laws hold school districts accountable for
fiscal operations, particularly if a district has fiscal difficulties.
Districts are required to have a fund reserve, account for
expenditures in a specified manner, subject financial transactions to
an annual audit, and have fiscal documents reviewed by county
offices of education and the state Department of Education. Lack of
adherence to required forms, procedures, and standards can result in
a state "takeover" of the fiscal affairs of a school district.
The Commission recommends that the constitution be amended to
require the state to adopt a statute outlining an accountability system
for education content, pupil performance, and financial and
managerial responsibilities. Under such a provision, the state could
enact fiscal accountability and pupil testing provisions that are
similar to those contained in current statutes. A constitutionally
required system developed in statute will maintain the state's
interest in K-12 education, while permitting periodic statutory
changes to allow for new conditions. Of equal importance, such a
system would provide a clear statement to the public regarding the
degree to which pupils are learning and the efficiency and
effectiveness of local districts.

Accountability at the State

--------------------------------8
Proposition 98 is a constitutional amendment approved by voters in
1988 and revised in 1990, that established a minimum school funding
guarantee--calculated on an annual basis-for elementary and
secondary education and the community colleges. The guarantee is a
state level aggregate commitment of funds; the proposition does not
spell out the process or prescribe how much of the total guarantee
dollars will go to elementary and secondary education or community
colleges. All distribution decisions are made each year by the
governor and legislature. As is true in the educational governance
area, the system for financing local schools has become so complex
that it is understood only by a limited number of experts. A frequent
question is: Why has financing our elementary and secondary
schools become so complex?
Over the past 25 years, court cases, constitutional initiatives passed
by the electorate, and numerous bills have changed the method and
amount of school funds a district receives each fiscal year. This
complexity relating to school funding began with the 1968 Serrano v.
Priest court case, which was not completely settled until the
rnid-1980s. When the Serrano case began, funding for elementary
and secondary schools was a shared state-local arrangement. The
state basically assured each school district a foundation or base level
of general purpose funds for each pupil, and local districts used their
control of property taxes to raise per pupil funding to the amount
the district wanted to spend.
In the original Serrano decision, the court held that the school

finance system that existed at the time was unconstitutional because
a community with high property values could raise a lot of local
money with a low tax rate. Conversely, a community with low
property values needed a high tax rate to raise the same amount of
money. This violated the equal opportunity and equal protection
provisions of the California Constitution. The original Serrano
decision permitted a different amount of funds to be spent on pupils,
but ruled that property tax revenue based on property wealth could
not be the reason for the difference.

21. Maintain PropOsition
98 and provide addi·
tional flexibility to. the
legislature and the
governor.

..

The Commission recommends maintaining the
statewide funding guaran·
tee for K-12 education. The
Commission alsorect~m
mends that the legislature
and governor be given
greater flexibility in deter-.
mining. how to appropriate
additional funds to K-12
education In excess of.the
minimum funding guarantee. Specifically, education
spending In excess of the
guarantee would be for.
one-time purposes unle~~S ·.
the legislature and the
governor chose to Increase
the guarantee.

After 15 years of court discussions, decisions, and new laws, the final
Serrano judgment determined that the early-1980s version of school
finance was in compliance with the constitution. However, that
decision didn't simplify matters. In 1978, prior to the final Serrano
judgment, the passage of Proposition 13 modified all school finance
formulas relative to local property taxes for elementary and
secondary education. Specifically, Proposition 13 removed the power
of local communities to control the amount of property tax revenue
they wanted for their schools. A limited number of school districts
have been able to obtain voter approval of a parcel tax generating
additional revenue, but the amount of money generated is quite
small. For all practical purposes, school finance has been centralized
with the governor and legislature. As a result, the state's General
Fund is now the primary source of any new dollars for schools.
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In any fiscal year, the governor and the legislature have the authority
to augment the minimum Proposition 98 funding guarantee by
appropriating funds above the minimum for schools. When the
legislature appropriates funds for schools above the minimum
guarantee, the current Proposition 98 language requires that any
appropriation made during one year will become part of the base
level of funding for the subsequent fiscal year. This provision can
have a "chilling effect" on any consideration to provide funds above
the minimum in a given year because such an increase will result in
that new amount setting a new minimum for the following year.
Future augmentations might be considered more favorably if any
augmentation "over the minimum" Proposition 98 funding
guarantee could be a one-time practice rather than being built into
the future minimum base.
The Commission concluded that the legislature and the governor
should have greater flexibility to determine how to appropriate
funds to K-12 education in excess of the funding guarantee.
Therefore, the Commission recommends that Proposition 98 be
revised so that, unless the legislature specifies otherwise, additional
funding over the guarantee would be for one-time purposes and
would not be built into the base funding for the subsequent year's
guarantee.

Enhancing Local
Control in the
Management and
Financing of K-12
Education
28. Increase local control
and authority.
The Commission recommends increasing local
control and the authority of
local school boards.

The state's constitution provides that the legislature may "authorize
the governing boards of all school districts to initiate and carry on
any programs, activities, or to otherwise act in any manner which is
not in conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts
are established." The legislature enacted the authorization in 1976,
but subsequent statutes, federal and state court decisions, and voter
initiatives have constrained the prerogatives of local school boards
and shifted more power than necessary to the state.
The Commission acknowledges that the state is ultimately
responsible for elementary and secondary education. But the
Commission also determined that locally elected board members
should be given as much authority as possible. The Commission
recommends that school districts be given the constitutional power
to make decisions that do not conflict with state law. Providing local
school boards with direct constitutional authority gives them the
power to act unless a statute prevents them from taking a particular
action or requires them to do something else. This may decrease the
state's role and its tendency to micro-manage school districts. The
state would continue to have ultimate educational authority, and the
legislature could enact a statute to assert a state interest that
overrides local authority.
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Perhaps the most notable example of the disconnection between the
local taxes paid and the services received is the relationship between
the local taxpayer and the school district. As mentioned earlier, the
state has centralized the financing of K-12 education to the extent
that there is little opportunity to supplement the statewide funding
guarantee with local resources that communities may wish to
provide to their schools. Many people believe that lottery revenue
has solved the state's education funding problem. In reality, lottery
revenue account for about three percent of the funds for elementary
and secondary education. School districts are often forced to resort to
begging, borrowing, and badgering to increase their financial
resources. Some districts have received corporate and foundation
support, while others have gone to their local electorate for approval
of parcel taxes. These efforts have helped many districts, but they are
not long-term solutions, and they have not generated significant
amounts of money.

29. Allow supplementary
local voter-approved
taxes .for education.
The Commission recommends allowing supplementary local voterapproved taxes for K-12
education.

The Commission recommends that if local communities want to
supplement the state guarantee, they should be permitted to raise
additional local funds by either or both of the following methods:
• An increase in the property tax with approval of two-thirds of
the voters within the district. This authority would apply only
to unified districts, and there would be limitations on the
amount of the increase to comply with the Serrano decision.
• An increase of up to one-half cent on the sales tax on a
countywide basis with majority approval of the voters. These
funds would be allocated to all districts in the county on an
equal per pupil basis.
The Commission recommends that any funds raised by these
methods should be constitutionally protected from any "take-away"
or supplanting by state law. The revenue would be supplemental,
.locally derived revenue that remain in the community. This
recommendation is based on the premise that the combination of the
state General Fund expenditures and the regular property tax
allocated to schools will satisfy the state's funding interest in public
elementary and secondary education. If communities want to
provide additional funds over the amount provided by the basic
guarantee, they should have the authority to seek voter approval for
such funding. The Commission determined that local communities
will be better connected with their schools if they are able to raise
and retain some revenue for education above the level of funding
provided by the state and general property tax revenue. This action
would shift the source of the additional funding over the state
guarantee for schools from the state General Fund to local
communities.
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30. Capital outlay planning
and development
should involve all local
agencies.
The Commission recommends that school districts
participate with other
public agencies in a capital
outlay planning program.
For a proposed project that
is consistent with a
multi-agency plan, the vote
required for general
obligation bonds should be
a majority of voters.

School districts have a backlog of capital construction projects
totaling more than seven billion dollars. These projects include new
school construction and the renovation and remodeling of existing
facilities. Both are necessary to meet enrollment increases and
program requirements into the twenty-first century. The most
common methods of financing capital projects for school districts are
general obligation bonds passed statewide by the electorate and local
general obligation bonds passed by a two-thirds majority vote of the
local electorate.
At the state level, school general obligation bond issues compete
with other state capital outlay needs such as colleges and
universities, prisons, and other infrastructure projects. State bonds
currently provide less than one billion dollars per year to meet local
needs, and it is not practical to expect every school's needs to be met
by state bonds. Some communities charge a construction fee which
provides a portion of the needed capital. Other districts have been
successful in obtaining gifts of land or other capital assets. These
methods do not meet all the local capital outlay needs. School
districts often place bond requests before their local communities,
but the two-thirds vote threshold for local bonds has proven to be an
insurmountable barrier in some communities. Despite this, the need
for capital outlay persists.
The need for capital investment in education facilities does not exist
in a vacuum. As communities grow, long-term capital investment is
needed in other community facilities including waste water
treatment, water and transportation systems, and other facilities that
make up the infrastructure of a community. Under our current local
government structure, these activities are undertaken by individual
agencies each asking the voters to approve particular projects. The
Commission determined that it would improve the efficiency of all
local agencies that invest in community facilities if they plan and
develop the community's capital facility needs on a collaborative
basis and then offer the voters a clear choice for the community's
future.
Under this new collaborative model, the Commission recommends
that the vote threshold for local general obligation bonds should be
changed from the current two-thirds requirement to a majority vote.
The majority vote authorization would be conditioned on all units of
local government corning together to design a community-wide
capital outlay plan and presenting it to the local electorate. If a
school district participates with other public agencies in a capital
outlay planning program implemented using a plan developed
through the Commission's proposed "Home Rule Community
Charter" and the proposed project is consistent with the plan, the
vote requirement for general obligation bonds would be a majority
vote of the voters. If the school district does not wish to be part of a
local areawide plan, they can still seek local voter approval for
bonds, but the vote·requirement would remain at two-thirds.
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Currently, California has 70 community college districts
encompassing 106 campuses. Community college districts are
governed by locally elected boards of trustees. According to Article
IX, community colleges have the same constitutional status as state
universities; both are authorized to exist as statutory entities. The
state university system is financed by the state budget. Community
colleges are part of the state's Master Plan for Higher Education and
are funded similarly to elementary and secondary education.
Through statutory changes made after the Master Plan's review in
the mid-1980s, community college funding was changed from an
average daily attendance system, which mirrored elementary and
secondary education, to a full-time equivalent student basis that is
somewhat similar to the state universities.

31. Community colleges
should be part of
higher education.
The Commission recommends that community
colleges be removed from
the Proposition 98 funding
guarantee and be given the
same funding status as the
California State University.

For the last ten years, the funding system for community colleges
has been a combination of local property tax revenue and
appropriations from the state's General Fund, plus a student
enrollment fee. The state annually appropriates a specific amount of
General Funds for community colleges from the statewide aggregate
Proposition 98 minimum guarantee. The constitution has no required
split of Proposition 98 funds between elementary and secondary
education and the community colleges. Usually, community colleges
receive 10 to 11 percent of each year's total. The community colleges
share of local property tax revenue are estimated each year, but if the
estimate is below actual receipts, the colleges are short of revenue.
Unlike K-12 education, the state does not automatically make-up for
funds not received because of lower property tax revenue. Therefore,
community college districts seldom know their total revenue picture
during a fiscal year.
The Commission determined that community colleges and state
universities should have similar fiscal systems, and the community
colleges should be clearly identified as institutions of higher
education. The Commission recommends that Article XVI
(Proposition 98) be amended to remove the community colleges. The
Commission does not recommend any changes to the Article IX
provision authorizing both the community colleges and the state
university systems to continue as public statutory entities. The
Commission also has no recommendation concerning whether the
community colleges should become a state system or should remain
locally governed. Decisions regarding implementation and other
changes to the community colleges are left to further legislative
deliberations.
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The adoption of the Commission's recommendation by the electorate
will result in all other aspects of the community colleges remaining
the same. However, the constitutional change could open at least the
following issues and questions for discussion:
• Should community colleges continue to be governed by locally
elected boards of trustees, should the system move to a
statewide governance entity similar to the state university, or
should a combination of the two forms of governance be used?
• Should community colleges continue to be jointly funded by
local property tax revenue and the state's General Fund, or
should the system be 100 percent funded by the General Fund?
The latter choice would result in the transfer of property tax
revenue to elementary and secondary education (K-12) and/or
other units of local government. If community colleges are 100
percent state funded, how will existing per student funding
disparities be addressed, since no Serrano-type equalization is
required for community colleges?
• Should community colleges be permitted to continue to seek
approval by the local electorate for construction bonds or
should they be part of a statewide construction system that
includes the state university and the University of California?
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of State and Local Government
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IV. State-Local Relations: Straightening out the
Relationship of State and Local Government
It is widely agreed by every group that has studied California state and local governments that they
are not serving the people as effectively as they should. In evaluating the structure and responsibilities of state and local governments, the Commission identified a number of problems that impede
state and local agencies from meeting the needs of Californians.

A key problem in the state-local relationship is that there is no
overarching goal or principle guiding the relationship. The resulting
assignment of responsibilities between state and local governments,
particularly counties, is confused and follows no objective path. As a
consequence, there is no accountability for each program. In 1992,
the Legislative Analyst published a report on this subject, entitled
"Making Government Make Sense." The report concluded that
". . . California's existing 'system' of government is dysfunctional,"
and that ". . . fundamental reorganization of state and local
government responsibilities is required." 24 The California
Business-Higher Education Forum issued a 1993 report entitled,
"California Fiscal Reform: A Plan for Action," concluded that
". . . government barely works in California." 25

What is the Problem?
• There is an absence of
clearly defined responsibilities of state and local
government.
• Since 1978 the state has
played a significant role
in local government
finance.

The absence of clearly defined responsibilities for operating and
financing government services has weakened the accountability of
government officials to the public. In many instances, the state
controls the program requirements and dictates how a program
operates, but often leaves little room for local flexibility and
creativity. As a result, local communities have limited ability to
respond to local needs and to develop innovative approaches to
solving community problems.
The tension between state government's desire for statewide policy
authority and the desire for local autonomy is not new. It has existed
since the Bear Flag Rebellion in 1846 when a group of citizens in
Sonoma expressed their frustration with the Mexican government by
declaring independence. From the first days of the legislature in 1849
to the present, legislators, governors, and local officials have argued
over taxation, home rule, special legislation, and the respective roles
of each group. The first 30 years of statehood were marked with
mistrust and meddling in the affairs of local communities by the
California legislature. The Constitution of 1879 introduced the
principle of "home rule." 26 Simply stated, home rule is the authority
of a local government to act independent of state intervention in the
control of local affairs. The extent of this authority ends where the
state expresses a statewide interest. And therein lies the
dilemma-who draws the line and where is it drawn?
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There was a time when the roles of state and local government were
clearer and more understandable. The state's responsibilities were
well-defined and were supported by the income, sales, and bank and
corporation taxes. These responsibilities included a higher education
system, a share of K-12 education, a prison system, and a health and
human services system. The latter was shared with county
governments which acted as agents of the state in the delivery of
certain services. Local governments, along with the schools, had the
property tax as their primary source of revenue for financing local
services. The framers of the 1879 constitution wanted to protect local
services from what had become an intrusive state government. A
prohibition was placed in the constitution providing that the
legislature may not impose taxes for local purposes but may
authorize local governments to impose them. This provision has
remained unchanged from its original version. Its purpose was to
prohibit legislative interference with local taxation and
expenditures. 27
How did such a long tradition of a strong local government change
in such a short period of time? The trend toward state control began
in the early 1970s and increased substantially after the passage of
Proposition 13 in 1978. The landmark law placed limitations on the
amount of property tax that could be levied and gave control of its
distribution to the state. Without a clear understanding of the
situation, voters accepted the need to limit the power of state and
local government to levy taxes and handed control of the primary
source of financing local services to the state.
The property tax revolt of 1978 did not occur overnight. For most of
the 1970s the legislature, two governors, and tax reform groups had
argued over ways to reform the property tax. During the high
inflationary period of the mid- to late-1970s, rapidly increasing
property values allowed the property tax burden to grow.
Additionally, as the state became more involved in health and
human services, the county property tax was increasingly used for
nonproperty-related services. The state income tax-not adjusted for
inflation-was causing the state coffers to fill to overflowing.
Government income was growing faster than personal income. The
legislature and the governor, in no particular hurry to solve this
problem, were faced with angry voters who had their own solution.
The voters took property tax reform into their own hands. Between
1965 and 1978, 29 initiatives were filed with the Secretary of State to
reform the property tax. Over this 13 year period, four measures
qualified for the ballot and only one passed-Proposition 13.28
Proposition 13 was a classic example of why the voters placed the
initiative process in the constitution in 1911. It was a release valve for
inaction by the state. Proposition 13 limited the property tax rate to
1% of the full value of the property and capped the amount that the
property value could grow for tax purposes to 2% per year. The
practical effect was to reduce the property taxes of homeowners and
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businesses by 60%. Local governments lost a major portion of the
revenue used to support local services. They asked the state to
replace the lost revenue in order to maintain the level of local
services. The significant reduction of the local revenue base resulted
in the transfer of power from local communities to state government.

The outcome was predictable. With reduced resources for local
services and a state surplus of over $4 billion, a fiscal relief plan was
adopted that replaced about two-thirds of the property tax lost by
local governments including schools. This cushioned the effect of the
initiative. In effect, the state replaced local revenue used for local
services with state funds. Approximately $1 billion went to cities,
counties, and special districts to prevent major local government
service reductions, particularly, police and fire protection services.
An additional $1.3 billion was used to "buy out" the county share of
a variety of health and welfare programs, and $2.8 billion was used
to replace the property tax lost to the schools. 29

• The state replaced most
of the property tax lost
due to Proposition 13,
thereby. using statewide

resources to finance
local services.

By this one act, the state undertook a new obligation-a significantly
larger share of funding for local services, including schools. At the
time, this approach was viewed as the long-term solution to the
impact of Proposition 13. The effect of the involvement of the state in
financing local services was not unforeseen. In January of 1980, in a
report written by Senator Albert S. Rodda, Chairman of the Senate
Finance Committee, the state was warned of the obligation it was
assuming.
"Fortunately, the state through this action (Proposition 13
fiscal relief) replaced about two-thirds of the Proposition 13
property tax loss and, as a result, local governments,
including schools, were spared the economic and social
disruptions which normally would have accompanied such a
dramatic change in their finances. State government, however,
paid a price for coming to the aid of local government
because the state committed itself to spend a substantial
portion of its revenue for the support of local government
and the public schools and, as a consequence, diminished its
ability to finance areas of public service traditionally
recognized as the responsibility of the state. The response to
Proposition 13 resulted, therefore, in a fundamental change in
state finance." 30
The seeds of destruction were planted, and a locally-controlled
finance system independent of the state was at an end. According to
the Legislative Analyst, by 1984 the cost of the fiscal relief program
had grown to over $7 billion.31 By the time the 1990 recession hit, the
cost of local fiscal relief had topped $9 billion. Since the state had
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complete control of the distribution of the property tax, it was no
surprise that when the fiscal effects of the 1990 recession continued
into the mid-1990s, the state would want "its" money back.

• When the 1990 recession
hit California, the state
was no longer able to
continue the level of
assistance to local
government.

To solve the state's fiscal problem, the legislature and the governor
partially reversed the fiscal relief program enacted in 1979 and
transferred $3.6 billion in property tax from local governments back
to the schools, thereby saving the state the equivalent amount of
money. State financial assistance has continued to erode the ability of
local governments to make choices about how tax dollars for local
services will be spent. An example of using state resources to replace
lost property taxes came in 1994. At the time, the voters approved
Proposition 172 which provided additional resources to local
government by continuing the state's temporary half-cent sales tax
levied in 1991 to help the state through the recession. The funds
raised were targeted only for local public safety purposes.
Additionally, the state established a "maintenance of effort"
requirement, which had the effect of placing future controls on local
spending. In effect, local discretionary revenue, in the form of the
property tax, was taken by the state and a portion replaced with a
statewide tax targeted for a specific purpose.

• The property tax, once a
local tax for local purposes, is now treated as
a tax for state purposes.

The voters, by giving the state the power over the distribution of the
property tax, disconnected themselves from the act of determining
the level of service desired and payment for the services received.
Now the state determines how much local property tax a particular
local agency will receive. It can be argued that the property tax is no
longer a local tax use<l exclusively for local services.
In 1979, an amendment was added to the constitution that required
the state to reimburse local government for "costs incurred" when
carrying out a state-mandated local program. Such a program was
defined as a new program or an increased level of service required
by the state. The purpose of this requirement was to provide for
some level of discipline in the state-local relationship by requiring
the state to pay for those activities in which it had an interest. Since
that time, the number of state-mandated local programs covered by
this provision has been reduced dramatically. Rather than pay for
particular services, the state has simply repealed the mandate.
Although local officials, particularly those representing counties,
urged the Commission to strengthen the mandate reimbursement
provisions, the Commission concluded that the central issue was the
programmatic relationship between the state and local governments
and not simply the mandate provisions. If the programmatic
relationship is straightened out, the issue of which level of
government finances a program will follow.
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The most deficient aspect of the state-local relationship centers on
the relationship between the state and counties. Since 1849, counties
have been recognized as providing a dual role-they act as agents of
the state as well as providing municipal services outside of cities.
The issue does not involve those functions that are either clearly
state, such as higher education, or those that are clearly local, such as
library services. Rather, the problem involves: 1) shared services that
have both a local and a statewide element; such as mental health and
transportation; and, 2) services that are statewide in nature, but are
administered on behalf of the state by another entity, such as a
county. In administering these programs, counties are treated as
agents of the state. Examples include indigent health care and
general assistance.

The Commission found that there is no magic template that will
neatly divide state and local programs. If there was one-someone
would have found it long ago. What can and should be done is the
initiation of a "realignment" process (governed by a set of
constitutional principles) to straighten out the relationship between
the state and local governments. This process must be an open
one-involving the governor, legislature, local governments, public
and private organizations involved in providing public services, and
the people who use the services. Additionally, this process must be
continuous. As noted in the budget section, the review and update of
the state strategic plan that occurs every four years must include a
review of the state-local relationship to keep it current with state and
local needs and changing conditions.

• The most difficult
relationship is the one
between the state and
counties. The counties
play two roles: first, they
are agents of the state
for state programs;
second, they are local
agencies.

What Change is
Needed?
• The governor and the
legislature must develop
and adopt a state-local
realignment plan.
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What Does the
Commission
Recommend?
32. Develop and adopt a
state-local realignment
plan.
The governor would be
required to submit a
State-Local Realignment
Plan proposing the alignment of state and local
services. A plan must be
adopted by the legislature.
Following adoption, the
plan would be incorporated
into the state's Strategic
Plan which would be
submitted by the governor
and adopted by the
legislature. The Strategic
Plan and the state-local
relationship would be
reviewed and updated at
least every four years.

As noted above, shared services have been financed by both state
and county governments under the assumption that there was a
local component to a particular activity and that the level of local
financial responsibility was generally provided by statute.
Throughout most of the state's history, counties had sufficient
resources to participate in shared programs. Limitations on local
resources and the advent of "maintenance-of-effort" requirements
(where the state requires a particular level of local financial
contribution) for shared services has blurred the distinction between
a shared service and a locally-administered state program. This has
meant that a local agency, usually a county, must use the tax base
intended to support local services to fund programs over which the
county may have limited programmatic or operational control.
The constitution is not the place to tightly define the duties and
obligations of each level of government. Shared program
responsibilities will vary over time, and state and local governments
must have the flexibility to change them. However, the Commission
determined that rules for the relationship between state and local
governments should be spelled out. The legislature and the governor
have a basic responsibility to develop a system for providing state
services that are locally-administered. Finding the right mix of
program responsibilities and financing for shared programs is
essential to straightening out the state-local relationship.
The realignment plan should provide for the assignment of program
responsibilities at the state and local levels. To assist in developing
the plan, the governor should establish an advisory committee
comprised of local representatives. Local officials working on the
development of community charters should also be involved in
developing the realignment plan. The objectives of the State-Local
Realignment Plan are as follows:
• Ensure that the roles and responsibilities for providing services
and exercising regulatory authority are clear.
• Ensure that the entity responsible for a service or regulation has
the resources to finance it.
• Ensure that the entity assigned to conduct an activity has the
ability to organize and administer the activity.
• Ensure that program responsibilities that are shared between
state and local agencies are identified and that local
administrative flexibility is given priority over state
administration.
The State-Local Realignment Plan should provide assignment of
responsibilities for program policy authority, administration, and
finance. Each program category (e.g., health, welfare, criminal justice,
judiciary, transportation, and environmental regulation) should be
defined as having one of the following categories of responsibility:

Page 66 -Changing the State-Local Relationship: Knowing Who Is in Charge

--------------------------------~
• State Responsibility: This includes programs where the role of
the state is policymaking, standards-setting, administrative, and
financial. Examples of current programs include higher
education, vehicle registration, and environmental regulation.
• Shared Responsibility: This includes programs where state ;md
local agencies share policymaking, administration, and
financing. Also included are programs for which the state sets
standards, (such as maintenance-of-effort requirements) for a
specific level of local financial involvement. Examples of current
programs include mental health and transportation.
• State Responsibility-Locally Administered: This includes
programs where a local agency-usually a county-is acting as
an agent of the state or on behalf of the state. Current programs
include-but are not limited to-indigent health care, general
assistance, and the judicial system.
• Local Responsibility: This includes programs where a local
agency has the responsibility, authority, and financial control for
a program. Current programs include law enforcement,
libraries, recreation and cultural activities, and other traditional
municipal services such as utilities.
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V. Strengthening Local Government:
Clarifying Roles, Enhancing Collaboration
and Strengthening Home Rule
Within California, a fragmented and confusing array of local agencies provide a myriad of services.
There are few incentives for collaboration. Recognizing that resources for local services remain
limited, California needs to review and revise its local governments to make them more efficient and
effective while reconnecting them with the people they serve.

In evaluating local government roles, the Commission identified
two key problems. First, the organization and provision of local
government services is far too complex. On the local level, there are
a multitude of governmental agencies providing services and
regulatory activities. As is the case with state-local responsibilities,
the confusing array of local government entities makes it difficult for
citizens to understand which agency is responsible for providing a
particular service and whom they should hold accountable.
Additionally, with so many local entities involved in providing
government services, redundancies often exist. A service may be
provided on an areawide basis by one agency, while a similar service
is also provided locally within each community. For example, in
many areas of the state, both municipal water agencies and
independent water districts exist side-by-side servicing the same
urban area with an arbitrary boundary separating them. Other
examples of overlap include fire, library, and park and recreation
services. Such overlap often is inefficient and results in greater costs
to taxpayers.

What is the Problem?
• Local government has
become far too complex.
There are 7,000 units
overseen by over 15,000
elected officials.

California has 7,000 local government agencies, including counties,
cities, special districts, and school districts. California voters elect
about 15,000 people to oversee these governmental agencies. Many
of these entities have overlapping-if not conflicting-duties and
responsibilities. The fabric that makes up the quilt of California's
local government and education system includes:
• 470 cities that are general purpose governments providing
municipal services.
• 58 counties providing municipal services to unincorporated
areas, countywide services, and selected areawide services
primarily as agents of the state.
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• 5,000 special districts. These entities provide specific services
within a county or across several counties. There are about 55
types of activities performed by special districts ranging from
operating airports to managing zoos. Approximately 2,200 are
"independent" districts. That is, they have elected or appointed
boards and are independent of the cities or counties in which
they provide services.
• 1,062 school districts and county offices of education.
• 70 community college districts.
The Commission concluded that the current structure of local
government is confusing and fragmented. The problem is more than
one of numbers. Within most counties, whether urban or rurat
observers will find a multitude of agencies with separate boards
operating programs and providing services. It is hard to accept that
services provided through this structure are cost-effective. Although
many opportunities exist for collaboration among local governments,
long-established parochial interests or institutional rigidity prevent
such activity. Additionally, it is often difficult for citizens to gather or
make sense of information about the cost of local services. It is
difficult, if not impossible to find understandable fiscal information
about the cost of services from local agencies with responsibilities
that overlap. Clarity in the local budgeting and taxation process
could improve accountability and better connect citizens and their
local governments. These problems exist within the context of an
increasing state population and the limited availability of resources
to meet people's needs. State and local governments must develop
more efficient and effective ways of meeting public needs using
existing resources.
• The power to make
decisions about local
problems has been
eroded over the last
20 years.

The second problem identified by the Commission is that the power
of local governments and schools to make choices about the level
and quality of local services has eroded over the last 20 years.
California has lost its long tradition of home rule. The home rule
tradition involves the ability of a community to adopt a home rule
charter. There are two aspects to this authority. The first is the power
to exercise all authority with respect to local matters, without being
granted such authority by state law. Thus local entities with home
rule authority start out with broad powers over local matters, which
are then subject to self-imposed limits as provided in their charters.
The second element of home rule authority concerns the resolution
of conflicts between state and local laws. Charter cities, which have
home rule authority, may enact laws that are inconsistent with state
law with respect to "municipal affairs." In other words, subject to
any restrictions local citizens placed in their charter, these entities
and their citizens have plenary authority over matters of local
concern.
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Currently, there is no clear dividing line for activities that constitute
a "municipal affair" or activities that are of statewide concern. The
courts have been the arbiters of disputes between the exercise of
local and state power. However, they have no standard or
constitutional principle to help resolve such disputes but have been
left to drift in a sea of "ad hoc intuition informed by pragmatic
common sense." 32

Clearly, there is a need to reevaluate our local governments. The
Commission examined several models for local government
organization. One model provided that the municipal services
function of counties be eliminated and that counties act only as
agents of the state. Under this plan, all local services would be
delivered by cities. A second model called for the elimination of
counties as agents of the state and required the state to determine
how locally-administered state programs would be handled. The
Commission concluded that the diversity of California's regions
makes it impossible for any uniform approach to local governance to
be responsive to the needs of every area. The solutions that work in
a rural, sparsely populated area may not be effective in an urban,
more densely populated area. Local areas are best suited to
determine the most efficient and effective way to serve local needs.
Consequently, the Commission believes that the best solution is a
flexible approach that allows communities to adapt government
structures to their own needs and desired level of public services.

What Change is
Needed?
• Local comunities should
review their governmental structures and
develop local government service plans.
• Local communities
should be given more
control over locally
levied taxes including
the property tax.

In conjunction with realigning the state-local relationship and
providing local entities with more responsibilities, the entities within
each county or multi-county area should reevaluate their
organization and functions to ensure that local services are being
provided in an effective and efficient manner. In conducting this
evaluation, consideration should be given to which services are
areawide in nature and which are more local (community-based).
Wherever possible, duplication of responsibilities among local
entities, including cities, counties, special districts, and schools,
should be eliminated. To the extent that responsibilities are to be
shared, each entity's responsibilities should be clearly known. This
will also provide an opportunity to increase collaboration between
governmental and non-governmental organizations involved in
providing public services. Finally, once the citizens of a community
evaluate, reconnect, and reorganize their governments, their ability
to control local affairs should be strengthened.
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What Does the
Commission
Recommend?
33. Evaluate local government structures and
develop a community
charter.
The local government
agencies within each
county (or multi-county
area) would be required to
initiate a process to
examine their current
governance structure,
methods of service delivery, and assignment of
responsibilities and
powers. From this examination, each area would
develop a local Government Services Plan.
Following the development
of the local Government
Services Plan, each local
area would develop a
"Home Rule Community
Charter" to implement the
local Government Services Plan. The charter
would be placed before the
voters in each area for
approval.

As mentioned previously, over the past two decades, local control
over service delivery and financing has eroded. The weakening of
the local revenue base has transferred program regulatory and fiscal
responsibilities from local communities to the state. This is
particularly true for counties. A key goal of the Commission is to
move authority for program administration and service delivery
back to the local level. The Commission believes that local
governments are best suited to respond to local needs and to
organize service delivery in an efficient manner. In conjunction with
being given more responsibility, local governments must reevaluate
the ways in which they provide such services and ensure clarity as
to which local entity is accountable for providing a service.
Although improving service delivery and clarifying accountability
are important objectives, constitutional barriers and the lack of
tangible incentives have discouraged, if not prevented, local
governments from initiating reform efforts. The state constitution
imposes a number of barriers to reform, including: 1) local
governments have no control over the allocation of property taxes
raised in their communities-the constitution requires the state to
allocate these revenue; and, 2) the constitution makes it difficult for
local entities to work collaboratively by prohibiting the pooling of
resources to address problems that overlap jurisdictions.
Clearly, a constitutionally mandated reform effort is needed, and the
barriers to reform must be removed. Meaningful incentives must be
provided to encourage the adoption of bold and innovative
approaches to addressing community problems and improving
government efficiency, accountability, and service delivery. Change
must be initiated and evaluated at all levels of government, and
proposals for local change must be submitted to local voters. As
noted earlier, since the diversity of California's regions makes it
difficult for a uniform approach to local governance to be responsive
to each area's needs, the flexible approach proposed by the
Commission allows local governments to adapt their structure to the
needs of their communities.
The Commission notes that this recommendation does not require
local areas to change their current governance structure. The
recommendation does require citizens within each county to
undertake the evaluation. If it is determined, upon completion of the
evaluation, that existing government structures and entities are
meeting current needs, a Community Charter could be established
that leaves those structures unchanged. The steps involved in this
recommendation are as follows:
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Each county (or multi-county area) would establish an appointed
body known as the Citizens Charter Commission on Local
Government Efficiency and Restructuring (CCC). The procedures for
establishing the CCC would be slightly different for single-county
and multi-county CCCs. Appointments would be made by elected
officials from the county(ies), cities, school districts, and special
districts. Further, each "type" of local government would be
represented on the CCC, and each CCC would be required to reflect
the diversity present within the community. The standard statutory
selection process would be used for the appointments. The work of
each CCC for preparing the Government Services Plan and the
proposed Community Charter would be financed equally by the
state and local entities. Each Charter Commission would allocate a
proportionate share of the local financial obligation among the local
entities.

Establishing the Citizens
Charter Commission

Single-County Commission: A single-county CCC would be
comprised of at least 15 members, consisting of both
non-government participants (majority) and government officials.
Once formed, each CCC could appoint any number of additional
members, but the majority of members would have to remain
non-government officials. For single-county commissions,
appointment to the 15-member CCC would be apportioned as
follows:

NonGovernment
Officials

Appointing
Authority
County Board of
Supervisors
City Councils
School Boards
Special District Boards

Government
Officials

Total

1
1

2
3
1
1

5
6
2
2

8

7

15

3
3

Multi-County Commission: With the passage of concurring
resolutions by each county, a multi-county CCC may be formed to
develop an areawide Government Services Plan and a Community
Charter to be voted on by the people. For multi-county commissions,
apportionment will be twice the numbers indicated in the above
chart.
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• Allocating local service and regulatory re~m<Jmntl
plan must designate
local agency is ""'"'"'"''"'"'
the delivery of services, the governing structure responsible for
the services, and the financing of the services. The plan must
also designate which entities are responsible for comprehensive
planning, as well as functional planning, and the exercise of
land use controls. The entities assigned the function of
regulating land use will be responsible for simplifying and
streamlining the existing land use regulatory process.

As part of the allocation of service responsibilities, a process for
developing, adopting, and updating a comprehensive multi-year
capital outlay plan will be included. The Local Government
Services Plan would identify all of the agencies responsible for
capital facility planning, financing, and operation. The objective
of this requirement is to improve the coordination and efficiency
of capital facility programming in order to meet the needs of
growing communities. General obligation bonds used to finance
any project that is consistent with the plan will require a
majority vote of the voters.
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particular note
in
construct the state's local
Since 1896, the constitution has included the power of rr.,-nn"''
to adopt charters which provide
the rules governing local
activities. As discussed in the recommendations regarding the
rule power, the Commission concluded that there was a need to
strengthen this provision as well as to recognize the special status of
the 89 charter cities. The Commission determined that a home rule
community charter could not interfere with or abrogate the authority
of a charter city.
Additionally, a state technical advisory group should be established
by statute to provide technical assistance and to monitor the progress
of the local charter commissions. This activity would also be useful
in providing a link between the local charter commissions and the
state-local realignment process. The technical advisory group would
go out of existence following action by the local electorate.
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34. Protect locally levied
taxes and provide for a
majority vote on local
taxes and bond
measures.
The constitution should
protect the property tax
and other local taxes from
state reallocation. Additionally, increases in local
taxes, except the property
tax, should be subject to a
majority vote of the
governing board and the
voters. A higher popular
vote requirement may be
included in the home rule
community charter.

One of the objectives of the Commission is to enhance local control
and ensure that local taxes are maintained and protected for
providing local services. Additionally, the Commission examined the
current method of levying the local sales tax and found that it had
an adverse effect on development patterns. Often described as the
"fiscalization of land use," local zoning decisions are made based on
the amount of sales tax that will be generated, rather than
consistency with overall growth and development polices of the
community. In order to accomplish these objectives-protect local
taxes for local purposes and reduce the fiscal pressure on land use
decisions-the Commission makes the recommendations described
below:

Allocation of the property tax

The non-school share of the property tax would be allocated by the
charter. The state would be prohibited from redistributing this
portion of the tax. The distribution of the local government share of
the property tax would no longer be determined by state law, it
would be determined by the local Community Charter.

Allocation of the local
sales tax

The general purpose locally levied 1% sales tax could be allocated by
the Community Charter. The area covered by the sales tax would be
determined in the charter. For example, a countywide charter may
have sub-county components with the sales tax allocated to local
governments within their respective areas. The objective of this
recommendation is to reduce the fiscal influence of land use
decisions. Currently there is extensive competition among cities for
the location of retail outlets. Since the sales tax is levied on
transactions that are not sensitive to the political boundaries of a city,
it would make sense to allow the distribution of the sales tax to be
based on a larger area covering more economic activity.

Allocation of the vehicle
license in-lieu fee

At one time automobiles were subject to property tax. When the state
repealed the tax it was repealing a local revenue. An "in-lieu" fee
was established in the place of the property tax. About $3 billion
goes to local government on a per capita basis. The allocation of
these resources could also be part of the home rule charter process.
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Proposition 13 attempted to distinguish between special taxes-those
taxes levied on specific activities and other taxes. After 18 years of
initiative measures and endless court battles, the distinctions
between "special" and other kinds of taxes remains muddled. The
Commission concluded that voters should play an active role in
issues dealing with local taxation. In order to simplify the process,
the Commission chose to require that local taxes-either special or
general-be subject to a majority vote of the governing body
proposing the tax and the voters unless the home rule charter
contained a higher threshold. This provision will allow the charter
development process to determine not only the organization of
services but also the vote requirements in excess of a majority vote.
The Commission concluded that approval of local taxes by a
majority the voters should be the rule unless the Community Charter
provides for a higher vote requirement. The restrictions on the
property tax contained in Proposition 13 would remain.

Local tax authority and the
vote requirement

Those specific local taxes could be included in the charter and the
voters could adopt them as part of the adoption of the Community
Charter. Some local taxes could be countywide, while others could
be sub-county or community-based. The voters will have the
opportunity to connect the governmental agency providing the
service with the taxes levied to provide those services.

The need for local control was reflected in the provisions of the 1879
constitution which granted certain home rule authority to cities and
to a limited extent to counties. Under Article XI and subsequent
amendments, cities were authorized to enact local regulations that
did not conflict with the general laws of the state and to engage in
utility activities to provide services to their people. The legislature
was prohibited from levying a state tax for a local purpose. Charter
cities were granted protection from legislative interference in
municipal affairs.
The Commission's goal in strengthening home rule authority is to
eliminate the confusion over matters in which charter cities and state
interests might conflict. By strengthening home rule and more clearly
defining its parameters, such conflicts should be minimized.
Moreover, by extending home rule authority to agencies
participating in a Home Rule Community Charter, the Commission
is offering a meaningful incentive.

35. Strengthening the
home rule provision.
The Commission recommends that California's
longstanding tradition of
home rule be strengthened
and provide a constitutional standard for balancing of state vs. local
interest.
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The Commission proposes an approach in which charter entities will
prevail over a state law unless one of the following conditions exists:
• The local action has significant extraterritorial effects. The
action of the local agency would affect the health, operation, or
behavior of people, businesses, or governments outside the
boundaries of the area covered by the charter or the action's
primary purpose is to regulate activities outside the charter's
boundary.
• The need for statewide uniformity overwhelms local
differences. In this case the policy interest in statewide
uniformity outweighs a predisposition toward local control. For
example the lack of uniformity might present substantial
obstacles to travel, to the ordinary conduct of business in the
state, or to the advancement of an important state policy that
requires such uniformity. General laws relating to the state's
health environmental, transportation social service and judicial
systems that are matters of statewide concern and are not the
purview of a local charter except to the extent that the state
gave the charter the authority to act.
One of the Commission's objectives is to provide additional
incentives for local agencies to participate in the Community Charter.
The ability to adopt local programs without state interference is one
of those incentives. The purpose of the charter is to provide for a
new governance document for defining the organization and powers
of local agencies. The Commission's recommendation strengthens
local government authority over issues that have been viewed as
"municipal affairs," and provides a constitutional standard for
balancing the interests of the state and local communities.
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VI. Opposing Views
A Difference of Principle: The Minority Report of the
California Constitution Revision Commission
Executive Summary
The undersigned authors of this report register their opposition to the recommendations of the
California Constitution Revision Commission.
We oppose the report on many specific grounds: it opens, for example, wide breaches in Proposition
13; it compromises the voters recent choices on term limits; it does nothing significant to restore the
autonomy in local matters of local institutions; it provides hardly any increases in accountability of
the government to the people, but more accountability of lower governments to higher; it increases
control of elected officials over initiatives; it rejects a major proposal to defend the individual from
invasion of his rights by government.
We think, moreover, that the specific failures in the proposal are not accidental. They stem from
principles that are already breaking down the constitutional limits on government. This report, if
adopted, will hasten that process.
After 24 months of patient and diligent work, the California
Constitution Revision Commission has produced a document. It
is a faithful effort by people of good will. The nature of its product
speaks volumes about the age in which we live and the barriers to
sound constitutional thinking within it.

Framers, Then
and Now

The art of making written constitutions was born and taken to its
highest state of perfection here in this country. The framers of the
first written constitutions-those of the United States of America and
each of its constituent states built their work upon a consensus that
does not exist today.
The consensus among the Framers concerned the principles, the first
things, of government. They agreed that government has but one
legitimate purpose: to secure the rights of its citizens. They agreed
that those rights are derived from the principles of human nature
and that human nature (being a nature) does not change over time
or from place to place. They agreed that the need for government is
written in the failings and the unique capacities natural to man.
Government is necessary because it enables us to secure our rights
from deprivation by one another. "One another" includes all of our
fellow citizens, not least the special case of those both elected and
un-elected who staff the government. "It is of great importance in a
republic," wrote Madison, "not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against
the injustice of the other part." 1
1

Federalist 51.

Opposing Views- Page 85

------------------------------~
The Framers were agreed on the character of these fundamental
rights. In the Declaration of Independence they are listed as "life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"; in the contemporaneous
Virginia Bill of Rights, as "the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the
means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety." 2 The Bill of Rights in the United
States Constitution provides a more detailed list of rights, each
fitting within the basic declarations of right that gave rise to the
Revolution and stated its aims. That list includes the right to
property, in roughly the form in which it occurs in the Virginia and
Massachusetts bills of rights.
We modern "framers" who sit upon the CCRC are not agreed about
the first principles of government. One of our witnesses, called to
help defeat a proposal that touched most directly upon them, stated
that the Declaration of Independence was written so as to demote
the idea of property rights from the understanding of it in John
Locke. This was part of an argument he was building that the
purpose of government is to "adjust clashing interests" in society. It
is a gross error to say either that the authors of the Declaration were
attempting merely to state the opinions of John Locke, or that they
meant to demote the right to property below that of any other right,
including freedom of speech, of worship, or of the press. To the
Founders, as we shall argue below, the right to property is as
fundamental as any right.
The witness told us less than nothing about the opinions of those
who wrote the most successful constitution. He told us volumes
about opinion today, of which the recommendations made by this
Commission are for the most part a fine reflection. In the
contemporary understanding, government is conceived as a vast
engineering scheme. It is managed by a professional class of social
engineers. Their job is to guide society according to a uniform and
comprehensive plan, made upon a national scale, conformed and
applied down to each locality, revised and reapplied continuously, in
an ongoing and evolutionary process. That is why when we use the
expression "accountability" in our recommendations, we mean
generally government professionals at one level, reporting to their
counterparts at another.
The Commission was charged to make rational the hopelessly
tangled relations between state and local government. We have
adopted measures that give local government wider scope, but only
at the expense of private citizens through new tax powers and
legislative authority. No co-opted authority, no pilfered revenue
stream, is returned from state government to local. On the contrary,
2
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state government is given new responsibility to rank and rate the
performance of local government according to comprehensive
criteria. Our recommendations continue and accelerate the
movement to make local government-which remained well into this
century the primary and largest agency of government in
America-into subservient local administrative units.
The specific recommendations of the Commission do not all fit into
this theme. Several, concentrated especially in the executive branch,
are salutary and we support them. But the thrust and meaning of the
Commission recommendations is plainly as we have stated it above.
We proceed then to an examination of the recommendations.

We begin with the section of the Commission recommendations in
which there are substantial items to praise.

Executive Branch

The proposal to reduce the number of statewide elective offices
follows the thinking of the Federalist that unity in the executive is the
best means to secure both energy and accountability. By making
these offices appointive and under the direct supervision of the
executive, policy-making becomes more streamlined and consistent,
and the people know better whom to blame.
The recommendation to combine the Franchise Tax Board and the
Board of Equalization into a single agency is also good, but carried
off badly in an important detail. Two taxing agencies waste money,
duplicate one another, and dissipate accountability. The new agency
would be run by a director, appointed by the governor, which is fine.
But the tax appeals board would also be appointed by this same
process, which makes it vulnerable to political pressure to get money
for the state. Woe to the taxpayer who goes before this board when
the governor and the legislature are scrambling to make up a deficit.
Many of us also think that the consolidation of executive agencies
goes too far when it includes the Treasurer, who has fiduciary
responsibilities that might conflict with the political interest of a
governor.

We do little good and much mischief with the recommendations
concerning the legislative branch. In particular:

Legislative Functions

• The Commission proposes to have initiatives that amend the
Constitution confined to the November general election ballot,
but initiatives generated in the legislature are exempted. We see
no reason for the exemption of the legislature from this
restriction, except to give their proposals-and not those of
private citizens-whatever political advantage is available on
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the primary ballot. Anyway, the restriction of initiatives
proposed by private citizens to the November ballot will only
make that ballot longer than it is now. This will make it yet
more difficult for voters to analyze the many proposals before
them.
• The Commission proposes that any statutory initiative may be
amended or repealed by the legislature after six years, provided
the legislature passes the amendment by a two-thirds vote. It
may amend or repeal younger statutory initiatives with the
agreement of the people. Citizens who take the trouble to
propose initiatives will not likely look forward to having their
proposals altered by the legislature. This gives them a new
motive to propose constitutional, rather than statutory,
amendments. The likely result of this Commission proposal is
therefore to complicate a document we are trying to simplify. In
a similar vein, the Commission proposes that the legislature, via
a special committee, be empowered to amend initiatives that
have qualified for the ballot before they are voted upon by
people. Some of us have grave reservations about allowing the
legislature this avenue to enter the initiative process.
• We agree warmly with the proposal to restrict the legislature to
a session of six months per year. 3 The old joke that the liberties
of the people are not safe when the legislature is in session has
an element of truth in it. Excessive time is a temptation to
exceed the purview of the legislative office. Shorter sessions
would provide an inducement to focus upon essentials. Four
thousand bills a year is too many to write with any care, too
many to read with any comprehension, too many to argue with
any penetration-too many, in short, to be good.
• Some of us argue with the proposal that the legislature should
veto regulations produced in the executive branch. They argue
upon constitutional grounds. The Supreme Court has found that
such oversight at the federal level constitutes a diminishment of
and interference with the executive power. By blurring the
distinction between execution and making of the law it
concentrates power in the legislature. On the other hand, some
of us argue that the proposal is good, given the fact that the
administrative agencies sprawl across and penetrate deeply into
every part of society. No executive can alone monitor their
activities. Some elected official, who after all owes his office to

3
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the regular approval of the people (who after all are still regarded
in some quarters as sovereign) should watch what these agencies
do. Let the legislature help. We should say here all together that
above this disagreement is a deeper agreement that the
administrative state must be curtailed. See our section below on the
proposal regarding property rights.
• The Commission proposes a series of reforms to the budget
process. Several of these are admirable, including measures to
increase the state reserve and to make firmer the existing
requirement that the budget be balanced-a constraint honored
as often in the breach as the observance. At the same time, these
recommendations are at least partially offset by the movement
to a two-year budget cycle. The Commission was informed of
research showing larger spending for states with two-year
cycles. This is no accident. Balancing a budget requires
forecasting both revenue and expenditures, and both are tricky.
Government habitually predicts more sunshine than appears,
more revenue and less expenditure than is actually received and
incurred. This permits more spending. In a two-year cycle,
reality takes longer to impose its constraints.
• The Commission proposal to include legislators in the public
employees retirement system creates a conflict of interest. Public
officers can judge better, when they are not judges in their own
cause. Public employees are generally higher-paid and receive
better benefits including pensions than private workers. Under
this proposal, legislators will now vote upon their own pensions
at the same time they vote upon those of this large and highly
paid class.
• Term Limits. We close this section with one of the Commission's
two most spectacular offenses against the public will. The
Commission proposes to double the terms of members of the
Assembly and increase those of senators by 50%. This equalizes
the terms in the two houses, and it eliminates thereby the
difference of perspective aimed for in devising longer terms for
the higher body. It alters a recent proposition approved by the
voters (Proposition 140), the effect of which has not yet been
fully realized. It constitutes, whether intended or not, a rank
appeal to members of the legislature to vote for the whole
constitutional revision package, because it gives them a thing
for which they dare not ask directly, a thing that must be the
heart's desire of many or most of them, a thing that comes
conveniently concealed in a larger package of changes to the
constitution. One need not agree with the often repeated
arguments in favor of term limits to see the brazen quality of
this recommendation.
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Education

When we reach education and local government, we reach places
where administrative power is concentrated, where vast sums of
public money are invested, where interests both private and public
abound. We reach, in short, the essence of modern government. The
Commission report is in these areas complex, like the phenomenon it
would alter. Here the jargon of government in the administrative age
is rampant. Here most egregiously we say one thing and mean
another. Consider first education, the domain of the strongest forces
in California government and politics.
The Commission has set out to make education less centralized, but
it cannot prosecute this mission with an undivided soul. Many
members of the Commission believe that "the state has a
fundamental interest in education." Notice the language. The state,
not the people, has an "interest." This "interest" is apparently not an
"authority," such as might be delegated from the people. Would the
state have that interest apart from some interest of the people, or in
opposition to their interests?
The members making this point do not seem to have meant the
"state" in the sense of "the people acting together." For they held
that the "state" that has this "interest" must be able to protect that
interest against any local body that might have authority in
education. Under the theory of government to which we in this
minority adhere, public bodies do not have "interests." They have
authority, and that only to the extent delegated from the people. If
one public body has a conflict of authority with another, they must
settle it according to the documents by which the people have
delegated authority to each of them. As our Commission is charged
to revise the most important document making these delegations of
authority (which the people would have then to approve by a
constitutional procedure), we were unable to see how any
"fundamental interest" of the "state" could rightly stand in our way.
After a little discussion of the meaning of these terms, members of
the Commission preferred to go on to other work. We adopted a
plan that itself reveals the deeper principles upon which we were
operating.
Two points are central, each having to do with who would gain and
who would lose power. First, we give broader authority to local
school boards to make rules. At the same time we qualify this
expanded authority in decisive ways. First, we take no money from
the state authority and give it to local authority. Similarly we rescind
no state rule or power, nor contemplate that any shall be rescinded
later. Instead, we place a requirement upon the state that it adopt
wider performance standards against which to measure local
districts.
This complex of recommendations has several implications. To start
with, it means that local school boards can have more power only by

Page 90- Opposing Views

--------------------------------A
making more rules, new rules beyond those that the state has made,
most likely in areas where the state has not legislated. Perhaps the
whole problem has been not enough rules. If so, our
recommendations will help solve it, and our children will soon be
learning at a gallop. If more rules is not the answer, then we may not
get that wonderful performance for which we hope.
The state itself will also be making more rules. One section of the
education recommendations is headed "Accountability in
Education." Recall that "accountability" is an important word to this
Commission. In this section local school boards are given power to
make rules that do not conflict with existing state law. At the same
time, the state is required to adopt an "accountability system . . .
limited to education content, pupil performance, and financial and
managerial responsibilities."
Limited to? The state will set standards in the strictly confined area
of what the children study, how their performance is measured, and
all the money dealings of the school. If the state should choose to
make use of this new power-if it should behave as it has
systematically behaved for more than a generation-the way is open.
The ratings will come out, and some school districts will fall short.
Journalists will bemoan the fact that nothing can be done by the state
to bring those districts into line. Few will remember that the children
in question are raised by fathers and mothers, and taught by
teachers, who are much nearer the children than the officials of the
state. These parents and teachers may even care for the children
more than remote officials who do not know their names. If schools
fail to meet these new standards, whatever their quality or
applicability to the local district, they will be labeled across the state
as "bad" districts. Pressure will grow to make them conform to the
mold.
As a solace to local boards, and as a complement to their new
rulemaking authority, they are given a handsome present: new tax
powers. Here is the first of several major breaches to Proposition 13
that the Commission recommends. The Commission would cripple
Proposition 13 by altering two of its basic principles: the 1% property
tax rate limit could be broken for schools with a two-thirds vote of
the people; and the provision requiring a two-thirds vote for special
taxes would fall to a majority vote on sales taxes for school financing
within a county.
We have many objections to these proposals. Whatever is wrong
with education, restrictions on government taxing authority cannot
be at fault. Our Commission makes its recommendations after a
generation of unprecedented government growth, a growth that now
reviles all but the most partisan enthusiasts for public
administration. This growth affects every level of government down
to the local, which in California, under Proposition 13, has kept pace
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in spending with state and federal government since the passage of
Proposition 13 in 1978.
The expansion of power to raise ad valorem taxes will be a massive
source of new revenue. The lifting of restrictions against speciaL taxes
will give rise to new assaults upon the taxpayer in the name of any
and every popular cause. If crime rates soar, taxes for law
enforcement will flourish. If highways clog, if drugs are rampant, if
garbage piles up to the rooftops-every urgent public need will
provide the occasion for another special tax.
If more taxes were the answer for our children, we would already be
raising up a generation of Solomons, and these recommendations
would be redundant. If we wish to liberate local districts and local
people to manage education, we will have to place the means in
their hands and let them use those means. We will not be able to
perpetuate central bureaucracies, with interests of their own, with
power to oversee and to have the final say.

Local Government

The recommendations concerning local government are parallel to
those in education. Once again we set up a presumption that the
local agency may make a law where none has been made before.
Once again we return no centralized authority to local hands. Once
again we allow the state to keep the revenue at its command.4 Once
again we allow expanded scope for local authority only in areas now
controlled by private citizens.
We do, in certain ways, allow for some form of real devolution later
on, but this is a weak reed. The Commission recommendations
require the governor to propose a state/local realignment plan and
to submit it to the legislature. In other words, we propose that the
political powers of some future day deliberate whether to upset the
arrangements of that day, which will have been solidly planted by
past practice, and which will be defended by the legions who have
an interest in them. We command the politicians of the future to fix
the problems we have not the stomach to tackle-and we then take
credit for what we expect them to do.
The detailed and complicated provisions regarding "Community
Charter Commissions" have many features to which we object. First,
the Commission places its faith in the mere process of planning. If
only local governments would plan ahead better, we could make
4
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progress. We therefore compel every local government to form a
Commission to deliberate whether to make a new charter, and to
make one if they think it a good idea. To make sure they proceed,
plenty of people are on board who would likely want a new charter:
the Commission in each locality is to include members who are
public officials, offset by a slight majority who are picked by public
officials. This, the Commission pretends, will ensure that private
citizens will dominate the charter commissions. Some commissioners
even argued in open session that there were too few government
officials on the proposed revision commissions!
Once formed and working, these commissions will have power to
eliminate the two-thirds majority requirement for a tax increase.
Here, as in education, new taxing powers complement new power to
make law where no law has been made. This is the second major
breach of Proposition 13. For any community that makes a charter,
this is a breach wide enough to accommodate an entire fleet of city
vehicles.
The Commission also proposes that the current two-thirds vote for
passage of local general obligation bonds be lowered to a simple
majority. This provision has been in the state constitution since 1879.
Over that time, which included two world wars, a depression, and
the incredible growth of the post-World War II period, this great
state has flourished under the law requiring a two-thirds vote for
local general obligation bonds. Also, about half of the bonds for
schools have passed under the two-thirds requirement.
Despite the fact that they often vote for the bonds, the people of
California support the two-thirds majority requirement for local
bonds. When an attempt to lower the two-thirds majority for school
bonds was on the ballot as Proposition 170 in 1993, it was defeated
by nearly 70% of the voters. An attempt to lower the two-thirds vote
requirement for bonds to a three-fifths vote in 1966 for schools and
libraries was also defeated. They understand that bonds must be
repaid, repaid with taxes, taxes that must continue for the years or
decades for which the bonds are issued.
One of the hallmarks of successful government in America has been
the primacy and preponderance of local institutions. This success
was built upon local discretion in all matters administrative, and
upon local responsibility for funding local matters. No state
mandates encouraged local spending and taxing. Restraint a.J!d
economy, built upon voluntary labor and local responsibility, were
the rule. This gave rise to a wonderfully various and adaptable
system. It was a marvel. We have lost it. Our Commission does
nothing to restore it, except to rationalize the top-down system, to
urge more consolidation locally, to give local government more
power to be the tax collector for the state. More of the same.
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Property Rights

The unpopularity of government in America dates back about 30
years, to the time of its transformation. As it has grown in relation to
the rest of society, as it has become more centralized and less
responsive to the public will, people have come to resent it. Today,
government and most of its activities are held in slight regard. At the
same time, each of its major programs has its constituents who are
deeply attached and will fight to preserve their own foothold in
power. As a group, the people would restrain and even contract the
power of government; at the same time each particular policy has its
constituency. Divided by this paradox, the people are unable to act.
Meanwhile government grows, and no force can stand in its way.
If the people are to retain control of this formidable engine, it must
be made to operate within limits that are agreed and observed as a
matter of law. The Commission considered one major proposal that
would have set such a limit. It was a proposal to rewrite Article 1,
section 19 of the Constitution. That article defends property rights.
We proposed to alter the provision to prohibit a modern method of
taking property without compensation, a method characteristic of the
new bureaucratic state.

The right to property is ranked in several of the Founding
documents alongside the right to life and to liberty. It is seen in the
Founding as a bulwark of those other rights. If one is entitled to
what he earns, he is then able to build by his labor the material
conditions of his independence. The Founders believed and argued
that nature was so arranged as to enable everyone with diligence to
earn a living. Those unable by physical impediment or misfortune
would be aided by local charity and public support, which would
distinguish carefully among cases of need to prevent subsidy of
idleness or immorality. Otherwise, each would provide for himself,
entitled to labor, entitled to keep what he earns. Thomas Jefferson
and Abraham Lincoln condemned slavery upon this ground, and
they supported limited and frugal government upon the same
ground.
Jefferson, who was cited by a witness against our proposal as only a
weak defender of property rights, wrote:
"To take from one, because it is thought his own industry and
that of his fathers has acquired too much, in order to spare to
others, who, or whose fathers have not, exercised equal industry
and skill, is to violate arbitrarily the first principle of
association, the guarantee to everyone the free exercise of his
industry and the fruits acquired by it." 5

5
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Madison, too, was said by our witness to have only a qualified
commitment to the right of property. If this is true, how are we to
interpret his statement that "The diversity in the faculties of men,
from which the rights of property originate, is not less an
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection of
these faculties is the first object of government." 6
Property to the Founders is, as we said, the bulwark of the other
rights, and in its broad application a synonym for them. Madison
wrote:
This term in its particular application means that dominion
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of
the world, in exclusion of every other individual.

In its larger and juster meaning, it embraces everything to
which a man may attach a value and have a right; and which
leaves to everyone else the like advantage. . .
In the former sense, a man's land, or merchandise, or money is

called his property.
In the latter sense, a man has a property in his opinions and the

free communication of them.
He has a property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of
his person.
He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions,
and in the profession and practice dictated by them.
He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free
choice of the objects on which to employ them.
In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he

may be equally said to have a property in his rights. Where an
excess of power prevails, property of no sort is duly respected.
No man is safe in his opinions, his person, his faculties, or his
possessions.
Government is instituted to protect property of every sort; as
well that which lies in the various rights of individuals, as that
which the term particularly expresses. This being the end of
government, that alone is a just government, which impartially
secures to every man, whatever is his own. 7

6
7

The Federalist, 10.
"Property," March 29, 1792, in Philip B. Kurland and Ralph Lerner, The Founders' Constitution
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 1:598.
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Today we often hear the claim that the Founders built a nation
devoted to pursuit of wealth as its highest aim. In truth, they
understood the right to property as necessary to all liberty; they saw
that any government powerful enough to violate that right, would
violate the others, too. They understood feudalism, in which control
of property is centralized, in which the right to build or to alter, to
sell or divide property remains with the crown even when the deed
has changed hands. They understood that this system demotes all
but the privileged to a dependent station. Forgetting that danger, we
implement a kind of feudalism in our own day.
What else would one call the experience of Mr. Erlich? He built and
ran a fitness center in one of our California cities. He found over
many years that it was difficult to make money in that business at
that place. He asked the city if he might build condominiums (in the
court case that followed, these are called "luxury" condominiums, to
emphasize that Mr. Erlich was proposing something questionable).
The city asked Mr. Erlich to mitigate the harm the city would incur
by the loss of these "recreational facilities." The city was after all in
acute need of such facilities, being "land locked " (its western border
is about eight miles from the sea). The theory here seems to be that
Mr. Erlich, in accepting his original permit to build his fitness center,
took on an obligation to provide "recreational facilities" to the
people of this city, whether they were prepared to purchase them or
not. Erlich was asked to pay $280,000.
The facts in this particular case and many others like it have been
established in court, this one before the California Supreme Court in
March of this very year. These cases were before the Commission
when it considered the proposal regarding property rights. The
chairman himself found these facts regarding Mr. Erlich
"outrageous." He and others wondered how often such things
happened. Members seemed to feel that the rights of citizens should
be protected only when they are frequently abused. Otherwise, place
no shackles on government, which values its prerogatives highly.
In the face of these outrageous and established facts from court
cases, the Commission voted down the proposal, eight to eight.
Members were not yet "comfortable" with the proposal. They
needed more time, as it was all very complicated. Some suggested
that although we should not make any specific recommendation, we
should recommend that the legislature look into the issue and come
up with one. A meager little sop.
Here, then, is a clear matter. The government is invading people's
rights. Courts are saying so, consistently. The California Supreme
Court has itself said so in the past ninety days. These court cases are
very clear, almost as clear as the plain common sense that calls these
takings "outrageous." But the court alone cannot stop them. Only
the few with the money and the dedication to sue for many years,
with little or no hope of return of their money, in litigation with
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people who are spending tax dollars on their side, can win in that
manner. To stop this practice only one thing will do: a law that is
outside the reach of the political forces of the day.
Our country, during its birth, invented a way to make such a law
and write it down for everyone to read. It is called a written
constitution. In voting down the protection of property rights, our
Commission exhibits its ignorance or repudiation of the thing it was
organized to revise and improve.

We can name other significant omissions in this report that would
have served to limit the government and protect the rights of
citizens, including their right to control the government. The
Commission considered for example "contracting out," a mild form
of privatization in which the government contracts with private
firms, upon a competitive basis, for work that is currently done by
the monopoly of state employees. This idea has broad support,
including the solid support of the governor who appointed ten
members to the Commission. Contracting out will save money and
strengthen the private sector, and it will reduce government payrolls.
When some members insisted that we should adopt language that
was not a mere sham, seeming to support but actually forbidding
contracting out, the idea was exiled to a sub-committee that never
met.

Contracting Out
and Redistricting

The Commission considered redistricting, the drawing of district
lines for elections. The decennial re-districtings in this state have
become increasingly scandalous exercises in incumbent protection
and partisan aggrandizement. The opposition of one powerful
member of the legislature was apparently sufficient to deter the
Commission from considering even the most modest reforms. Either
an independent commission to draw district lines, or some criteria
that limits partisan abuse, are necessary to make sure districts are
drawn to represent the people and not the incumbents. The
Commission report is silent on this issue.

Our opposition to this report is based, then, on grounds both specific
and general. We do not like the overturning of term limits that the
people have lately adopted. We do not like the invasion of
Proposition 13, which has stood as a bastion of tax resistance in our
state and nation for almost twenty years. We do not like many other
specific items noted above.

Conclusion

In recognizing the good will and ability of those who differ from us,
and in thanking the chairman for his work if not for his product, we
must still make the general point. Free government is rare, and
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rarely successful. Where it abides over time, it operates in
recognition of the principles informing our own precious
Constitution of the United States. Every nation must vindicate those
principles for itself. Our own nation must vindicate them for itself, in
each generation. That is the urgent work that faces California and
America today.
This report of this Commission obstructs more than advances that
highest work. We here register our firm opposition.
Larry P. Arnn
Edward J. Erler
Alan Heslop
Steven Frates
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Senator William Leonard
Joel Fox
Richard Rider
George Babikian
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An Opposing View on Recommendations by the
California Constitution Revision Commission
by Joel Fox, Member
California Constitution Revision Commission
Taxpayer protections will be sacrificed if certain recommendations of the California Constitution
Revision Commission are adopted. As proposed, the recommendations: make it easier to raise taxes;
set up confusing Charter Communities which entice local governments to join by offering easier
routes to tax increases but offer little incentive for the taxpayers; and take away the people's ability to
vote for important officers who oversee tax revenue. Further, the important initiative process is
weakened under the CCRC plan.

The Commission would cripple Proposition 13 by altering two of its
basic principles. The 1% property tax rate limit could be broken for
schools with a two-thirds vote of the people; and Proposition 13's
provision requiring a two-thirds vote for special taxes would fall to a
majority vote on sales taxes for school financing within a county. In
addition, a majority vote for special taxes for other services will
likely be the result of the CCRC' s Charter Communities proposal.

Changes to
Proposition 13

Altering the 1% ad valorem property tax rate is not only designed as
a new revenue source for schools, but as a way to raise great
amounts of tax dollars. Schools currently have the power to increase
property tax revenue with a two-thirds vote of the people for a
parcel tax. The parcel tax is a flat charge levied against properties.
The ad valorum property tax is based on the percentage of the
property's value and can bring in a large amount of revenue at
deceptively low percentage rate increases.
Aside from its potential to drain the property taxpayer, there are
further dangers in cracking the 1% property tax rate for education.
Other public agencies will seek a property tax override if one is
granted for schools.
If public safety is the first responsibility of local government, police
and fire officials will ask why they cannot have the same property
tax override, (or majority vote sales tax), that schools are granted.
Once the limit is pierced, additional public agencies will make
similar demands and soon the tax limitations of Proposition 13 will
become meaningless.
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Two-thirds Vote

The two-thirds vote to raise special taxes is under attack in the
CCRC recommendations. The proposal seeks to allow a majority
vote for sales taxes for schools within a county. Further, the
recommendations allow for Charter Communities to seek a majority
vote for all taxes if the Charter Commission, made up of elected
officials and those appointed by elected officials, so choose.Majority
vote selection by the Charter Commissions is a foregone conclusion.
These majority votes could apply to all types of taxes, including
property taxes in the form of parcel taxes.
In certain circumstances, the two-thirds vote is a necessary protection
for taxpayers.
The argument against the two-thirds vote is that this is a democracy,
therefore majority rules. With the two-thirds vote, one-third of the
voters plus one can block the will of the majority. Thus, it is argued,
with a two-thirds vote we have a tyranny of the minority.
However, the concept of the two-thirds vote has always been part of
our democratic republic, it appears ten times in the United States
Constitution. The purpose is to give certainty to important decisions.
There is no more important power of government than the power to
levy taxes. Chief Justice John Marshall reminded us that the power
to tax is the power to destroy. We live in a country that sets up
extraordinary safeguards to protect us in life, liberty, and property.
The two-thirds vote is a protection against a tyranny of a majority to
take property . . . that is taxes . . . from the people.
The two-thirds vote is a safeguard against historian Alexander
Tytler' s oft-quoted plaintive lament: "A democracy cannot exist as a
permanent form of government. It can only exist until a majority of
voters discover that they can vote themselves largess out of the
public treasury."
On the practical side, the two-thirds vote discourages earmarked
taxes, called special taxes. Earmarked taxes take away discretionary
decision making from elected officials. If a majority vote is granted
for all tax increases, every tax increase on the ballot will be
earmarked taxes for popular services. These taxes will be dedicated
and elected officials will not be able to direct this tax money for
other uses. In an emergency, they cannot shift earmarked revenue
away from its intended purpose. If too much earmarked revenue is
coming in for a particular service, officials cannot reduce the revenue
without first going to the ballot. To prevent ballot box budgeting that
will tie government into knots, maintaining the two-thirds vote for
special taxes is necessary.
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The Commission also is recommending the two-thirds vote for local
general obligation bonds be lowered to majority. This provision has
been in the state constitution since 1879. Over that time, which
included two world wars, a depression, and the incredible growth of
the post-World War II period, this great state has flourished under
the law requiring a two-thirds vote for local general obligation
bonds.

Majority Votes
For Bonds

The people of California support the two-thirds vote for local bonds.
When an attempt to lower the two-thirds vote for school bonds was
on the ballot as Proposition 170 in 1993, it was defeated by nearly
70% of the voters. An attempt to lower the two-thirds vote
requirement for bonds to a three-fifths vote in 1966 for schools and
libraries was also defeated.
Taxes which repay bonds are paid over a long period of time. While
other taxes can be altered or eliminated from year to year, once a
bond contract is in place, the tax to repay the bond is an obligation
for two to three decades. Local general obligation bonds are backed
by the collateral of an individual's home or property. If someone
cannot pay the tax, the home or property can be forfeited. This
extraordinary tax demands an extraordinary vote for approval.

The goal of eliminating some of the 7,000 local government entities
as proposed by the CCRC is an admirable one. However, the method
chosen is a muddled concept of Charter Communities that offer
some vague notion of reform and efficiency while promising, with
near certainty, that taxes will increase.

Community Charters

The question that goes unanswered is this: Why do we need to offer
governments easier access to tax dollars if the ultimate goal of the
reform is more efficiency which means the need for less tax revenue?
The Charter Community process would begin with the establishment
of a Citizens' Charter Commission made up of at least seven elected
officials and eight appointees of elected officials. There is danger
here. Bias toward more government and turf wars over government
powers can be the only result.
One task given the Charter Commission is to establish the vote
requirement for tax increases within the Charter Community with a
majority vote being the floor. I see no elevator to raise that
requirement above the floor, meaning, if approved, tax increases will
be more easily achieved than under current requirements.
Furthermore, charter cities, where half the population of California
resides, will be exempt from vote requirements for general tax
increases.
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Where is the incentive for taxpayers to accept such a plan?
While the stated purpose of the Charter Community reform is to
eliminate some of the current number of governments and taxing
authorities, there is a suspicion that we will end up with new levels
of government in the form of sub-counties and the like.
Charter Communities will be allowed to pass general obligation
bonds by a majority vote. For the reasons discussed above, I oppose
this plan.

Election of Revenue
Officials

The CCRC recommends that the State Treasurer become an
appointed position; and that the Board of Equalization be abolished,
with the Board's functions merged with the functions of the
Franchise Tax Board in a new combined Department of Revenue.
While the merging of the functions of two agencies into one is a
good plan, the new agency's top officials must be elected. The
Treasurer should remain an elected position, also.
The people want direct control over officials who manage their tax
dollars. By keeping these positions elective, these officers will be
more responsive to the people, rather than to the person who
appoints them.

The Initiative Process

The initiative process grants the people equal law-making power to
the legislature. The constitution declares that, "All political power is
inherent in the people." Proposed changes by the CCRC will make
the legislative power more equal than the people's power in making
law.
A proposal to allow initiative constitutional amendments to appear
only on the November ballot allows an exemption for the legislature
to put legislative constitutional amendments on primary and special
election ballots with a two-thirds vote. There is no reason for this
special dispensation. All constitutional amendments should be
treated equally and given access to any ballot. By putting all
initiative constitutional amendments on the same ballot, a long ballot
may likely result. Long ballots often discourage voters, and they may
not give certain initiatives the attention they deserve.
The recommendations propose that any statutory initiative may be
amended by the legislature after six years. Those who believe the
legislature should not have this power, will most likely turn to
qualifying a constitutional amendment which cannot be amended
directly by the legislature. The end result will mean more
amendments to the constitution, burdening a document the CCRC
hoped to condense.
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When the federal constitution was written in Philadelphia over two
centuries ago, the new constitution did not meet the approval of the
people until a Bill of Rights was added guaranteeing the citizens
protection from government.

Taxpayer Bill of Rights

The first consideration of any constitutional change must be an
enumerated Bill of Rights for taxpayers-beginning with the right of
the people to vote on local tax increases-no matter what aliases
these tax increases go under.
The right to vote on taxes is the only protection taxpayers have from
being drained by the combined force of all the taxing authorities in
this state.
There must be a vote on all local tax increases. All tax increase
elections should appear on general election ballots to avoid the
practice of holding special elections at off-times when only
supporters of a tax increase are mobilized and motivated to vote.
If the people want to reduce or eliminate a tax in the future, they
should have that right through an amendment to the constitution
which recognizes the people's power of initiative to change any long
standing tax. Referendum power should also be added for measures
that would not be covered by automatic votes, such as certain fees or
assessments; or new types of revenue raising devices which courts
may rule fall outside the automatic vote requirement.

The initiative and referendum powers must be reasonably attainable.
That means the number of petition signatures required for a measure
to qualify for the ballot should be five percent of the number of
people who voted in the last election, the same as the state
requirement for initiatives. The current standard for local initiatives
is signatures from ten percent of registered voters, an unrealistic
total.
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Appendix 1
Biographies of Commission Members

William Hauck, Chairman, is President of the California Business
Roundtable. He has also served as Executive Vice President, and
member of the Board of Directors for Information for Public Affairs,
Inc. since 1975. Hauck has also served as a Deputy Chief of Staff to
Governor Wilson, in various capacities in the State Assembly, as the
Chief of Staff to former Speaker of the Assembly Bob Moretti, and as
director of the Assembly Office of Research.

Governor Wilson
Appointees

Donald C. Benninghoven, Vice-Chairman, of Sacramento, has been
employed by the League of California Cities for the past 37 years
and has served as the League's executive director since 1972.
Patricia E. Castillo, was the mayor of Sunnyvale from 1991 to 1993
and has served on the City Council since 1985. From 1992 to 1993,
Castillo served as the president of the League of California Cities,
and also served as the League's vice president from 1991 to 1992.
Joel Fox, of Granada Hills, has been the President of the Howard
Jarvis Taxpayers Association, a 200,000 member taxpayer association
in California since 1986. As President, Fox serves as the association's
chief of policy and spokesman reporting to the Board of Directors
(served from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 1996).
Russell S. Gould, of Sacramento, recently joined Metropolitan West
Securities as director of Financial Advisory Services. He served as
the director of the California Department of Finance from 1993 to
March, 1996.
Alan Heslop, Ph.D., of Claremont, has been a professor at
Claremont McKenna College since 1967, where he is also the director
of the Rose Institute, a Claremont McKenna College research center.
He has also taught political science at the University of Texas and
TexasA&M.
Gary H. Hunt is Executive Vice President, Corporate Affairs and
Administration of the Irvine Company. He is currently responsible
for entitlement, regional infrastructure planning, and strategic
governmental and communications efforts to enable the company to
develop the nation's largest master planned urban environment in
Orange County, California (served from March 25, 1996 to June 30,
1996).
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Senator Bill Leonard, of Upland, was first elected to the California
state senate in 1988 and was re-elected in 1992. Prior to his election
to the senate he served five terms as a state assemblyman,
representing California's Inland Empire.
Jane G. Pisano, Ph.D., of Los Angeles, is Vice President for External
Relations at the University of Southern California. In addition, she is
Dean of the School of Public Administration, a position she has held
since 1991.
Leon L. Williams, of San Diego, has spent three decades in public
service, first as a member of the San Diego City Council and then as
a Supervisor on the San Diego County Board of Supervisors. He has
been active in transit development for many years and currently
serves as the chairman of the Board of Directors for the Metropolitan
Transit Development Board.

Senate Rules
Committee Appointees

Anne Bakar, of San Francisco, currently serves as president and chief
executive officer of Telecare Corporation where she is responsible for
the leadership, management and development of a $70 million
behavioral health care corporation.
Andrew R. Baron, served as the California political and legislative
director of the American Federation of State, County and Municipal
Employees (AFSCME).
Lewis Coleman is Senior Managing Director and co-head of
Investment Banking at Montgomery Securities.
Betty Tom Chu was the Founding Chairman of the Board of
Directors and Chief Executive Officer for the Trust Savings Bank
from 1975 to 1995. Chu has also served as the Principal Deputy
County Counsel for Los Angeles County Counsel's Office, Schools
Division.
Senator Lucy Killea, of San Diego, was first elected to the state
senate in 1989 as a Democrat after serving three and one-half
consecutive terms in the state assembly. Killea also served on the San
Diego City Council from 1978 to 1982.

Assembly Speaker
Appointees

Dr. Larry Arnn has served as President of The Claremont Institute
since 1985, and he currently serves as the co-chairman of the
California Civil Rights Initiative campaign (Served from January 31,
1996 to June 30, 1996).
George Babikian, of Palos Verdes Estates, is president of Los
Angeles 2000 Partnership. He retired from ARCO in June 1993, after
serving for eight years as President of ARCO Products Company, the
corporation's refining and marketing division.
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Dr. Edward Erler is a Professor of Political Science at California State
the California Advisory
Bernardino and a
on
has also
director of
Endowment for the
Bicentennial Constitution in 1983 to 1984
from
31,
30, 1996).
1996 to
Dr. Steven Frates served as the Executive
of the San Diego
County Taxpayers Association from 1990 to 1994. Currently, he is the
Second Vice President of Girl Scouts of San Diego and Imperial
Counties. He has held teaching positions at several universities
including the University of Southern California, San Diego State
University, and California State University, Fullerton (Served from
January 31, 1996 to June 30, 1996).
Richard Rider is a retired stockbroker and financial planner, who
has been active in several taxpayer-advocacy organizations. These
include the National Taxpayers Union, San Diego Taxpayers
Association and Paul Gann's Citizens Committee (served from
January 31, 1996 to June 30, 1996).

Craig L. Brown, Director, Department of Finance, of Citrus Heights,
served as the Director of the California Youth Authority from June
1995 until March 1996. He also served on the California Task force to
Review Juvenile Crime and Juvenile Justice Response. Previously, he
was the undersecretary of the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
from 1987 to 1995 (served from March 4, 1996 to June 30, 1996).

Ex-Officio Members
of the Commission

Elizabeth G. Hill, Legislative Analyst, was appointed state
Legislative Analyst by the Joint Legislative Budget Committee in
1986. As Legislative Analyst, she oversees the preparation of annual
fiscal and policy analyses of the state of California's budget and its
various programs.
Judge Ronald B. Robie (for Supreme Court Chief Justice, Malcolm
M. Lucas), of Sacramento, was presiding judge of the consolidated
Superior and Municipal Courts for 1994 and 1995. He has also
served as a member of the Appellate Department, Superior Court.
Robie also served as the Director of California's Department of Water
Resources from 1975 to 1983. Robie received his J.D. from McGeorge
School of Law (Served from March 25, 1996 to June 30, 1996).
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Former Members
of the Commission

Elizabeth Cabraser, of Santa Rosa, is an attorney and Partner with
Lieff, Cabraser and Heinmann law offices in San Francisco. Cabraser
holds a J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, Boalt Hall
(served from April 11, 1994 January 31, 1996).
Kamala Harris, of Oakland, is a deputy district attorney for Alameda
County. Harris holds a J.D. from Hastings College of Law (served
from April 11, 1994- January 31, 1996).
Assemblyman Phil Isenberg formerly served as a city
.councilmember and later as mayor of the Sacramento. He was first
elected to the Assembly in 1982 (served from April 11, 1994 -January
31, 1996).
Dr. Chui Tsang is the Dean of Vocational Education for the John
O'Connell Campus at San Francisco City College. Tsang received his
Ph.D. from Stanford University (served from April11, 1994- January
31, 1996).
Judge Roger Warren (for Supreme Court Chief Justice, Malcolm M.
Lucas), formerly a Sacramento Superior Court Judge. Warren left the
Courts in March of 1996 to become the President of the National
Center for State Courts, based in Williamsburg, Virginia (served from
Aprilll, 1994- February 22, 1996).
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APPENDIX 2
Chapter 1243 of the Statutes of 1993
Senate Bill 16
Senator Lucy Killea
An act to add and repeal Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 8275)
of Chapter 3.5 of Division 1 of Title 2 of the Government Code.

SECTION 1. The Legislature finds and declares the following:
(a) California's budget process has become crippled by a complex
entanglement of constraints that interfere with an orderly and
comprehensive consideration of all fiscal matters. A complete review of
the process by an independent citizens' commission would provide the
Legislature a basis for considering changes that would result in a more
thoughtful and deliberative process.
(b) The legislative process has at times become mired in gridlock.
Rivalries between the two houses of the Legislature and the executive
branch have deterred the state's ability to make significant policy changes
in response to the changing times. Changes to existing government
organizational structures may provide a more responsive and productive
form of governance for California than the current system.
(c) California's existing "system" of government is dysfunctional and
does not work together sufficiently to achieve the public's goals. The
various components have no common conception of mission and often
work at cross-purposes.
SEC. 2. Article 1.5 (commencing with Section 8275) is added to
Chapter 3.5 of Division 1 of Title 2 of the Government Code, to read:
Article 1.5.

California Constitution Revision Commission

8275. There is created in state government the California Constitution
Revision Commission.
8275.1. (a) The commission shall consist of 23 members, as follows:
(1) Ten members appointed by the Governor. No more than six
members may be registered with the same political party.
(2) Five members appointed by the Speaker of the Assembly. No more
than three members may be registered with the same political party. Two
members shall be appointed in consultation with the Assembly Minority
Caucus.
(3) Five members appointed by the Senate Committee on Rules. No
more than three members may be registered with the same political party.
Two members shall be appointed in consultation with the Senate Minority
Caucus.
(4) The Chief Justice of California, or his or her designee.
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(5) The Legislative Analyst, or his or her designee.
(6) The Director Finance, or his or her designee.
The Governor,
Committee on Rules, and the Speaker of
Assembly may each appoint no more
one
the ~~"'""''-'
to the commission. No lobbyist, as defined in Section 82039, may serve
as a member of the commission. The membership of
commission shall
broadly reflect the ethnic, racial, cultural, geographic, and gender diversity
of the state.
(b) The initial appointments to the commission shall be made not later
than 90 days after this article becomes operative.
8275.2. Each member of the commission shall serve without
compensation, but each member other than an elected officer shall receive
one hundred dollars ($100) for each day
on official business of the
commission. In addition, each member shall also be entitled to receive
necessary expenses actually incurred in the performance of his or her
duties.
8275.3. (a) The Governor shall select one of the members as the chair
of the commission.
(b) The commission may appoint an executive secretary and fix his
or her compensation in accordance with law. The commission may employ
and fix the compensation, in accordance with law, of any professional,
clerical, and other assistants that may be necessary.
(c) The Legislative Counsel, Legislative Analyst, State Auditor, and
the Department of Finance shall assist the commission in the performance
of its duties.
8275.4. The commission shall assist the Governor and the Legislature
by doing the following:
(a) Examining the process by which a budget is formulated and enacted
by state government, the manner in which the budget serves the future
needs of the state, the appropriate balance of resources and spending
by the state, and the fiscal relations of the state, federal, and local
governments, and any constraints and impediments that interfere with
an orderly and comprehensive consideration of all fiscal matters that
impact upon the development of a budget for the state.
(b) Examining the structure of state governance and proposed
modifications that may increase accountability and improve the process
of formulation, consideration, and approval of policy determinations and
a budget for the state.
(c) Examining the current configuration of state and local government
duties, responsibilities, and priorities; the fiscal relations of state and local
governments; the types of services delivered; mechanisms of service
delivery; desired program outcomes; and methods of performance
measurement; and any constraints or impediments that interfere with
the most effective allocation of state and local responsibilities.
(d) Examining the feasibility of integrating community resources into
service delivery mechanisms in order to reduce duplication and increase
efficiency, and the feasibility of community coalitions making
recommendations to local entities regarding a community's vision and
goals.
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8275.5. The commission shall submit a report to the Governor and
the Legislature no later than August 1, 1995, that sets forth its findings
with respect to the mandate in Section 8275.4. The commission should
submit interim reports before that date whenever it makes a finding and
recommendation on a specific topic.
8275.6. In carrying out its duties and responsibilities, the commission
shall have the following powers:
(a) To meet at times and places as it may deem proper. The commission
is a state body subject to the provisions of the Bagley-Keene Open Meeting
Act (Article 9 (commencing with Section 11120) of Chapter 1 of Part 1
of Division 3).
(b) To issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the
production of books, records, papers, accounts, reports, and documents.
(c) To administer oaths.
(d) To contract, as it deems necessary, for the rendition of services,
facilities, studies, and reports to the commission as will best assist it to
carry out its duties and responsibilities.
(e) To cooperate with and to secure the cooperation of county, city,
city and county, and other local law enforcement agencies in investigating
any matter within the scope of its duties and responsibilities, and to direct
the sheriff of any county or any marshal to serve subpoenas, orders, and
other process.
(f) To secure directly from every department, agency, or instrumentality
full cooperation, access to its records, and access to any information,
suggestions, estimates, data, and statistics that it may have available.
(g) To do any and all things necessary or convenient to enable it fully
and adequately to perform its duties and to exercise the powers expressly
granted to it.
8275.7. This article shall become inoperative on July 1, 1996, and, as
of January 1, 1997, is repealed, unless a later enacted statute, which
becomes effective on or before January 1, 1997, deletes or extends the
dates on which it becomes inoperative and is repealed.
SEC. 3. The sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000) is hereby
appropriated from the General Fund for the 1993-94 fiscal year to the
California Constitution Revision Commission established by this act to
carry out its duties and responsibilities under this act.
SEC. 4. This act is an urgency statute necessary for the immediate
preservation of the public peace, health, or safety within the meaning
of Article IV of the Constitution and shall go into immediate effect. The
facts constituting the necessity are:
In order for the California Constitution Revision Commission, created
by this act, to carry out its functions and duties as soon as possible, it
is necessary that this act take effect immediately.
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Appendix 3
Commission Votes on the Recommendations *
I. Improving Accountability in State Government

Yes

No

Abstain

18

0

0

11
15
14
16
14
9

5
1
1
2
2
5

2
2
3
0
2
4

12
17
9
11

6
0
6
7

0
1
2
0

15
13
11

1
3
6

2
2
0

16
11

2
3
5
2

0
4
3
0

0

0
3
0
0
1
2

Executive Branch
The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor should run on the same ticket
Reduce the number of elective statewide offices
- Governor appoints Treasurer
- Governor appoints Superintendent of Public Instruction
- Governor appoints Insurance Commissioner
Abolish the BOE, merge tax admin. functions and appoint appeals board
Shorten the term sof the University of California Board of Regents
Change the Responsibilities and Terms of the State Personnel Board

Legislative Branch
Lengthen the terms of Legislators
Shorten legislative sessions
Give legislature the power to veto administrative regulations
Provide limited retirement benefits

Initiative Process
Place initiative constitutional amendments on the November Ballot
Allow amendment of statutory initiatives after six years
Provide a role for the legislature in the initiative process

II. Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process
Adopting a longer vision
Require strategic planning and performance measures in the budgetary process
Outcome-based performance measures
Authorize the adoption of a two-year budget
Provide a budget rebalancing mechanism

10

14

Increasingfiscal discipline
Require state's budget to be balanced
Require a three percent general fund reserve
Prohibit external borrowing across fiscal periods
Require a majority vote to enact the budget and budget-related legislation
Allow multiple subject implementation legislation
Tie budget passage to salaries

18
13
18
15
10
16

2

0
3
7
0

* Commission actions were taken at meetings held on February 5, 6, and 25, 1996.
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III. Changing K-12 Education

Yes

No

Abstain

14
14

0
0

0
4

15
16
17

1
0
0

2
2
1

12
16

2
1

0
0

10

6

0

9

8

1

10
10
10
17
9

7
6
6
1
8

1
0
0
0
0

11

7

0

Accountability In Education
Provide local boards with greater authority
Establish a K-12 accountability system

Constitutional/Statutory Nature

of Education Governance

Change constitutional nature of the Superintendent of Public Instruction
Change constitutional nature of the state Board of Education
Delete constitutional references to county
Superintendents of schools and school boards

Financing Education
Maintain the current guarantee with excess funding to be one time unless legislature
puts it into the base
Allow property tax increase for unified districts with a two-thirds vote of the voters
Allow an increase of up to one-half cent on the sales tax with a majority vote for
school districts

IV. State and Local Relations
State-Local Realignment Process
Require a state-local realignment process

V. Strengthening Local Government
The Structure o[ Local Government
The Home Rule Community Charter
Establish Citizens Charter Commission
Contents of the Charter
Straightening out the state/local relationship
Fiscal Disclosure requirements

Local Tax Authorit!f. and Vote Req_uirement
Require that local taxes (except property) be approved by a majority vote of the
governing board and the electorate unless a higher vote requirement is provided
for by the Community Charter
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Constitutional Language Implementing the
Commission's Recommendations
- Guide By Subject NOTE: The effective dates included on this table assumed placement and approval by the
voters at the November 1996 ballot. For placement on future ballots, the effective dates
would change to conform to the date of the election and the desired effective date.

I

Improving Accountability in State Government
Article#

Page#

Effective
Date

145
145
145

1/1/97
1/1/98
1/4/99

141
145

1/1/97
1/4/99

145
153

1/4/99

147

1/1/97

145

1/1/97

138
138
139
141
144
139

1/1/97
1/1/2002
1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/97

Executive Branch

•
•
•

Governor maintains powers when absent from the state
V Sec 10
Governor and Lt. Governor run on the same ticket
V Sec 9.5
Governor may appoint Lt. Governor to executive branch
V Sec 10.5
position
• Governor has a 60 day veto period at end of legislative session
IV Sec 10
V Sec 12 & 14(f)
• Reduce the number of elective statewide offices
- Governor Appoints Treasurer
- Governor Appoints Superintendent of Public Instruction
- Governor Appoints Insurance Commissioner
V Sec 14(f)
• Abolish the Board of Equalization, provide for an
appointed tax appeals body, and consolidate tax
XIII Sees. 3(j), 11,
administration duties
17, 18, 18.5, 19,
28(h)
University
of
California
Board
of
Regents
terms
IX Sec 9
•
and membership
VIISec2&3
• State Personnel Board terms and functions

Legislative Branch

•
•

•
•

•
•

Six month legislative sessions
Term limits
Allow legislation to be heard sooner than 31 days
House of origin bill deadline
Oversight of the regulatory process
Retirement

IV Sec 3
IV Sec 2.1
IV Sec 8
IV Sec 10
IV Sec 29
IV Sec 4.5
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•

Place constitutional amendments on the November ballot

•

Amending statutory initiatives
Legislative review and enactment of statutory and
constitutional initiatives
Referendum provisions (conforming to the budget revisions)

•
•

Articte #

Page#

Effective
Date

II Sec 8
XVIII Sec 1
II Sec 10
II Sec 8.5

137
161
137
137

1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/2002
1/1/97

II Sec 9

137

1/1/97

II Improving the State Budget and Fiscal Process
NOTE: The revisions to the budget process are phased in over two periods. Section 12 of Article IV includes all
of the changes that begin 1/1/97. The 2 year budget and rebalancing process begins in 2001. Section 21.1
of Article IV includes all of the budget provisions that will be in effect after 2001.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•

Balanced budget requirement
Phase in Three Percent Prudent Reserve
Multiple subject budget implementation bill
Majority vote on budget bills
Two-year budget process
Budget rebalancing bill
Limitations on state borrowing
Governor and legislature forfeit salary I per diem
if budget not passed on the deadline
Strategic planning/ four-year capital outlay plan
Outcome-based performance measures
Changes to the spending limit to conform to the
two-year budget

IV Sec 12(f)
IV Sec 12(g)
IV Sec 9
IV Sec 12(d)
IV Sec 12.1
IV Sec 8 & 9
XVI Sec 1.2
IV Sec 12(h)

141
142
140
142
142
139
158
142

1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/2001
1/1/2001
1/1/97
1/1/97

V Sec 3
IV Sec 12
XIII B

144
141
155

1/1/2001
1/1/99
1/1/2001

IX Sec 13.5
IX Sec 14

149
149

1/1/97
1/1/97

145
146
146
146

1/1/99

148
149

1/1/97
1/1/97

III Changing K-12 Education
Accountability in Education
• Provide for local school boards and grant greater authority

•

Establish an accountability system and standards for Public
schools

Constitutional/Statutory Nature of Education
Governance
• Change constitutional nature of the Superintendent of Public
V Sec 12
Instruction
IX Sec 2
• Change constitutional nature of the State Board of Education IX Sec 2.1, 7 & 8
IX Sec 3, 3.1, 3.2,
• Delete constitutional references to county
superintendents of schools and school boards
3.3
IX Sec 12
• Organization of Community Colleges
IX Sec 13
• Organization of the State University
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1/1/97
1/1/99

Effective
Date

Article#

Page#

XVI Sec 8 & 8.5
XIIIA Sec 1
XIIIA Sec 4

159
154
155

XIASec4
XVI Sec 18

152
161

1/1/97
1/1/97
1/1/97 bond
vote
requirements
HRCC
adoption

V Sec 3, 5

144

1/1/97

XIASec 1
XIA Sec 2

151
152

1/1/97
CCAdoption

XIA Sec 3

152

- Authority to allocate local revenue

IXA Sec 5
XIIIA Sec 4
IXA Sec 4
XVI Sec 18
XIA Sec 2(£)

152
155
152
161
152

CC Adoption
CCAdoption
CCAdoption

- Charter cities
- Counties
- Home Rule Community Charters

XI Sec 5
XI Sec 7
XIA Sec 6

150
150
152

Financing Education

•

Revisions to Proposition 98
- Property Tax
- Sales Tax

IV State-Local Relations

•

Straightening out the state/local relationship

V Strengthening Local Government

..
•
•

•

Citizen Charter Commission
Governmental Service Plan and Home Rule Community
Charter
Sub-county charters
New Authority for HRCC
- Vote requirements for local taxes
Vote requirements for GO bonds

CCAdoption
CC Adoption
Home Rule
Authority
1/1/97
1/1/97
CCAdoption
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Constitutional Language Implementing the
Commission's Recommendations
-Guide By ArticleArticle
Article II
Voting, Initiative and Referendum, and Recall

Page#

137

• Place initiative constitutional amendments on November ballot (Sec. 8)
• Legislative review and amendment of qualified statutory and constitutional initiatives
(Sec. 8.5)
• Amendment of statutory initiatives (Sec. 10)

Article III
State of California

138

• Conforming change to eliminate Insurance Commissioner, Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Treasurer, and members of the Board of Equalization from the list of state
officers (Sec. 8)

Article IV
Legislative
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

138

Legislative term limits (Sec. 2.1)
Shorten legislative sessions (Sec. 3)
Allow legislators to participate in state retirement system (Sec. 4.5)
Shorten in-print requirement for legislation in house of origin (Sec. 8)
Forfeiture of pay by Governor and Legislature for failure to reach a budget agreement
(Sec. 12 (h))
Multiple subject budget implementation bill (Sec. 9)
Phased in three percent reserve (Sec. 12 (g))
Balanced budget requirement (Sec. 12(f))
Majority vote on budget (Sec 4( d)
Two-year budget (Sec 12.1)
Budget rebalancing process (Sec. 21.1)
Legislative oversight of the regulatory process (Sec. 29)
Performance budget measures (Sec 12 (a)

Article V
Executive
• Strategic planning (Sec. 3)
• State-local government realignment plan (Sec. 3.5)
• Governor and Lieutenant Governor shall run on a single ticket in primary election
(Sec. 9.5)
• Governor retains power when absent from the state (Sec. 10)
• Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Insurance Commissioner shall be
appointed by the Governor (Sec. 12)
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144

Article
Article VII
Public Officers and Employees

Page#

145

• Conforming change eliminating Insurance Commissioner, Superintendent of Public
Instruction, Treasurer, and members of the Board of Equalization as elective statewide
offices Sec. 11)
• Reduction of Personnel Board terms (Sec. 2)
• Personnel Board Duties (Sec 3)

Article IX
Education

146

•

Conforming changes removing constitutional references to state Board of Education,
Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Deputy Superintendent of Public Instruction
(Sec. 2 & 2.1)
• Provide local boards with greater authority
• Establish accountability system and standards for public schools
• Reduction of the terms of the UC Regents and reduction of the number of members to
conform with recommendations

Article XI
Local Government

149

• Strengthening of the Home Rule provision
• Procedures for governance under the Home Rule Community Charter of Article XIA

Article XIA
Community Charter

151

• Establishment of the Community Charter Commission and process for adoption of Home
Rule Community Charters

Article XIII
Taxation

153

• Elimination of Board of Equalization and the establishment of a single state government
entity in its place

Article XIIIA
Tax Limitation

154

• Two-thirds vote requirement for local property taxes under the Home Rule Community
Charter

Article XIIIB
Government Spending Limitation

155

• Conforming changes on the limitations of state and local government spending under
the two-year budget
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Article
Article XVI
Public Finance
•
•
•

162

Conforming changes to legislative terms

Article XXI
Reapportionment of Senate, Assembly, Congressional, and Board
of Equalization Districts
•

161

Legislative amendments to the Constitution shall be placed on the November ballot

Article XX
Miscellaneous Subjects
•

158

Balanced budget requirement
Public school system finance
Vote requirement for General Obligation bonds

Article XVIII
Amending and Revising The Constitution
•

Page#

Elimination of references to Board of Equalization districts
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CONSTITUTIONAL LANGUAGE TO IMPLEMENT THE
COMMISSION'S RECOMMENDATIONS *
Resolved by the Senate, the Assembly concurring, That the Legislature of the State of California at its 1995-96 Regular
Session commencing on the fifth day of December 1994, two-thirds of the members elected to each of the two houses
of the Legislature voting therefor, hereby proposes to the people of the State of California that the Constitution of
the State be amended as follows:
First-That subdivision (c) of Section 8 of Article II thereof is amended to read:
(c) (1) The Secretary of State shall then submit the measure at the next general election held at least 131 days
after it qualifies or at any special statewide election held prior to that general election. The Governor may call a
special statewide election for the measure.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an initiative measure that proposes an amendment to this Constitution shall be submitted
to the electors only at a statewide election held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an evennumbered year.
Second-That Section 8.5 is added to Article II thereof, to read:
SEC. 8.5. (a) (1) Following certification of an initiative measure for the ballot, each house of the Legislature, at least 124
days prior to the election at which the measure is to be voted upon, shall hold and complete a committee hearing during which
testimony on the initiative measure shall be received. As an alternative to committee hearings of each house for this purpose,
a hearing may be held by a joint committee of the Senate and the Assembly, or a hearing may be held at which separate committees
of each house meet jointly. The proponents of the initiative measure shall be given written notice of a committee hearing held
pursuant to this paragraph at least three days prior to the hearing.
(2) Immediately upon the completion of the hearing or hearings both committees or, if applicable, the joint committee, shall
recommend to the Legislature whether the Legislature should take a course of action described in subdivision (b), or should
take no action.
(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (c) of Section 8, the Secretary of State immediately shall modify the initiative measure to
include the legislative changes described in this subdivision if, not later than 117 days prior to the general election at which
the initiative measure is scheduled to be submitted to the voters, both of the following occur:
(1) By concurrent resolution adopted by both houses of the Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, the Legislature
proposes only clarifying or technical changes, or both, to the initiative measure.
(2) The legislative changes are endorsed in writing by the proponent or a majority of the proponents of the initiative measure,
and that written endorsement is submitted to the Secretary of State.
(c) The Secretary of State shall place any initiative measure, modified as provided by subdivision (b), on the ballot of the
election at which the original initiative would have been submitted to the voters.
(d) For the purposes of this section, "proponent" or "proponents" means the person or persons who submit a draft of a petition
proposing the initiative measure to the Attorney General with a request that he or she prepare a title and summary of the measure
as provided by law.
Third-That subdivision (a) of Section 9 of Article II thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 9. (a) The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes except
urgency statutes, statutes calling elections, arui statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for usual current
expenses of the State, urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section
9 of Article IV, any statute enacting a budget bill, and any statute enacting a budget rebalancing bill.
Fourth-That subdivision (c) of Section 10 of Article II thereof is amended to read:
(c) (1) The Legislature may amend or repeal referendum statutes. It may am-eM GJ: ~ aH initiative~
P:y another ~ .that becomes effective nnly wrum approved P:y tl:le electors ~ tl:le initiative ~ permits
amendment GJ: ~ without th@ii: approval.
(2) The Legislature may amend or repeal an initiative statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved
by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval. This paragraph applies only
to initiative statutes approved by the electors on or before November 5, 1996.
* NOTE: This language was included in Senate Constitutional Amendment 39 and Assembly Constitutional Amendment 49 which
were introduced in the California Legislature on May 13, 1996. No action was taken. Effective and operative dates contained
in this language assume adoption by the voters in November 1996. For placement on future ballots, effective dates would
need to be revised accordingly.
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(3) With regard to initiative statutes approved by the electors after November 5, 1996:
(A) The Legislature rtUIY amend or repeal an initiative statute that has been in effect for less than six years by another statute
that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without
their approval.
(B) The Legislature, by a two-thirds vote of the membership of each house, and notwithstanding any provision in the initiative
statute, may amend or repeal an initiative statute by a statute that does not become operative sooner than six years after the
initiative statute took effect. A bill to enact a statute pursuant to this subparagraph shall specifically identify the affected initiative
statute, and state that the initiative statute was previously approved by the electors and the date on which the approval occurred.
This subparagraph does not affect the power of the electors to amend or repeal an initiatipe statute pursuant to Section 8.
Fifth-That subdivision (b) of Section 14 of Article II thereof is amended to read:
(b) A petition to recall a statewide officer must be signed by electors equal in number to 12 percent of the last
vote for the office, with signatures from each of 5 counties equal in number to 1 percent of the last vote for the office
in the county. Signatures to recall Senators, members of the Assembly, membsrs Gf ~ ~ Gf Eqy.alization, and
judges of courts of appeal and trial courts must equal in number 20 percent of the last vote for the office.
Sixth-That subdivision (1) of Section 8 of Article III thereof is amended to read:
(l) "State officer," as used in this section, means the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller,
Insurancs Commissionsr, Secretary of State, Supsrintendent Gf ~ Instruction, Treasurer, member Gf ~ ~
~ Gf Eqy.ali!6ation, and Member of the Legislature.
Seventh-That Section 2 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 2. (a) The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for~ four-year terms, 20 to begin every
2. two years. No Senator may serve more than 1 two terms.
The Assembly has a membership of 80 members elected for ~ two-year terms. No member of the Assembly
may serve more than ~ three terms.
Their terms shall commence on the first Monday in Dscembsr January next following their election or, if that day

is a holiday, then on the next day.
(b) Election of members of the Assembly shall be on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of evennumbered years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature. Senators shall be elected at the same time and places
as members of the Assembly.
(c) A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is an elector and has been a resident
of the legislative district for one year, and a citizen of the United States and a resident of California for~ three years,
immediately preceding the election.
(d) When a vacancy occurs in the Legislature the Governor immediately shall call an election to fill the vacancy.

(e) The limitations on the number of terms prescribed by this section shall not apply to any term of office as a Senator or
member of the Assembly that commences on or after January 6, 2003. This section shall remain in effect only until January
6, 2003, and as of that date is repealed.
Eighth-That Section 2.1 is added to Article IV thereof, to read:
SEC. 2.1. (a) The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for four-year terms, 20 to begin every two years. No

Senator may serve more than three terms.
The Assembly has a membership of 80 members elected for four-year terms, 40 to begin every two years. No member of the
Assembly rtUIY serve more than three terms.
Their terms shall commence on the first Monday in January next following their election or, if that day is a holiday, then
on the next day.
(b) Election of members of the Assembly shall be on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of evennumbered years unless otherwise prescribed by the Legislature. Senators shall be elected at the same time and places as members
of the Assembly.
(c) A person is ineligible to be a member of the Legislature unless the person is an elector and has been a resident of the
legislative district for one year, and a citizen of the United States and a resident of California for three years, immediately preceding
the election.
(d) When a vacancy occurs in the Legislature the Governor immediately shall call an election to fill the vacancy.
Ninth-That Section 3 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 3. (a) The Legislature shall convene in regular session in each odd-numbered year at noon on the first Monday
in December Gf @ach even numbered ~ January or, if that day is a holiday then on the next day, and each house shall
immediately shall organize. The Legislature shall not meet in regular session on or after July 8th of any calendar year, except
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that, immediately following the conclusion of the 60-day period described in paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b) of
Section 10, the Legislature may meet for a period of not more than five consecutive days to reconsider any bill returned by
the Governor in that calendar year. Either house of the Legislature may authorize the introduction of bills at any time during
a regular or special session, including during any recess of the house. Each session of the Legislature shall adjourn sine
die by operation of the Constitution at midnight on November 30 December 31 of the following even-numbered year.
(b) On extraordinary occasions the Governor by proclamation may cause the Legislature to assemble in special
session. When so assembled it has power to legislate only on subjects specified in the proclamation but may provide
for expenses and other matters incidental to the session.
Tenth-That Section 4.5 of Article IV is thereof amended to read:
SEC. 4.5. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution or other existing law, a person elected to or
serving in the Legislature on or after November 1, 1990, shall participate in the Federal Social Security (Retirement,
Disability, Health Insurance) Program System, and~ may elect to participate in the Public Employees' Retirement System.
The State shall pay only the employer's share of the contribution contributions necessary to su4 that participation.
No other pension or retirement benefit shall accrue as a result of service in the Legislature, su4 that service not
being intended as a career occupation. This Section section shall not be construed to abrogate or diminish any vested
pension or retirement benefit whlch that may have accrued under an existing law to a person holding or having
held office in the Legislature, but upon adoption of this Act act no further entitlement to nor vesting in any existing
program shall accrue to any such person, other than the Social Security System and the Public Employees' Retirement
System to the extent herein provided.
Eleventh-That Section 8 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 8. (a) At regular sessions no bill other than the budget bill may be heard or acted on by committee or either
house until the 11th day after the bill is introduced, nor may any such bill be passed by the house of origin until the 31st
day after the bill is introduced rmless , except that the house dispenses witA tl+.is requirement may dispense with either
or both of these requirements by rollcall vote entered in the journal, tRree ~ threefourths of the membership concurring.
(b) The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill. No bill may be
passed unless it is read by title on 3 days in each house except that the house may dispense with this requirement
by rollcall vote entered in the journal, twG .thWs two-thirds of the membership concurring. No bill may be passed
until the bill with amendments has been printed and distributed to the members. No bill may be passed unless,
by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a majority of the membership of each house concurs.
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, a statute enacted at a regular session shall
go into effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute and a statute
enacted at a special session shall go into effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which
the bill was passed.
(2) A statute, other than a statute establishing or changing boundaries of any legislative, congressional, or other
election district, enacted by a bill passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns for a joint
recess to reconvene in the second calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session, and in the possession
of the Governor after that date, shall go into effect on January 1 next following the enactment date of the statute
unless, before January 1, a copy of a referendum petition affecting the statute is submitted to the Attorney General
pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 10 of Article II, in which event the statute shall go into effect on the 91st day
after the enactment date unless the petition has been presented to the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision
(b) of Section 9 of Article II.
(3) Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses
of the State, and urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9 and
any statute enacting a budget bill shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment.
(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement
of facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill
shall be passed separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two tRirGs two-thirds of the membership concurring.
An urgency statute may not create or abolish any office Gr , change the salary, term, or duties of any office, Gr grant
any franchise or special privilege, or create any vested right or interest.
(e) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Twelfth-That Section 8 is added to Article IV thereof, to read:

SEC. 8. (a) At regular sessions no bill other than the budget bill may be heard or acted on by committee or either house
until the 11th day after the bill is introduced, nor may any such bill be passed by the house of origin until the 31st day after
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the bill is introduced, except that the house may dispense with either or both of these requirements by rollcall vote entered in
the journal, three1ourths of the membership concurring.
(b) The Legislature may make no law except by statute and may enact no statute except by bill. No bill may be passed unless
it is read by title on 3 days in each house except that the house may dispense with this requirement by rollcall vote entered
in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. No bill may be passed until the bill with amendments has been printed
and distributed to the members. No bill may be passed unless, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, a majority of the membership
of each house concurs.
(c) (1) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, a statute enacted at a regular session shall go into
effect on January 1 next following a 90-day period from the date of enactment of the statute and a statute enacted at a special
session shall go into effect on the 91st day after adjournment of the special session at which the bill was passed.
(2) A statute, other than a statute establishing or changing boundaries of any legislative, congressional, or other election
district, enacted by a bill passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns for a joint recess to reconvene
in the second calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session, and in the possession of the Governor after that date,
shall go into effect on January 1 next following the enactment date of the statute unless, before January 1, a copy of a referendum
petition affecting the statute is submitted to the Attorney General pursuant to subdivision (d) of Section 10 of Article II, in
which event the statute shall go into effect on the 91st day after the enactment date unless the petition has been presented to
the Secretary of State pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 9 of Article II.
(3) Statutes calling elections, statutes providing for tax levies or appropriations for the usual current expenses of the State,
urgency statutes, any statute implementing a budget bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, any statute enacting a
budget bill, and any statute enacting a budget rebalancing bill shall go into effect immediately upon their enactment.
(d) Urgency statutes are those necessary for immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety. A statement of
facts constituting the necessity shall be set forth in one section of the bill. In each house the section and the bill shall be passed
separately, each by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring. An urgency statute may not
create or abolish any office, change the salary, term, or duties of any office, grant any franchise or special privilege, or create
any vested right or interest.
Thirteenth-That Section 9 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 9. A
as provided in subdivision
a statute shall embrace but one "u'"cc'-'·
in its title. If a statute embraces a
not
its
the
not ex1JressE~d void. A
if the statute makes rVI~ffft>,c>C
One statute may be enacted
each calendar year that embraces more than one
rnnrJm,Pnr:'Ino that calendar
in law that are necessary to the
the nn11rn-nri.?titln<;
P'YYJrP<:<:.Pfi in itS
the
act. If the statute makes a substantive
any section the bill'"'"'+"'"'"'u'
the statute!
those '"'""'"'''""'
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that change is void. The Governor, while approving other sections of the bill that enacts the statute, may eliminate one or more
sections that he or she determines not to be reasonably related to the implementation of one or more of the purposes of the budget
rebalancing bill as enacted. Any section of the bill eliminated by the Governor pursuant to that determination shall be '>Pn•'1mi'Pi11
reconsidered and may be passed over the Governor's veto in the same manner as bills.
(c) A statute may not be amended by reference to its title. A section of a statute may not be amended unless the section
is re-enacted as amended.
Fifteenth-That Section 10 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 10. (a) Each bill passed by the Legislature shall be presented to the Governor. It becomes a statute if it
is signed by the Governor. The Governor may veto it by returning it with any objections to the house of origin, which
shall enter the objections in the journal and proceed to reconsider it. If each house then passes the bill by rollcall
vote entered in the journal, two thirds of the membership concurring, it becomes a statute.
(b) (1) Any bill, other than a bill which would establish or change boundaries of any legislative, congressional,
or other election district, passed by the Legislature on or before the date the Legislature adjourns fffi: a ~ ~
.00 reconv~ m ~ ~ in July of the first calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session pursuant to subdivision
(a) of Section 3, and in the possession of the Governor after that date, that is not returned within ,W 60 days after
that date becomes a statute.
(2) Any bill passed by the Legislature on or before Sep~mber 1- the date the Legislature adjourns in July of the second
calendar year of the biennium of the legislative session pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 3, and in the possession
of the Governor on or after Septsmber .t that date! that is not returned GR Ql' ~ September ,W e£ tRat ~ within
60 days after that date, becomes a statute.
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during the fiscal year for which the budget bill is to be enacted, except emergency bills recommended by the Governor
or appropriations for the salaries nn4 expenses of the Legislature , not including salaries, or travel or living expenses,
of Members of the Legislature .
(d) No bill except the budget bill may contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one certain, expressed
purpose. Appropriations from the General Fund of the State, except appropriations for the public schools or appropriations
made in the budget bill or a budget implementation bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, are void unless passed
in each house by rollcall vote entered in the journal, ~ .tl:Hr4s two-thirds of the membership concurring.
(e) The Legislature may control the submission, approval, and enforcement of budgets and the filing of claims
for all state agencies.
(j) (1) The total of all expenditures that are authorized to be made from the .General Fund of the State by the budget bill
or any other statute for the fiscal year for which the budget bill is to be enacted, combined with the total of all General Fund
reserves required under subdivision (g) for that fiscal year and any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding
fiscal year, may not exceed the total of all revenues and other resources, including reserves for prior years, that are estimated
to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that fiscal year. The total amount of those expenditures and reserves
authorized by the budget bill or any other statute for that fiscal year, as of the date of enactment of the budget bill, together
with any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding fiscal year, and the total amount of the revenues and other
resources, including reserves, estimated to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that fiscal year, shall be set
forth expressly in the budget bill.
(2) After the enactment of the budget bill, no bill shall be enacted that would cause the total of all General Fund expenditures,
together with any remaining deficit, as identified pursuant to paragraph (1) for the fiscal year for which the budget bill is enacted,
to exceed the total of all revenues and other resources estimated for that fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1). If any bill is
enacted that makes an appropriation in violation of this paragraph, as determined by final judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction, all sections of that bill that make an appropriation are thereupon void.
(g) (1) Except as otherwise specified in paragraph (2), the budget bill for each fiscal year shall provide for a state reserve
fund, to include General Fund moneys in an amount equal to 3 percent of the total of all expenditures that, as of the date of
enactment of the budget bill, are authorized to be made from the General Fund of the State for that fiscal year by the budget
bill and any other statute.
(2) The minimum amount required to be set aside in the state reserve fund as provided for by this subdivision for the 1997-98
fiscal year shall be an amount equal to one-third, and for the 1998-99 fiscal year shall be an amount equal to two-thirds, of
the amount that otherwise would be calculated for each of those fiscal years pursuant to paragraph (1).
(h) Notwithstanding Sections 4 and 8 of Article III and Section 4 of this article, in any year in which the budget bill is
not enacted by midnight on June 30, the Governor and each Member of the Legislature shall forfeit any salary or reimbursement
for travel or living expenses during any regular or special session for the period from midnight on June 30 until the day preceding
the date that the budget bill is enacted. No forfeited salary or travel and living expenses shall be paid retroactively.
(i) This section shall not apply to The budget or budget bill for any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This
section shall remain in effect only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Seventeenth-That Section 12.1 is added to Article IV thereof, to read:
SEC. 12.1. (a) Within the first 10 days of each odd-numbered calendar year, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature,
with an explanatory message, a budget for the two-year fiscal period commencing on the ensuing July 1, containing itemized
statements for recommended state expenditures and estimated state revenues. If recommended expenditures exceed estimated
revenues, the Governor shall recommend the sources from which the additional revenues should be provided. Together with
the budget, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature a statement , as prescribed by statute, identifying both the policy goals
to be accomplished by the recommended state expenditures and outcome-based performance measures to determine the extent
to which the goals are accomplished, for use by the Legislature in considering the budget bill.
(b) The Governor and the Governor-elect may require a state agency, officer, or employee to furnish whatever information
is deemed necessary to prepare the budget.
(c) The budget shall be accompanied by a budget bill itemizing recommended expenditures. The bill shall be introduced immediately
by the person chairing the committee that considers the budget. The Legislature shall pass the budget bill by midnight on June
30 of the year in which it is introduced. Until the budget bill has been enacted, the Legislature shall not send to the Governor
for consideration any bill appropriating funds for expenditure during the fiscal period for which the budget bill is to be enacted,
except emergency bills recommended by the Governor or appropriations for the expenses of the Legislature, not including salaries,
or travel or living expenses, of Members of the Legislature.
(d) No bill except the budget bill, or the budget rebalancing bill enacted for the purpose set forth in subdivision (h), may
contain more than one item of appropriation, and that for one certain, expressed purpose. Appropriations from the General Fund
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of the State, except appropriations for the public schools or appropriations made in the budget bill , the budget implementation
bill as described in subdivision (b) of Section 9, or the budget rebalancing bill, are void unless passed by the Legislature by
rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership concurring.
(e) The Legislature may control the submission, approval, and enforcement of budgets and the filing of claims for all state
agencies.
(j) (1) The total of all expenditures that are authorized to be made from the General Fund of the State by the budget bill
or any other statute for the ensuing fiscal period for which the budget bill is to be enacted, combined with the total of all General
Fund reserves required under subdivision (g) for that fiscal period and any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the
preceding fiscal period, may not exceed the total of all revenues and other resources, including reserves for prior years, that
are estimated to be available to the State for General Fund purposes for that ensuing fiscal period. The total amount of those
expenditures and reserves authorized by the budget bill or any other statute for that ensuing fiscal period, as of the date of
enactment of the budget bill, together with any deficit in the General Fund remaining from the preceding fiscal period, and
the total amount of the revenues and other resources, including reserves, estimated to be available to the State for General Fund
purposes for that ensuing fiscal period, shall be set forth expressly in the budget bill.
(2) After the enactment of the budget bill, no bill shall be enacted that would cause the total of all General Fund expenditures,
together with any remaining deficit, as identified pursuant to paragraph (1) for the fiscal period for which the budget bill is
enacted, to exceed the total of all revenues and other resources estimated for that fiscal period pursuant to paragraph (1). If
any bill is enacted that makes an appropriation in violation of this paragraph, as determined by final judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction, all sections of that bill that make an appropriation are thereupon void.
(g) (1) The budget bill for each fiscal period shall provide for a state reserve fund, to include General Fund moneys in an
amount equal to 3 percent of the total of all expenditures that, as of the date of enactment of the budget bill, are authorized
to be made from the General Fund of the State for that fiscal period by the budget bill and any other statute.
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of this subdivision, if, at the conclusion of any fiscal period, the balance of the state
reserve fund is less than the amount required to be provided for in that fund for that fiscal period pursuant to paragraph (1),
at the election of the Legislature, as declared in the budget act, the minimum amount that shall be required to be provided for
in that fund by the budget act for the next succeeding fiscal period shall be an amount equal to that remaining balance. Regardless
of the concluding balance for that succeeding fiscal period, the minimum amount required to be provided for in the state reserve
fund by the budget act for the fiscal period following a fiscal period for which that election is made shall be determined pursuant
to paragraph (1).
(h) (1) No later than February 1 of each even-numbered calendar year, the Governor shall submit to the Legislature a budget
rebalancing plan containing recommendations for adjustments in expenditures or revenues, or other changes, as necessary to
maintain the balance required by subdivision (j) throughout the two-year period for which the budget bill was enacted. The
plan shall be accompanied, as appropriate, by a budget rebalancing bill itemizing those adjustments or other changes, as described
in subdivision (b) of Section 9. The bill shall be introduced immediately by the person chairing the committee that considers
the budget.
(2) If the Governor determines that no adjustments are necessary for the purpose described in paragraph (1), he or she shall
submit to the Legislature by February 1 a report updating, for the current fiscal period, the totals of expenditures, reserves,
deficits, and revenues and other resources identified for that fiscal period pursuant to subdivision (j).
(i) Notwithstanding Sections 4 and 8 of Article III and Section 4 of this article, in any odd-numbered calendar year in which
the budget bill is not enacted by midnight on June 30, the Governor and each Member of the Legislature shall forfeit any salary
or reimbursement for travel or living expenses during any regular or special session for the period from midnight on June 30
until the day preceding the date that the budget bill is enacted. No forfeited salary or travel and living expenses shall be paid
retroactively.
(j) This section applies only to the budget and budget bill for fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001.
(k) Whenever, in this Constitution or any other law, reference is made to "Section 12" of this article, that reference shall
be deemed to refer to this section unless that reference expressly provides that it does not apply to this section.
Eighteenth-That Section 18 of Article IV thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 18. (a) The Assembly has the sole power of impeachment. Impeachments shall be tried by the Senate. A
person may not be convicted unless, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, twG .thl£4; two-thirds of the membership
of the Senate concurs.
(b) State officers elected on a statewide basis 7 members ~ the £tate ~ ~ Eqaalization, and judges of state
courts are subject to impeachment for misconduct in office. Judgment may extend only to removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the State, but the person convicted or acquitted remains subject to criminal
punishment according to law.
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Nineteenth-That Section 29 is added to Article IV thereof, to read:
SEC. 29. (a) The Legislature may, by adoption of a concurrent resolution, repeal any state agency regulation. Regulations
repealed by the Legislature shall thereafter have no force or effect.
(b) Any concurrent resolution to repeal a regulation shall identify specifically the regulation to be repealed or, if an entire
title, part, division, chapter, or article is to be repealed, a specific reference thereto shall be made.
(c) Any concurrent resolution introduced pursuant to this section shall be subject to the same procedural rules, including,
but not limited to, rules regarding public notice, printing, and committee referral, that apply to bills.
(d) Every regulation, to be effective, shall include a citation to the statute or constitutional provision that is being interpreted,
carried out, or otherwise made more specific by the regulation.
(e) As used in this section, the term "state agency" includes every state office, officer, department, division, bureau, board,
and commission, whether created by the Constitution, statute, or initiative, but does not include the courts, any agency in the
judicial or legislative branch of state government, the University of California, or the Hastings College of the Law.
(j) As used in this section, the term "regulation" includes every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application
or the amendment, supplement, or revision of any of those rules, regulations, orders, or standards adopted by any state agency
to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure, except one that
relates only to the internal management of the state agency. "Regulation" does not mean or include any form prescribed by
a state agency or any instructions relating to the use of the form, except that this provision is not a limitation upon any provision
of law governing the adoption of any regulation that is needed to implement the law under which the form is issued.
Twentieth-That Section 3 of Article V thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 3. (a) The Governor shall report to the Legislature each calendar year on the condition of the State and
may make recommendations.
(b) In addition to the report prepared pursuant to subdivision (a), in 2001 and every fourth year thereafter the Governor
shall submit a strategic plan to the Legislature, no later than February 1, that sets forth all of the following:
(1) Policy and fiscal priorities of the State.
(2) Outcome-based performance measures that gauge the productivity of state expenditures.
(3) A capital facilities and financing plan that includes a state policy for infrastructure investment, an assignment of responsibilities
for implementing the capital outlay plan, and the financing methods to be used for each program area.
(4) Proposed programmatic relationships between the State and local government agencies.
(c) In each calendar year specified in subdivision (b), the Legislature shall adopt a concurrent resolution containing findings
and declarations of the Legislature, with regard to the issues set forth in the strategic plan submitted that year by the Governor.
Twenty-First-That Section 3.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read:
SEC. 3.5. (a) By October 1, 1997, the Governor shall submit a state-local government realignment plan to the Legislature.
To assist in preparing the plan, the Governor shall establish an advisory committee including representatives of local government.
The plan shall include the assignment of program responsibilities of state and local government, assigning program responsibility,
to the extent possible, to the agency of government having the authority to organize, administer, and finance the program. In
the case of a program that is shared among government agencies, the plan shall provide for administrative flexibility at the
local level.
(b) The realignment plan shall be submitted to the Legislature in the form , as appropriate, of a bill setting forth any necessary
statutory changes, a measure proposing amendment or revision to the Constitution, or both. The bill or measure shall be introduced
immediately in each house by the chair of the committee that considers local government matters and, subject to amendment,
shall be passed by the Legislature and presented to the Governor by June 30, 1998, or, in the case of a measure proposing amendment
or revision to the Constitution, shall be submitted to the voters at the general election held on November 3, 1998.
(c) Following the adoption of the realignment plan statute, the constitutional amendment or revision, or both, as appropriate,
the state-local government realignment plan, as reviewed and updated, shall be incorporated into the state strategic plan described
in subdivision (b) of Section 3.
Twenty-Second-That subdivision (b) of Section 5 of Article V thereof is amended to read:
(b) Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Superinmndent Gf ~ Instruction, ti::l.@ Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary of State, Controller, TI'E!asurer, or Attorney General, GJ: Gn ~ £tate &am Gf Equalization, the Governor
shall nominate a person to fill the vacancy who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority of the membership
of the Senate and a majority of the membership of the Assembly and who shall hold office for the balance of the
unexpired term. In the event the nominee is neither confirmed nor refused confirmation by both the Senate and
the Assembly within 90 days of the submission of the nomination, the nominee shall take office as if he or she had
been confirmed by a majority of the Senate and Assembly 7 provided1 that i£ ~ However, i£ ~ 90-day period
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ends during a recess of the Legislature, the period shall be extended until the sixth day following the day on which
the Legislature reconvenes.
Twenty-Third-That Section 9.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read:

SEC. 9.5. (a) The Governor and the Lieutenant Governor shall be of the same political party. With respect to each political
party, the person receiving the highest number of votes in a primary election for Governor and the person receiving the highest
number of votes in a primary election for Lieutenant Governor shall jointly represent that political party at the general election.
(b) The candidate for Governor shall appear on the ballot jointly with the candidate for Lieutenant Governor and each shall
be elected by the casting by each voter of a single vote applicable to both offices.
Twenty-Fourth-That Section 10 of Article V thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 10. The Lieutenant Governor shall become Governor when a vacancy occurs in the office of Governor.
The Lieutenant Governor shall act as Governor during the impeachment 7 absenciOl £mm tile~ of the Governor
or ~ during any temporary disability of the Governor or of a Governor-elect who fails to take office.
The Legislature shall provide an order of precedence after the Lieutenant Governor for succession to the office
of Governor and for the temporary exercise of the Governor's functions.
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction to determine all questions arising under this section.
Standing to raise questions of vacancy or temporary disability is vested exclusively in a body provided by statute.
Twenty-Fifth-That Section 10.5 is added to Article V thereof, to read:
SEC. 10.5. (a) The Governor may appoint the Lieutenant Governor to any office or position in the executive branch of

government. The Lieutenant Governor shall hold that office or position at the pleasure of the Governor. Except as specified in
subdivision (b), the Lieutenant Governor shall not hold more than one office or position to which he or she has been appointed
under this subdivision at any one time.
(b) The Lieutenant Governor may hold other offices or positions as provided by statute or the Constitution.
Twenty-Sixth-That Section 11 of Article V thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 11. The Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller, and Secretary of State 7 nn4 Tn2asurer shall be
elected at the same time and places and for the same term as the Governor. No Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General,
Controller, or Secretary of State 7 Gr Tn2asurer may serve in the same office for more than 2 terms.
Twenty-Seventh-That Section 12 is added to Article V thereof, to read:
SEC. 12. The Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and Insurance Commissioner shall be appointed by the Governor,

subject to confirmation by the Senate, and shall hold office at the pleasure of the Governor.
Twenty-Eighth-That subdivision (f) of Section 14 of Article V thereof is amended to read:
(f) "State officer," as used in this section, means the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Controller,
Insurance Commissioner, and Secretary of State 7 Superintendent Gi ~ Instruction, Treasurer, nn4 member Gi
~ ~ ~ Gi Equalization.
Twenty-Ninth-That Section 2 of Article VII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 2. (a) There is a Personnel Board of 5 members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate,
a majority of the membership concurring, for 10 year 6-year terms and until their successors are appointed and qualified.
Appointment to fill a vacancy is for the unexpired portion of the term. A member may be removed by concurrent
resolution adopted by each house, two-thirds of the membership of each house concurring.
(b) The board annually shall elect one of its members as presiding officer.
(c) The board shall appoint and prescribe compensation for an executive officer who shall be a member of the
civil service but not a member of the board.
Thirtieth-That Section 3 of Article VII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 3. (a) The board shall enforce the civil service statutes and, by majority vote of all its members, shall pr€lscribe
prooationary periods nn4 classifications, adopt other rules authorized by statute , and review disciplinary actions.
(b) The executive officer shall administer the civil service statutes under rules of the board.
Thirty-First-That subdivision (i) of Section 4 of Article VII thereof is amended to read:
(i) The teaching staff of schools under the jurisdiction of the State Department of Education er tile Superintendent
~~Instruction.

Thirty-Second-That subdivision (a) of Section 10 of Article VII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 10. (a) No person who is found liable in a civil action for making libelous or slanderous statements against
an opposing candidate during the course of an election campaign for any federal, statewide, ~ Gi E~ualization,
or legislative office or for any county, city and county, city, district, or any other local elective office shall retain the
seat to which he or she is elected, where it is established that the libel or slander was a major contributing cause
in the defeat of an opposing candidate.
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A libelous or slanderous statement shall be deemed to have been made by a person within the meaning of this
section if that person actually made the statement or if the person actually or constructively assented to, authorized,
or ratified the statement.
"Federal office," as used in this section, means the office of United States Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives; aa4 to the ~xtent that the provisiOilS e£ this section 4G does not conflict with any provision of federal
law, it is intended that candidates seeking the office of United States Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
comply with this section.
Thirty-Third-That Section 2 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
~ Z. A SuperiatenGlent ~ ~ Instruction shall bQ electeGl ~ th@ "iualifieGl el9ctors e£ th@ StaW at ~
gubernatorial election. ::Qle. SuperintenGlent e£ l4lblie Inswction shall enter :ypnn the dYties e£ the ~ on th@ first
Monday aftel: the first 4a;t e£ Janyary ~ succeeGling ~ gybematorial election. ~ SuperintenGlent ~ ~
Instruction ~ ~ more tl:\an 2. terms.
Thirty-Fourth-That Section 2.1 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
SEG. l,.l... ~ State lloarG e£ EGlYcation, on nommatinn e£ the 5\lperintenGlent e£ ~ Inswction, sllall appoint
~ Deputy SuperintenGlent e£ l4lblie Instruction and tmee .'tssociate 5\lperintenGlents e£ ~ Inswction :wl:\,Q
~ bQ e*empt £rGm state ~ service aa4 wl\ose tefms e£ Gffiee shall bQ fuY£ ;rears.
+Ris seQion sllall not bQ cOilSweGl as prohibiting the appointn'lent, in accomance witl\ law, e£ aGlGitional.'\.£sociate
SuperintenGlentB ~ ~ Imwction ~to state ~ service.
Thirty-Fifth-That Section 3 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
SEc;;. J.. A SuperintenGlent e£ Schools fui: ea4 coYnty ~ bQ electeGl ~ th@ "iualifieGl electors thereof at ea4
gubernatorial election '* ~ bQ appointeGl ~ the mYnty Poar4 ~ eGlucation, aa4 the manner e£ the selection shall
~ GletermineGl ~ a majority ¥Gte ~ th@ electors ~ th@ mYnty ¥Gting Otl th@ "l\lestion; proviGleGl, that tw:o Gr more
counties ma;7 ~ an election conGlucteGl pursuant to Section J..2. ~ this ~ Ytlite fui: th@ purpose e£ electing Gr
appointing one joint superintenGlent fui: th@ co1mties so Ytliting.
Thirty-Sixth-That Section 3.1 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
SEc;;. J..l. {a} Not>.vithstanQing any provision e£ this Cotl!ltirution to the contrary, the Legislatw:e shall prescribe
~ qyalifkations re"'YireGl ~ mYtlty superintenGlentB ~ schools, and fui: these purposes shall classify th@ several
counties in th@ State.
(bj NotwithstanGling any provision e£ this Constimtion to th@ contrary, th@ mYnty Poar4 ~ eGlucation Gr joint
county Poar4 ~ eGlucation, as th@ ~ ~ ber shall ~ th@ salary e£ th@ mYnty superintenGlent ~ schools Gr th@
jQint county superintenGlent ~ schools, respectv;ely.
Thirty-Seventh-That Section 3.2 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
SEc;;. ~ NotwithstanGling any provision e£ this COilStit\ltion to the contra~y, any tw:o or more chartereGl cOYnties,
'* nonchartereGl col:Ulties, Gr any coltlbination theE9of, ma;7 ~ a majority ¥Gte ~ th@ electors ~ each such coYnty
voting Otl the proposition at an election call9d fui: that purpose in each such country', establish one joint ~ ~
edYCation aa4 one joint COYtlty superintenGent e£ schools for the co\lnties so Ytliting. A joint CO\ltlty boarQ e£ eGiYcatinn
and a joint mYnty superintenGlent ~ schools shall bQ govemeGl ~ the general stamtes anGl shall not bQ govemeGl
~ ~ provisions e£ any mYnty charter.
Thirty-Eighth-That Section 3.3 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
~ ~ ~as proviGeGl in Section J..2. e£ this~ it shall bQ competent to proviGle in any charter frameGl
for a county Ytl4er any provision e£ this Constit\ltion, Gr ~ th@ amenGlment e£ any such charter, fui: th@ election
~ ~ meltlbers ~ th@ mYtlty ~ e£ ed\lcation ~ such mYtlty anGl fui: tl:\@ir "l\lalifications anGl tefms ~ office..
Thirty-Ninth-That Section 4 is added to Article IX thereof, to read:
SEC. 4. (a) The Public School System includes all public kindergartens, elementary schools, and secondary schools established

in accordance with law, and the school districts and other public agencies authorized to maintain those kindergartens and schools.
(b) No school or any part of the Public School System shall be, directly or indirectly, transferred from the Public School
System or placed under the jurisdiction of any authority other than one included within the Public School System.
(c) Solely for purposes of subdivision (d) of Section 12 of Article IV, the "public schools" include the Public School System,
the California Community Colleges, and the California State University.
Fortieth-That Section 5.5 is added to Article IX thereof, to read:

SEC. 5.5. Each school district maintaining one or more public schools shall be governed by a board of education elected,
in accordance with law, by the voters in the school district. ·
Forty-First-That Section 6 of Article IX thereof is amended to read:
SEC 6. ~ person, other than a substimte empl~e, employeGl ~ a school Gistrict as a teacher or in any other
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p9sition l'@qtliring certificatign q:yalifications AAall be paiQ a ~ whlch AAall be at tl:w rate ~ an annttal ~
kss ~ twenty four hundred 4ollars ($2AOO) for a~ ssrving. full ~as dsfinsd by law.
~ l2uPlic £chool Sysoom shall iP.dude all kindsrgartsn schools, slsmffitill)' schools, sscondary schools, oochnical
schools, and state collsgss, establishsd in accordance with law and, in addition, tl:w schoGl districts and ~ ~
agencies authorized to maintain them.. Wo schoGl Gr ~ Gr .any: ~ ¥aft ~ tl:w l2uPlic £chool Systsm AAall ~
directly Gr indirectly, transfsrrsd from tl:w ~ School Systsm Gr placed ~ tl:w jurisdiction ~ .any: authority
~than one included within~~ School System.
~ Legislature shall adG to the State £choolllund such ~ ~ £rom the l'@V:enues g{ the Stat9 as shall prov:ide
m said funG for apportionment in ea4 fiscal~ an amount :nGt kss ~one hundrsd ~ dGllars ~ ~
pupil in avsrage daily attsndance in the kindergartsn schools, elemsntary schools, secondary schools, and technical
schools in the~ School System during~ mOO: preceding fiscal y.e.ar.. (a) There shall be maintained in the State
~~

Treasury the State School Fund. Appropriations by the State for the support of the Public School System shall be transferred
to the State School Fund prior to apportionment.
(b) The entire State School Fund shall be apportioned in each fiscal year in such the manner as the Legislature
nny: provide provides, through the school districts and other public agencies maintaining such schools, for the support
of7 and aid tor kindergarten schools, elementary schools, and secondary schools 7 and technical schools ~ that
there shall be apportioned to ea4 schoGl district in ea4 fiscal ~ :nGt less than one hundred twenty dGllars {$U()j
per pupil in average daily attsndance in the district 4uring the ~ preceding fiscal ~ and ~ that the amount
apportioned to ea4 ~ district in ea4 fiscal :yea,r AAall be :nGt less than p;;,zenty four hundred dollars ($2,400).
~with~ to .any: retiremsnt ~provided for in the chart9r ~.any: wunty Gr Qty and county pursuan-t
.00 the provisigns ~ which tl:w contributions ~ and benefits tor certificaood employees ~ a schGo.l district who are
members ~ such system are baSE!d upnn the pwportion ~ ~ salaries ~ such certificated employees contributed

PJt said oounty Gr citf and county, all
(c) Any amounts apportioned to saiG a county or city and county, or to any school districts district therein, pursuant
solely for a retirement system provided for in the charter of a county or city and county,
pursuant to which the contributions of, and benefits to, certificated employees of a school district who are members of that retirement
system are based upon the proportion of the salaries of those certificated employees contributed by the county or city and county,
shall be considered as though deemed to be derived from county or city and county school taxes for the support of
county and city and county government and shall not be deemed money provided by the State within the meaning

.00 the pmvisigns ~ this section

gfth,is~.

Forty-Second-That Section 7 of Article IX thereof is repealed.
7-. :rh9 Legislatul'@ shall provide for the app9intment Gr election ~ the State .6oord g{ Education and a board
gf education in ea4 county Gr for~ election~ a jGint ~board~ education for tw:g Gr m
wunties.
Forty-Third-That Section 7.5 of Article IX thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 7.5. The State .&ard ~ Education shall adopt Legislature shall provide for the adoption of tsxtboo!Q; instructional
materials for use in kindergarten and grades Gn9 through eight throughout ~ StatE! 1 to 8, inclusive, of each school in
the Public School System, to be furnished without cost as provided by statute .
Forty-Fourth-That Section 9 of Article IX thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 9. (a) The University of California shall constitutE! constitutes a public trust, to be administered by the existing
corporation known as "The Regents of the University of California," with full powers of organization and government,
subject only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure ensure the security of its funds and compliance
with the terms of the endowments of the university and such any competitive bidding procedures as may be made
applicable to the university by statute for the letting of construction contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing
of materials, goods, and services. Said, The corporation shall be in fGrm a board composed of ~ six ex officio
members, which shall be • . the Governor, the Lieutenant Governor, the Speaker of the Assembly, :rh9 Superintsndffit
~ I4Wlic Instructi~ the president and the vice president of the alumni association of the university , and the acting
president of the university, and 1S 15 appointive members appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate,
a majority of the membership concurring 7 provide~ howe'ler that the pressnt appointi'le members shall hold ~
Ylltil the expiration ~ ~ present terms .
(b) :rh9 tE!rms g{ ~ members appointed prior to Nov:ember ~ ~ shall be ¥ years7 the tE!rms ~ tw.o appointive
members to expire as heretofore nn March J.st ~ ~ even numbered calendar ~ and tw:g Two members shall
be appointed for terms commencing on March 1, 1976, and on each March 1 ~ ea4 :yea,r thereafter 7 provided that
no~ appointmsnts AAall be made for terms to commence nn, except March 1, 1979, (;)( nn and March 1 of each
fourth year thereafter, to the end that no appointment to the regents for a newly commencing term shall be made
~
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during the first year of any gubernatorial term of office. The terms of the members appointed for terms commencing
on and after March 1. 1976, shall be 12 years. The terms of the members appointed for terms commencing on and after
March 1, 1997, shall be 10 years. During the period of transition until the time when the appointive membership is
comprised exclusively of persons serving for terms of .U 10 years, the total number of appointive members may
exceed the numbers specified in the preceding paragraph subdivision (a). No member appointed on or after November
6, 1996, to serve a full term shall be eligible to serve more than one full term.
In case of any vacancy, the term of office of the appointee person appointed to fill SYGh the vacancy, who shall be
appointed by the Governor and approved by the Senate, a majority of the membership concurring, shall be for the
balance of the term for which SYffi the vacancy exists. A person appointed to fill the balance of a term subsequently may
be appointed to fill one full term.
(c) The members of the board may, m ~discretion, following procedures established by them and after
consultation with representatives of the faculty and students of the university, including appropriate officers of the
academic senate and student governments, may appoint to the board~ fir both o£ the follovving persons as ~mbers,
with all rights of participation T , a member of the faculty at a campus of the university or of another institution
of higher education 7 or a person enrolled as a student at a campus of the university for each regular academic term
during his or her service as a member of the board , or both of those persons. Any person so appointed shall serve
for not less than one year commencing on July 1.
(d) Regents shall be able persons broadly reflective of the economic, cultural, and social diversity of the State,
including ethnic minorities and women. However, it is not intended that formulas or specific ratios be applied in
the selection of regents.
(e) In the selection of the Regents regents, the Governor shall consult an advisory committee composed as follm;,rs;
~ of the Speaker of the Assembly and two public members appointed by the Speaker, the President Jqg. pro Tempore
of the Senate and two public members appointed by the RYles Committee o£ the Senate Committee on Rules , two
public members appointed by the Governor, the chairman chairperson of the regents o£ the tmiversity , an alumnus
of the university chosen by the alumni association of the university, a student of the university chosen by the Council
of Student Body Presidents, and a member of the faculty of the university chosen by the academic senate of the
university. Public members shall serve for four years, except that one each of the initially appointed members selected
by the Speaker of the Assembly, the President Jqg. pro Tempore of the Senate, and the Governor shall be appointed
to serve for two years; student, alumni, and faculty members shall serve for one year and may not be regents of
tHe university at the time of their service on the advisory committee.
(f) The Regents o£ the University o£ California shall be regents are vested with the legal title and the management
and disposition of the property of the university and of property held for its benefit, and shall ~ the ~ to
may take and hold, ~ by purchase or by , donation, or gift, testamentary or otherwise, or in any other manner,
without restriction, all real and personal property for the benefit of the university or incidentally to its conduct 7
provided, howe,,rer, that sales . However, the sale of university real property shall be subject to SYffi any competitive
bidding procedures as may be provided by statute. £aid The corporation shall also ~ has all the powers necessary
or convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the power to sue and, to , be sued, to use a seal,
and to delegate to its committees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, SYGh any authority or functions
as it rna;<~ deems wise. ~ Regents
The regents shall receive all funds derived from the sale of lands pursuant to the act of Congress of July 2, 1862,
and any subsequent acts amendatory thereof. The university shall be entirely independent of all political or sectarian
influence and kept free therefrom in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its affairs, and no
person shall be debarred admission to any department of the university on account of race, religion, ethnic heritage,
or sex.
(g) Meetings of the Regents of the University Gf California regents shall be public, with exceptions and notice
requirements as may be provided by statute.
Forty-Fifth-That Section 12 is added to Article IX thereof, to read:
SEC. 12. (a) The Legislature shall have power to provide for a postsecondary education system of community colleges to
be known as the California Community Colleges.
(b) The Legislature, by general law, may provide for the incorporation and organization of community college districts as
part of the California Community Colleges. The Legislature may authorize the governing boards of community college districts
to initiate and carry on any program or activity or to otherwise act in any manner that is not in conflict with the laws and
purposes for which community college districts are established.
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Section 13 is added to Article IX thereof, to read:
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Forty-Ninth-That Section 16 of Article IX thereof is amended and renumbered to read:
~ l-9,.

SEC. 11. (a) It shall be
in all charters framed under the
by Section 5 of Article XI
and Article XIA , to provide, in
to those
allowable by this Constitution 7 and
the laws of the
State , for the manner in
the times at which, and the terms for which the members of boards of education
shall be elected or
for their qualifications,
, and removal, and for the number ~ that
shall constitute any one of~ these boards.
(b) Notwithstanding Section 3 of Article XI, when the boundaries of a school district 9l.' community ~ ~
extend beyond the limits of a city whose charter provides for any or all of the foregoing with respect to the members
of its board of education, no charter amendment effecting a change in the manner in which, the times at
or the terms for which the members of the board of education shall be elected or appointed, for their qualifications,
compensation, or removal, or for the number ~ that shall constitute ~ the board, shall be adopted unless
it is submitted to and approved by a majority of all the qualified electors of the school district GJ: community ~
district voting on the question. Any such amendment, and any portion of a proposed charter or a revised charter
~ that would establish or change any of the foregoing provisions respecting a board of education, shall be submitted
to the electors of the school district GJ: community college district as one or more separate questions. The failure
of any such separate question to be approved shall have the result of continuing in effect the applicable existing
law with respect to that board of education.

(c) A home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, may establish a procedure for board of education fomuztion
or reorganization without regard to the requirements of this section.
Fiftieth-That Section 1 of Article XI is amended to read:
SEC. 1. (a) The State is divided into counties .wJ::H4 that are legal subdivisions of the State. The Legislature shall
prescribe a uniform procedure for county formation, consolidation, and boundary change. Formation or consolidation
requires approval by a majority of electors voting on the question in each affected county. A boundary change requires
approval by the governing body of each affected county. A home rule community charter for a multicounty region, adopted
pursuant to Article XI A, may establish a procedure for county fomuztion, consolidation, or boundary changes without regard

to the requirements of this section.
(b) No county seat shall be removed unless two-thirds of the qualified electors of the county, voting on the proposition
at a general election, shall vote in favor of ~ the removal. A proposition of removal shall not be submitted in
the same county more than once in four years.

w
(c) The Legislature shall provide for county powers, an elected county sheriff, an elected district attorney, an elected

assessor, and an elected governing body in each county. Except as provided in subdivision (b) of Section 4 of this
article, each governing body shall prescribe by ordinance the compensation of its members, but the ordinance prescribing
~ that compensation shall be subject to referendum. The Legislature or the governing body may provide for other
officers whose compensation shall be prescribed by the governing body. The governing body shall provide for the
number, compensation, tenure, and appointment of employees.

Section 5 of Article XI is <C:'-''"'"'-'";u.
lt shall b€!
in ~
~~~~in~w8t

charters
~~~~
~supersede

allla:w:s inconsistEmt therewith.
It &hall be competent in all
charters tG provide, in addition tG th96e
allov,rable by this Constitution,
aH4. by ~ la:w:s g£ the ~ £g.r.;. flj ~ constitution, regulation, an4 government g£ ~
~ ~ ~
subgovernment in all or part g£ a city ~ conduct g£ city elections and {4} plenary authorit;r is hereby granted, ~
~ tG the restrictions g£ this article, tG provide therein or by amendment thereto, the manner in ~ the method
by~ the times at~ and the terms for which the~ municipal gfficers and employees whose compensation
is paid by the city sl:lall be elected or appointed, and for their removal, and for their compensation, and for the number
G£ deputies, ~ an4 ~ employees that ea4 shall ~ and~~ compensation, method g£ appointment,
qualifications, tnnure g£ ~ and removal g£ &YCh dsputies, ~and~ employees.
Fifty-Second-That Section 5 is added to Article XI thereof, to read:
SEC. 5. (a) A city that adopts a charter may govern as to all matters with respect to municipal affairs, subject only to
~

limitations provided in the charter.
(b) A city charter may, among other things, provide for the government of the city, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) The selection, terms of office, and removal of city officers and employees.
(2) The conduct of city elections.
(c) An enactment or failure to act by a city governed by a charter is presumed to pertain to the city's municipal affairs.
In the event a charter-city enactment or failure to act conflicts with a general law, the burden of rebutting the presumption
rests with the person challenging the enactment or failure to act by the charter city. In rebutting that presumption, the challenger
shall show that the Legislature, in adopting the general law, expressly declared its intention that the law apply to charter cities
and supported that declaration with findings based on the criteria stated below. Furthermore, the challenger shall demonstrate
to the satisfaction of the court, exercising its independent judgment, one or more of the following:
(1) The charter city's enactment or failure to act significantly and directly interferes with the State's effective administration
of its health, justice, environmental, transportation, or social services systems.
(2) The enactment or failure to act has significant extraterritorial effects. To demonstrate the regulation has significant
extraterritorial effects, the challenger shall demonstrate all of the following:
(A) The enactment or failure to act affects significantly the health or behavior of people, or the operation of businesses or
governments outside the city's boundary.
(B) The enactment's primary, rather than incidental, effect is to regulate activities beyond the city's boundary.
(C) The effect is not merely speculative or theoretical.
(3) The State's public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the presumption of local control. For purposes of
this paragraph, the challenger shall demonstrate either of the following:
(A) The lack of statewide uniformity would present substantial obstacles to travel or to the ordinary and usual conduct of
business throughout the State.
(B) Statewide uniformity is essential, and not merely desirable, to advance an important policy of the State, and the means
selected is narrowly tailored to accomplish the enactment's purpose with the least intrusion on local control.
(d) A general law conflicts with a charter city enactment or failure to act when either the city enactment or failure to act
frustrates the goals sought to be achieved by the State in adopting the law, or compliance with both the general law and the
city enactment is either physically impossible or prohibitively expensive.
(e) The provisions of a home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, may not interfere with or derogate
the authority of a charter city with regard to its municipal affairs.
Fifty-Third-That Section 6 of Article XI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 6. (a) A county and all cities within it may consolidate as a charter city and county as provided by statute
or as provided in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A.
(b) A charter city and county is a charter city and a charter county. Its charter city powers supersede conflicting
charter county powers.
Fifty-Fourth-That Section 7 of Article XI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 7. A county or city may make and enforce, within its limits, all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances
and regulations not in conflict with general laws. A county or city that is not governed by a charter provided for in Section

3 or 4 that is a participant in a home rule community charter, as provided for in Article XI A, additionally shall possess the
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authority with respect to municipal affairs specified in Section 5 except as otherwise specified by the home rule community
charter.
Fifty-Fifth-That Section 8 of Article XI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 8. (a) The Legislature may provide that counties perform municipal functions at the request of cities within
them.
(b) If provided by their respective charters, a county may agree with a city within it to assume and discharge
specified municipal functions.

(c) Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (b), municipal functions may be perfonned, as prescribed in a home rule community
charter, as provided for in Article XI A.
Fifty-Sixth-that Section 13 of Article XI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 13. (a) The provisions of Sections~ subdivision (b) of Section 1 (except for the second sentence),~
subdivision (a) of Section 3, and Sections 4 7 and 5 ~ thls ~,as enacted in 1970, relating to matters affecting
the distribution of powers between the Legislature and cities and counties, including matters affecting supersession,
shall be construed as a restatement of all related provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to tRe
effective date~ thls amendment June 3, 1970, and as making no substantive change.
The terms general law, general laws, and laws, as used in this ~article, shall be construed as a continuation
and restatement of those terms as used in the Constitution in effect immediately prior to the effeetive date~ thls
amendment June 3, 1970, and not as effecting a change in meaning.

(b) The provisions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of Section 5 enacted in 1996 shall be construed as a restatement of all related
provisions of the Constitution in effect immediately prior to November 6, 1996, and as making no substantive change.
Fifty-Seventh-That Section 14 of Article XI is repealed.
SI!G.. .U.. A ~ government formed a£tel: the effeetive date ~ thls section, the boYndaries ~ whlcf\ inclYde
all GJ: part~ two GJ: ~ counties, Bhall nGt ~a property ~~~~rut-s been approved bf a majority
¥Gte ~the qualified ¥Gters ~ ~ ~ government ¥Gting nn the issue~ the~
Fifty-Eighth-That Section 15 of Article XI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 15. (a) All Except as otherwise prescribed in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A,
all revenues from taxes imposed pursuant to the Vehicle License Fee Law, or its successor, other than fees on trailer
coaches and mobilehomes, over and above the costs of collection and any refunds authorized by law, shall be allocated
to counties and cities according to statute.
(b) This section shall apply to those taxes imposed pursuant to that law on and after July 1 following tl:\e approval
G£ thls section bf the ¥Gters, 1986.
Fifty-Ninth-That Section 16 is added to Article XI thereof, to read:
SEC. 16. The Legislature shall provide for a uniform system of financial disclosure applicable to all local government
agencies. This disclosure shall include, but is not limited to, revenues from all sources, expenditures for all purposes,
debts, and liabilities.
Sixtieth-That Article XI A is added thereto, to read:
ARTICLE X/A
HOME RULE COMMUNITY CHARTERS

SECTION 1. (a) On or before February 1, 1997, a citizens' charter commission on local government efficiency and restructuring
shall be appointed in each county. The commission shall consist of persons appointed as follows:
(1) The board of supervisors shall appoint five persons, two of whom are officers or employees of a local government agency.
(2) The cities within the county shall jointly appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, six persons, three
of whom are officers or employees of a local government agency. In any county in which there is no city, the appointments
described in this paragraph shall be made by the board of supervisors.
(3) The school districts within the county shall jointly appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, two
persons, one of whom is an officer or employee of a local government agency.
(4) The special districts within the county, not excluding any special district for which the board of supervisors is the governing
board, shall appoint, pursuant to a procedure to be established by statute, two persons, one of whom is an officer or employee
of a local government agency.
(b) By resolution of the boards of supervisors, several counties may form a multicounty commission and adopt a multicounty
charter.
(c) "Local government agency," for purposes of this article, includes any city, county, city and county, school district, special
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district, authority, or other political subdivision of or within the State.
(d) The commission may appoint additional members to the commission, subject to the condition that a majority of the members
of the commission consists of persons who are neither officers nor employees of any local government agency.
(e) For purposes of this article:
(1) "Citizens' charter commission on local government efficiency and restructuring" or "commission" means the body appointed
pursuant to Section 1, which is responsible for developing a government services plan and community charter within a county.
(2) "Community charter" means the implementing grant of authority for the governmental services plan, which provides
for greater public accountability in the delivery and financing of local governmental services. A community charter is a grant
of authority for those actions required to implement the governmental services plan.
(3) "Governmental services plan" means a plan for the delivery and financing of a variety of local governmental services
as described in Section 2.
SEC. 2. Each commission shall develop and adopt a governmental services plan, which shall address the delivery and financing
of local government services. The government services plan shall contain the following:
(a) Changes that will result in a reduction in the number of local government agencies and the cost of local government,
taking into consideration the geography, population density, and other factors that influence the operation of local government.
The goal of these changes shall be to reduce the cost of local government and the number of local government agencies.
(b) Changes that will result in greater accountability to the public.
(c) Specifications that designate which local government agencies are responsible for the delivery of certain services, the local
agency governing entity responsible for each service, and the method of financing that service. Specifications in the plan also
shall designate which local government agencies are responsible for comprehensive and functional planning. The agencies responsible
for land use regulation shall be required to simplify, and increase the efficiency of existing land use regulation procedures.
(d) A multiyear capital outlay plan for infrastructure needs in the jurisdiction covered by the charter and the local government
agencies responsible for implementation of the capital outlay plan.
(e) The organization and administration of programs administered jointly by the State and local government agencies in
accordance with any state-local government realignment plan adopted pursuant to Section 3.5 of Article V .
(j) The allocation of the nonschool share of the property tax, Bradley-Bums Uniform Local Sales and Use Tax-Law revenue,
and vehicle license fee revenue. The plan may impose terms and conditions under which any local
agency covered
by the charter may levy any local tax otherwise authorized by state law.
(g) Procedures for the organization, reorganization, and boundaries of local government
covered the charter. The
governmental services plan may include subcounty components.
SEC. 3. (a) The commission shall develop a community charter that is consistent
and
a framework for
implementing, the governmental services plan described in Section 2. The community charter shall be submitted to the voters
as provided in Section 7.
(b) A subcounty region that includes one or more local government agencies may develop and propose to the voters of that
region a subcounty charter that provides for the structure and authority of the agency or
involved. That subcounty
charter shall be consistent with the charter adopted by the commission pursuant to Section 2.
(c) If a charter is not approved by the voters, as proposed by a plan pursuant to Section 2, a subcounty charter may be proposed
and approved pursuant to this section that is not in conflict with the plan adopted by the commission pursuant to Section 2.
SEC. 4. General obligation bond indebtedness incurred by a local government agency, in implementing the multiyear capital
outlay plan specified in subdivision (d) of Section 2, that is included under a charter adopted pursuant to this article may be
incurred only with the approval of a majority of the voters voting on the proposal.
SEC. 5. (a) Any new tax or increase in an existing tax levied for general or special purposes, except any tax as described
in Section 1 of Article XIII A may be imposed by a local government agency governed by a charter adopted pursuant to this
article with the approval of a majority of the governing board of the agency and a majority of the voters voting on the proposal.
A charter adopted pursuant to this article may provide expressly for a higher vote requirement as to either or both of the vote
requirements described in this subdivision.
(b) Where local government agencies are governed by a charter adopted pursuant to this article, taxes may be countywide
or effective in a region of the county that is under the jurisdiction of one or more agencies.
(c) In the case of charter cities, the authority to levy taxes may not be reduced or restricted by this article or the community
charter.
SEC. 6. (a) An enactment or failure to act by a city or county participating in a community charter is presumed to pertain
to that agency's municipal affairs. In the event an enactment or failure to act is alleged to conflict with a general law, the burden
of rebutting the presumption rests with the person challenging the enactment or failure to act by the city or county, as the
case may be. In rebutting that presumption, the challenger shall show that the Legislature, in adopting the general law, expressly
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declared its intention that the law apply to a city or county participating in a community charter and supported that declaration
with findings based on the criteria stated below. The challenger shall prove to the satisfaction of the court, exercising its independent
judgment, one or more of the following:
(1) The enactment or failure to act significantly and directly interferes with the State's effective administration of its health,
justice, environmental, transportation, or social services systems.
(2) The enactment or failure to act has significant extraterritorial effects. To demonstrate the regulation has significant
extraterritorial effects, the challenger shall prove all of the following:
(A) The enactment or failure to act affects significantly the health or behavior of people, or the operation of businesses or
governments outside the agency's boundary.
(B) The enactment's primary, rather than incidental, effect is to regulate activities beyond the agency's boundary.
(C) The effect is not merely speculative or theoretical.
(3) The State's public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the ordinary predisposition toward local control.
To demonstrate that the public policy interest in statewide uniformity outweighs the ordinary predisposition toward local control,
the challenger shall prove all of the following:
(A) The lack of statewide uniformity would present substantial obstacles to travel or to the ordinary and usual conduct of
business throughout the State.
(B) Statewide uniformity is essential, and not merely desirable, to advance an important policy of the State and the means
selected is narrowly tailored to accomplish the enactment's purpose with the least intrusion on local control.
(b) A general law conflicts with an enactment or failure to act when either the enactment or failure to act frustrates the
goals sought to be achieved by the State in adopting the law, or compliance with both the general law and the enactment is
either physically impossible or prohibitively expensive.
SEC. 7. The commission established pursuant to Section 1 shall submit the proposed plan for a charter to the voters in
the county on or before the general election on November 7, 2000. Approval of the charter requires a majority vote of the voters
voting in the election.
SEC. 8. Of the costs incurred by local government agencies to form the commissions specified in Section 1, to provide for
the administrative costs of these commissions, and to conduct the election required by Section 7, 50 percent shall be paid by
those agencies and 50 percent by the State, pursuant to procedures specified by statute.
Sixty-First-That subdivision (j) of Section 3 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read:
G) Immature forest trees planted on lands not previously bearing merchantable timber or planted or of natural
growth on lands from which the merchantable original growth timber stand to the extent of 70 percent of all trees
over 16 inches in diameter has been removed. Forest trees or timber shall be considered mature at such time after
40 years from the time of planting or removal of the original timber when so declared by a majority vote of a board
consisting of a representative from the State Board of Forestry, a representative from the State &al:4 Gf Eqyalization
state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article XIII, and the assessor of the county
in which the trees are located.
The Legislature may supersede the foregoing provisions with an alternative system or systems of taxing or exempting
forest trees or timber, including a taxation system not based on property valuation. Any alternative system or systems
shall provide for exemption of unharvested immature trees, shall encourage the continued use of timberlands for
the production of trees for timber products, and shall provide for restricting the use of timberland to the production
of timber products and compatible uses with provisions for taxation of timberland based on the restrictions. Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed to exclude timberland from the provisions of Section 8 of this article.
Sixty-Second-That subdivision (g) of Section 11 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read:
(g) Any assessment made pursuant to~ nw tG ~ inclmive, Gf tRis Amel@ subdivisions (a) to (d), inclusive,
shall be subject to review, equalization, and adjustment by the State &aJ:G Gf Eq~aalization state government entity
designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article, but an any adjustment shall conform to tile provisionB
Gf ~ Sections those subdivisions.
Sixty-Third-That Section 16 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 16. (a) The county board of supervisors, or one or more assessment appeals boards created by the county
board of supervisors, shall constitute the county board of equalization for a county. Two or more county boards
of supervisors may jointly create one or more assessment appeals boards which shall constitute the county board
of equalization for each of the participating counties.
~ as provided in sttbdivision {gj Gf Section U., t:M
(b) The county board of equalization, under SY.4 rules of notice as the county board may prescribe, shall equalize
the values of all property on the local assessment roll by adjusting individual assessments.
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(c) County boards of supervisors shall fix the compensation for members of assessment appeals boards, furnish
clerical and other assistance for those boards, and adopt rules of notice and procedures for those boards as may be required
to facilitate their work and to ~ ensure uniformity in the processing and decision of equalization petitions, and
may provide for their discontinuance.
(d) The Legislature shall provide by statute for each of the following: W ~
(1) The number and qualifications of members of assessment appeals boards, the manner of selecting, appointing, and removing
them, and the terms for which they serve 1 af\4 W the.
(2) The procedure by which two or more county boards of supervisors may jointly create one or more assessment
appeals boards.
Sixty-Fourth-That Section 17 of Article XIII thereof is repealed.
£EG.. J.7. +Re ~ g£ EquaJigation consists g£ e ¥Gting ITI.@mbsrs: ~ Controllsr af\4 4 msmbsrs slsctsd fur 4~ t8rms at gubsmatorial slsctions. +Re statE! sllall b8 dividsd intG fum: ~ g£ Equalii!:ation districts with ~
~ g£ ~ district slscting ~ msmbsr. WG msmbsr 1naf ~ ~ tRaro ~ tElrms.
Sixty-Fifth-That Section 18 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 18. The ~ Legislature shall designate by statute the state government entity that shall both measure county
assessment levels annually and sl:lall bring those levels into conformity by adjusting entire secured local assessment
rolls. In the event a property tax is levied by the statE! State, however, the effects of unequalized local assessment
levels, to the extent any remain after~ those adjustments, shall be corrected for purposes of distributing this tax
by equalizing the assessment levels of locally and state-assessed properties and varying the rate of the state tax inversely
with the counties' respective assessment levels.
Sixty-Sixth-That Section 18.5 is added to Article XIII thereof, to read:

SEC. 18.5. (a) The Legislature shall establish by statute in the state government the Board of Tax Appeals, which shall
be vested with all powers and duties necessary to conduct the de novo administrative review of all tax matter determinations
made by the state governmental entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article.
(b) The board shall be composed of five members appointed by the Governor, subject to confirmation by the Senate.
Sixty-Seventh-That Section 19 of Article XIII thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 19. (a) The~ state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article annually
shall annually assess (l} pipelines, flumes, canals, ditches, and aqueducts lying within~ two or more counties, and
~ property, except franchises, owned or used by regulated railway, telegraph, or telephone companies, car companies
operating on railways in the State, and companies transmitting or selling gas or electricity. This property shall be
subject to taxation to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.
No other tax or license charge may be imposed on these companies .whl4 that differs from that imposed on
mercantile, manufacturing, and other business corporations. This restriction does not release a utility company from
payments agreed on or required by law for a special privilege or franchise granted by a government body.
(b) The Legislature may authorize~ asssssmsnt g£ the state government entity designated by statute pursuant
to Section 18 of this article to also assess property owned or used by other public utilities.
The ~state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of this article may delegate to
a local assessor the duty to assess a property used but not owned by a state assessee on which the taxes are to be
paid by a local assessee.
Sixty-Eighth-That subdivision (h) of Section 28 of Article XIII thereof is repealed.
{l:\j +Re ~ providsd fur b:y thls ssction sBall b8 assssssd b:y ~ £tats ~ g£ Equalii!:ation.
Sixty-Ninth-That Section 1 of Article XIII A thereof is amended to read:
SECTION 1. (a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real property shall not exceed OnE! one percent
(1%) of the full cash value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax tG shall be collected by the counties and
apportioned according to law to the districts within the counties, except that a home rule community charter adopted
pursuant to Article XI A may provide otherwise for the apportionment of the nonschool share of the proceeds of that tax.
(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special assessments to
pay the interest and redemption charges on (1) any indebtedness approved by the voters prior to July 1, 1978, or
(2) any bonded indebtedness for the acquisition or improvement of real property approved on or after July 1, 1978,
by two-thirds of the votes cast by the voters voting on the proposition.

(c) The limitation provided in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes imposed on real property in a unified school
district for the support of the unified school district approved on or after January 1, 1997, by two-thirds of the votes cast by
the voters voting on the proposition. However, the total amount of revenues proposed to be generated by the ad valorem taxes
pursuant to this subdivision shall not exceed an amount equal to 10 percent of the total statewide average revenue limit per
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Seventieth-That Section 4 of Article XIII
SECTION

SEC 4.

thereof

amended to read:

wicciu•fw<•c 11.'lrf:lr1Ylf1hna

1m1oo~;e

in which the proposition
the

in home rule Cn111m'U111W Charter adc>ptt~d

by a two-thirds vote of the 4'-""-'H<c:u electors of such
"'"""·"u taxes on such
except ad valorem taxes on real nrrw'"'',..~""
,..,.,".,"'"h' within SY4
County the city, county, or
district.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision
commencing
1997-98 fiscal year and each fiscal year thereafter, a county, by
a majority vote of the voters voting on the proposition, may impose a transactions and use tax in the county not to exceed
the rate of 1/2 percent, for the purpose of making disbursements for the support of school districts within the county in an
equal amount per
in enrollment in each such school district.
Seventy-First-That Section 1 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read:
SECTION 1. (a) The total annual appropriations subject to limitation of the State and of each local government
shall not exceed the appropriations limit of the entity of government for the prior year adjusted for the change in
the cost of living and the change in population, except as otherwise provided in this article.

(b) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Seventy-Second-That Section 1 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read:
SECTION 1. (a) The total appropriations of the State for a two-year fiscal period, as specified in Section 12.1 of Article

rv; that are subject to limitation shall not exceed the appropriations limit of the State for the prior two-year fiscal period adjusted
for the change in the cost of living and the change in population, except as otherwise provided in this article.
(b) The total annual appropriations subject to limitation of each local government shall not exceed the appropriations limit
of the entity of government for the prior year adjusted for the change in the cost of living and the change in population, except
as otherwise provided in this article.
(c) This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001.
Sev~nty- Third-That Section 2 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 2. (a) (1) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately
following it in excess of the amount ~ that may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article
during that fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be transferred and allocated, from a fund
established for that purpose, pursuant to Section 8.5 of Article XVI.
(2) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately following
it in excess of the amount ~ that may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article during that
fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules
within the next two subsequent fiscal years.
(b) All revenues received by an entity of government, other than the State, in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year
immediately following it in excess of the amount wl:H4 that may be appropriated by the entity in compliance with
this article during that fiscal year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of
tax rates or fee schedules within the next two subsequent fiscal years.

(c) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Seventy-Fourth-That Section 2 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read:

SEC. 2. (a) (1) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a two-year fiscal period in excess of the amount that
may be appropriated by the State in compliance with this article during that period shall be transferred and allocated, from
a fund established for that purpose, pursuant to Section 8.5 of Article XVI.
(2) Fifty percent of all revenues received by the State in a two-year fiscal period in excess of the amount that may be appropriated
by the State in compliance with this article during that period shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules within
the next fiscal period.
(b) All revenues received by an entity of government, other than the State, in a fiscal year and in the fiscal year immediately
following it in excess of the amount that may be appropriated by the entity in compliance with this article during that fiscal
year and the fiscal year immediately following it shall be returned by a revision of tax rates or fee schedules within the next
two subsequent fiscal years.
(c) This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001.
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Seventy-Fifth-That Section 3 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read:
SEC 3. The appropriations limit for any fiscal year
to £ee,. Section 1 shall be adjusted as follows:
In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is
in whole or in
whether
by
or otherwise, from one entity of government to
for the year in which
&Y4 the transfer becomes effective, the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable
amount as the saki affected entities shall mutually agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall
be decreased by the same amount.
(b) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, from an
entity of government to a private entity, or the financial source for the provision of services is transferred, in whole
or in part, from other revenues of an entity of government, to regulatory licenses, user charges or user fees, then,
for the year of ~ that transfer, the appropriations limit of ~ the affected entity of government shall be decreased
accordingly.
(c) (1) In the event an emergency is declared by the legislative body of an entity of government, the appropriations
limit of the affected entity of government may be exceeded, provided that the appropriations limits in the following
three years are reduced accordingly to prevent an aggregate increase in appropriations resulting from the emergency.
(2) In the event an emergency is declared by the Governor, appropriations approved by a two-thirds vote of the
legislative body of an affected entity of government to an emergency account for expenditures relating to that emergency
shall not constitute appropriations subject to limitation. As used in this paragraph, "emergency" means the existence,
as declared by the Governor, of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within
the State, or parts thereof, caused by such conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the
United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.

(d) This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Seventy-Sixth-That Section 3 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read:
SEC. 3. The appropriations limit for any two-year fiscal period, in the case of the State, or for one fiscal year, in the case

of local government, pursuant to Section 1 shall be adjusted as follows:
(a) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, whether by annexation,
incorporation or otherwise, from one entity of government to another, then, for the period in which the transfer becomes effective,
the appropriations limit of the transferee entity shall be increased by such reasonable amount as the affected entities mutually
shall agree and the appropriations limit of the transferor entity shall be decreased by the same amount.
(b) In the event that the financial responsibility of providing services is transferred, in whole or in part, from an entity of
government to a private entity, or the financial source for the provision of services is transferred, in whole or in part, from
other revenues of an entity of government, to regulatory licenses, user charges or user fees, then, for the year of that transfer,
the appropriations limit of the affected entity of government shall be decreased accordingly.
(c) (1) In the event an emergency is declared by the legislative body of an entity of government, the appropriations limit
of the affected entity of government may be exceeded, provided that the appropriations limits in the following two fiscal periods,
in the case of the State, or three fiscal years, in the case of local government, are reduced accordingly to prevent an aggregate
increase in appropriations resulting from the emergency.
(2) In the event an emergency is declared by the Governor, appropriations approved by a two-thirds vote of the legislative
body of an affected entity of government to an emergency account for expenditures relating to that emergency shall not constitute
appropriations subject to limitation. As used in this paragraph, "emergency" means the existence, as declared by the Governor,
of conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons and property within the State, or parts thereof; caused by
such conditions as attack or probable or imminent attack by an enemy of the United States, fire, flood, drought, storm, civil
disorder, earthquake, or volcanic eruption.
This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001.
Seventy-Seventh-That Section 5.5 of Article XIII B thereof is repealed.
~ ~ Prudent £tat@ Reserve. ~ Legislature shall establish a prudent statE! reserve frm4 in ~ amount
as it shall~ reasonable an4 necessary. Contributions to;. an4 'Nithdrawals ~the frm4 shall~~ w the
provisions G£ Section ~ G£ this Article.
Seventy-Eighth-That Section 8 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read:
SEC 8. As used in this article and except as otherwise expressly provided herein:
(a) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of the State means any authorization to expend during a fiscal year
the proceeds of taxes levied by or for the State, exclusive of Stat@ state subventions for the use and operation of local
government (other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) and further exclusive of refunds of taxes, benefit
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payments from retirement, unemployment insurance, and disability insurance funds.
means any authorization to <>YT,Pn.n
(b) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of an entity of local
a fiscal year the
of taxes levied by or for that
and the
of £tate state ""'"'"''n"
to that
(other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) exclusive of refunds of taxes.
(c) "Proceeds of taxes" shall include, but not be restricted to, all tax revenues and the proceeds to an entity of
government, from (1) regulatory licenses, user charges, and user fees to the extent that those proceeds exceed the
costs reasonably borne by that entity in providing the regulation, product, or service, and (2) the investment of tax
revenues. With respect to any local government, "proceeds of taxes" shall include subventions received from the
State, other than pursuant to Section 6, and, with respect to the State, proceeds of taxes shall exclude 8Y4 these
subventions.
(d) "Local government" means any city, county, city and county, school district, special district, authority, or other
political subdivision of or within the State.
(e) (1) "Change in the cost of living" for the State, a school district, or a community college district means the
percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding year.
(2) "Change in the cost of living" for an entity of local government, other than a school district or a community
college district, shall be either (A) the percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding
year, or (B) the percentage change in the local assessment roll from the preceding year for the jurisdiction due to
the addition of local nonresidential new construction. Each entity of local government shall select its change in the
cost of living pursuant to this paragraph annually by a recorded vote of the entity's governing body.
(f) "Change in population" of any entity of government, other than the State, a school district, or a community
college district, shall be determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature.
"Change in population" of a school district or a community college district shall be the percentage change in the
average daily attendance of the school district or the number offull-time equivalent students of the community college
district from the preceding fiscal year, as determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature.
"Change in population" of the State shall be determined by adding (1) the percentage change in the State's population
multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior fiscal year that is expended for other than educational
purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges, and (2) the percentage change
in the total statewide average daily attendance in kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the number of
full-time equivalent students in the community colleges, multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior
fiscal year that is expended for educational purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the
community colleges.
Any determination of population pursuant to this subdivision, other than that measured by average daily attendance
or the number of full-time equivalent students , shall be revised, as necessary, to reflect the periodic census conducted
by the United States Department of Commerce, or successor department.
(g) "Debt service" means appropriations required to pay the cost of interest and redemption charges, including
the funding of any reserve or sinking fund required in connection therewith, on indebtedness existing or legally
authorized as of January 1, 1979, or on bonded indebtedness thereafter approved according to law by a vote of the
electors of the issuing entity voting in an election for that purpose.
(h) The "appropriations limit" of each entity of government for each fiscal year is that amount~ that total
annual appropriations subject to limitation may not exceed under Sections 1 and 3. However, the "appropriations
limit" of each entity of government for the 1978-79 fiscal year 1978/79 is the total of the appropriations subject to
limitation of the entity for that fiscal year. For the 1978-79 fiscal year 1978/79, £tate state subventions to local
governments, exclusive of federal grants, are deemed to have been derived from the proceeds of £tate state taxes.
(i) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5, "appropriations subject to limitation" do not include local agency
loan funds or indebtedness funds, or investment (or authorizations to invest) funds of the State, or of an entity of
local government in accounts at banks or savings and loan associations or in liquid securities.
This section shall not apply to any fiscal period commencing on or after July 1, 2001. This section shall remain in effect
only until July 1, 2001, and as of that date is repealed.
Seventy-Ninth-That Section 8 is added to Article XIII B thereof, to read:

SEC. 8. As used in this article, and except as otherwise expressly provided herein:
(a) "Appropriations subject to limitation" of the State means any authorization to expend during a two-year fiscal period
the proceeds of taxes levied by or for the State, exclusive of state subventions for the use and operation of local government
(other than subventions made pursuant to Section 6) and further exclusive of refunds of taxes, benefit payments from retirement,
unemployment insurance, and disability insurance funds.
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and (2) the investment tax revenues. With respect to
shall include subventions received from the State, other than
to Section 6, and, with
nrt1f"t>•>r1<::. of taxes shall exclude these subventions.
(d) "Local government" means any
city and county, school district, special district, authority, or other political
subdivision of or within the State.
(1) "Change in the cost
the State, a school district, or a community college district means the percentage
change in California per capita personal
the preceding two-year fiscal period, in the case of the
or one fiscal
year, in the case of a school district or community college district.
(2) "Change in the cost living" for an entity of local government, other than a school district or a community college
district, shall be either (A) the percentage change in California per capita personal income from the preceding year, or (B) the
percentage change in the local assessment roll from the preceding year for the jurisdiction due to the addition of local nonresidential
new construction. Each entity of local government shall select its change in the cost of living pursuant to this paragraph annually
by a recorded vote of the entity's governing body.
(j) "Change in population" of any entity of government, other than the State, a school district, or a community college district,
shall be determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature.
"Change in population" of a school district or a community college district shall be the percentage change in the average
daily attendance of the school district or the number of full-time equivalent students of the community college district from
the preceding fiscal year, as determined by a method prescribed by the Legislature.
"Change in population" of the State shall be determined by adding (1) the percentage change in the State's population multiplied
by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior two-year fiscal period that is expended for other than educational purposes
for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges, and (2) the percentage change in the total statewide
average daily attendance in kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the number of full-time equivalent students in
the community colleges, multiplied by the percentage of the State's budget in the prior two-year fiscal period that is expended
for educational purposes for kindergarten and grades one to 12, inclusive, and the community colleges.
Any determination of population pursuant to this subdivision, other than that measured by average daily attendance or the
number of full-time equivalent students, shall be revised, as necessary, to reflect the periodic census conducted by the United
States Department of Commerce, or successor department.
(g) "Debt service" means appropriations required to pay the cost of interest and redemption charges, including the funding
of any reserve or sinking fund required in connection therewith, on indebtedness existing or legally authorized as of January
1, 1979, or on bonded indebtedness thereafter approved according to law by a vote of the electors of the issuing entity voting
in an election for that purpose.
(h) The "appropriations limit" of each entity of government for each fiscal period, as appropriate, is that amount that total
appropriations subject to limitation may not exceed under Sections 1 and 3. However, the "appropriations limit" of each entity
of government for the 1978-79 fiscal year is the total of the appropriations subject to limitation of the entity for that fiscal
year. For the 1978-79 fiscal year, state subventions to local governments, exclusive of federal grants, are deemed to have been
derived from the proceeds of state taxes.
(i) Except as otherwise provided in Section 5, "appropriations subject to limitation" do not include local agency loan funds
or indebtedness funds, or investment (or authorizations to invest) funds of the State, or of an entity of local government in
accounts at banks or savings and loan associations or in liquid securities.
This section shall apply only to fiscal periods commencing on or after July 1, 2001.
Eightieth-that Section 10.5 of Article XIII B thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 10.5. (a) For fiscal years beginning on or after July 1, 1990, the appropriations limit of each entity of government
shall be the appropriations limit for the 1986-87 fiscal year, adjusted for the changes made from that fiscal year pursuant
to this article, as amended by the measure adding this section, adjusted for the changes required by Section 3.

(b) In the case of the State, beginning with the two-year fiscal period commencing on July 1, 2001, the appropriations limit
shall be the appropriations limit for the 2000-2001 fiscal year, adjusted for the changes made from that fiscal year pursuant
to this article and adjusted for the changes required by Section 3.
Eighty-First-That Section 1.2 is added to Article XVI thereof, to read:

SEC. 1.2.

Except as to any indebtedness approved by the voters pursuant to Section 1, during any fiscal period for which
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a budget bill is to be, or has been, enacted pursuant to Section 12 or 12.1, as applicable, of Article IV, the Legislature shall
not in any manner create any debt or debts, or liability or liabilities, unless the debt or debts, or liability or liabilities, are repaid
during that same fiscal period. For purposes of this section, "debt or debts, or liability or liabilities" includes an obligation for
which an appropriation is made from anticipated funds, but does not include borrowing between state funds.
Eighty-Second-That Section 8 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 8. (a) From all state revenues there shall first be set apart the moneys to be applied by the State for support
of the ~ ~ system aA4 ~ instit:Htions ~ ~ ed1:1cation Public School System.
(b) Commencing with the 1990-91 fiscal year, the moneys to be applied by the State for the support of~
districts aA4 comnumity college districts the Public School System for any fiscal year shall be not less than the greater
of the following amounts:
(1) The amount~ that, as a percentage of General Fund revenues whicll that may be appropriated pursuant
to Article XIII B, equals the percentage of General Fund revenues appropriated for~ districts and community
college districts, respectively, the Public School System in the 1986-87 fiscal year 1936/87.
(2) The amount required to ensure that the total allocations to ~ districts aA4 community oollege districts
the Public School System from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated
local proceeds of taxes shall not be less than the total amount from these sources in the prior fiscal year, excluding
any revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for changes in enrollment and adjusted
for the change in the cost of living pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 8 of Article XIII B. This
paragraph shall be operative only in a fiscal year in which the percentage growth in California per capita personal
income is less than or equal to the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues plus ~ AaU one-half
of one percent.
(3) (A) The amount required to ensure that the total allocations to~ districts nn4 community~ districts
the Public School System from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated
local proceeds of taxes shall equal the total amount from these sources in the prior fiscal year, excluding any revenues
allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for changes in enrollment and adjusted for the change
in per capita General Fund revenues.
(B) In addition, an amount equal to one-half of one percent times the prior year total allocations to school districts
-tm4 commYnity colleges from General Fund proceeds of taxes appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B and allocated
local proceeds of taxes, excluding any revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) of Section 8.5, adjusted for
changes in enrollment.
(C) ::t:Ws pa,r:agraph Paragraph (3) shall be operative only in a fiscal year in which the percentage growth in California
per capita personal income in a ~ year is greater than the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues
plus ~ AaU one-half of one percent.
(c) In any fiscal year, if the amount computed pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) exceeds the amount
computed pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) by a difference that exceeds one and one-half percent of General
Fund revenues, the amount in excess of one and one-half percent of General Fund revenues shall not be considered
allocations to ~ districts nn4 commYnity colleges the Public School System for purposes of computing the amount
of state aid pursuant to paragraph (2) or ~ (3) of subdivision (b) in the subsequent fiscal year.
(d) In any fiscal year in which scOOol districts nn4 comml:lnity ~districts are the Public School System is allocated
funding pursuant to paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) or pursuant to subdivision W (g), tAey the Public School System
shall be entitled to a maintenance factor, equal to the difference between (1) the amount of General Fund moneys
~ that would have been appropriated pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) if that paragraph had been
operative or the amount of General Fund moneys ~ that would have been appropriated pursuant to subdivision
(b) had subdivision (b) not been suspended, and (2) the amount of General Fund moneys actually appropriated
to ~ districts aA4 comnumity college districts the Public School System in that fiscal year.
(e) The maintenance factor for ~ districts aA4 cOIIltn.'IIDity CGilege districts the Public School System determined
pursuant to subdivision (d) shall be adjusted annually for changes in enrollment, and adjusted for the change in
the cost of living pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (e) of Section 8 of Article XIII B, until it has been allocated
in full. The maintenance factor shall be allocated in a manner determined by the Legislature in each fiscal year in
which the percentage growth in per capita General Fund revenues exceeds the percentage growth in California per
capita personal income. The maintenance factor shall be reduced each fiscal year by the amount allocated by the
Legislature in that fiscal year. The minimum maintenance factor amount to be allocated in a fiscal year shall be equal
to the product of General Fund revenues from proceeds of taxes and one-half of the difference between the percentage
growth in per capita General Fund revenues from proceeds of taxes and in California per capita personal income,
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not to exceed the total dollar amount of the maintenance factor.
(f) For purposes of this section, "changes in enrollment" shall be measured by the percentage change in average
daily attendance. However, in any fiscal year, there shall be no adjustment for decreases in enrollment between the
prior fiscal year and the current fiscal year unless there have been decreases in enrollment between the second prior
fiscal year and the prior fiscal year and between the third prior fiscal year and the second prior fiscal year.

w

(g) Subparagraph (B) of paragraph (3) of subdivision (b) may be suspended for one fiscal year only when made
part of or included within any bill enacted pursuant to Section 12 of Article IV. All other provisions of subdivision
(b) may be suspended for one fiscal year by the enactment of an urgency statute pursuant to Section 8 of Article
N, provided that the urgency statute may not be made part of or included within any bill enacted pursuant to Section
12 of Article IV.
(h) For the purposes of this section, "allocated local proceeds of taxes" does not include any tax imposed pursuant to Section
5 of Article XI, any ad valorem real property tax imposed pursuant to subdivision (c) of Section 1 of Article XIIIA, or any
tax imposed pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 4 of Article XIII A.
(i) Commencing with the 1997-98 fiscal year, and each fiscal year thereafter, for the purpose of making computations pursuant
to paragraphs (2) and (3) of subdivision (b), any amount appropriated for the support of the Public School System from General
Fund revenues that may be appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B in the prior fiscal year that exceeds the amount that was
required to be appropriated from those revenues for that prior fiscal year pursuant to paragraph (1) or (2) of subdivision (b),
as applicable, shall be included within the amounts appropriated for the support of the Public School System from General Fund
revenues that may be appropriated pursuant to Article XIII B in that prior fiscal year only if the Legislature specifically so
provides.
(j) For the fiscal period commencing July 1, 2001, and for each subsequent fiscal period, "fiscal year," as used in this section,
shall be deemed to refer to one of the two 12-month periods from July 1 to June 30, inclusive, that comprise collectively the
two-year fiscal period described in subdivision (a) of Section 12.1 of Article IV. The Legislature shall identify, in the budget
act for each of those fiscal periods, the amount of the appropriations made by that budget act that apply for the support of the
Public School System for purposes of this section for each of the two fiscal years within that fiscal period. Additional state funding
determined to be required under this section for the second fiscal year of a fiscal period may be appropriated in the budget rebalancing
bill or other appropriate statute.
Eighty-Third-That Section 8.5 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 8.5. (a) In addition to the amount required to be applied for the support of~ districts nn4 community
college districts the Public School System pursuant to Section 8, .tl:\@ CootroUsr BhaJ1 during each fiscal ~ period the
Controller shall transfer and allocate all revenues available pursuant to paragraph 1 of subdivision (a) of Section 2
of Article XIII B to that portion of the State School Fund restricted for elementary and high school purpose~ ~
w .tl:\at portion Gf .tl:\@ ~ ~ I4m4 fli!StrictE!d £ol: community college purposE!s, rE!spE~cti.vE~ly, in proportion w
~ E!nroll-IRE~nt in ~ districts ~ community coUE!ge districts rli!SpE!ctivE~ly.
fJ,j Witk rli!Spect w £un4> allocated w taat portioo Gf .tl:\@ ~ ~ I4m4 restricted £ol: elementary ~ Aigh
~purposes, no
(b) No transfer or allocation of funds pursuant to this section shall be required at any time that the Director of
Finance and the Superintendent of Public Instruction mutually determine that current annual expenditures per student
equal or exceed the average annual expenditure per student of the 10 states with the highest annual expenditures
per student for elementary and high schools, and that average class size equals or is less than the average class size
of the 10 states with the lowest class size for elementary and high schools.
~ With respect w £unGs allocated w tRat portioo ef thE! £tate~ Iiund fli!Stricted fur community colleg9 purposes,
no transfer Gr allocatioo ef £un4> pursuant w thls 69ctinn BhaJ1 bE! rE~quifli!d at any tim@ tRat thE! Director Gf FinancE!
and ~ ChancE!Uor Gf .tl:\@ California Community CollegE!s muwally dE!tE!rminE! that currE!nt annual E!XpE!ndiW.fli!s
pEl~' studE!nt fui: community collegE~s in thls StatE! equal Gr ~ thE! av9ragE! annual E!XpE!nditufE! per studE!nt Gf .tl:\@
W stat9s with .tl:\@ highE!st annual 9XpE!ndituf9s pEl~' studE!nt £ol: community collE~gE!s.
{Pj
(c) Notwithstanding .tl:\@ provisions ef Article XIII B, funds allocated pursuant to this section shall not constitute
appropriations subject to limitation.

w

(d) From any funds transferred to the State School Fund pursuant to subdivision (a), the Controller shall, each

~fiscal

period, allocate to each school district ~ community collE~gE! district an equal amount per enrollment
in the school districts district from the amount in that portion of the State School Fund restricted for elementary and
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high school purposes aH4 nn ~ amount ~ enrollment m community college districts £rom tHat portion Gf .fu.@
State ~ Ilun4 restricted fur community college purposes.

w

(e) All revenues allocated pursuant to subdivision (a) shall be expended solely for the purposes of instructional
improvement and accountability as required by law.

w

(j) Any school district maintaining an elementary or secondary school shall develop and cause to be prepared
an annual audit accounting for sucll ~ revenue received pursw:mt to this section, and shall adopt a School Accountability
Report Card for each school.
Eighty-Fourth-That Section 10 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read:
SEC 10. Whenever the United States government or any officer or agency thereof shall provide pensions or other
aid for the aged, co-operation by the State therewith and therein is hereby authorized in such manner and to such
extent as may be provided by law.
The money expended by any county, city and county, municipality, district or other political subdivision of this
State made available under the provisions of this section shall not be considered as a part of the base for determining
the maximum expenditure for any given year permissible under Section 20 of Article Xl of this Constitution independent
of the vote of the electors or authorization by the £tate ~ Gf Equalization state government entity designated by

the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article XIII .
Eighty-Fifth-That Section 18 of Article XVI thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 18. We (a) Except in the case of general obligation bond indebtedness incurred by a local government agency included
in a home rule community charter adopted pursuant to Article XI A, no county, city, town, township, .ooard e£ education7
or school district7 shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in
year
the income and revenue provided for such that year, without the unless both of the following conditions are met:
(1) The indebtedness or liability receives the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof, voting at an election
to be held for that purpose, except that with respect to ;;my; such, for any public entity which that is authorized to
incur indebtedness for public school purposes, any proposition for the incurrence of indebtedness in the form of
general obligation bonds for the purpose of constructing, repairing,
or
public school
d€ltermined, m .fu.€! manner prescribed ~
w be structurally ~ fui: ~ ~
be
approval of a majority of the qualified electors of the
on the orcmc,sitton
HGF~~.

(2) Before or at the time of incurring sucll the indebtedness,
~ be is made for the collection of an annual
tax sufficient to pay the interest on such the indebtedness as it falls
and &lGG
to constitute provide for
a sinking fund for the payment of the principal thereof, on or before maturity, which shall not exceed forty years
from the time of contracting the ~ provided, however, anything to the
~
when

indebtedness.
(b) When two or more propositions for incurring any indebtedness or liability are submitted at the same election,
the votes cast for and against each proposition shall be counted separately, and when two-thirds or a majority of
the qualified electors, as the case may be, voting on any one of such the propositions, vote in favor thereof, such
the proposition shall be deemed adopted.
Eighty-Sixth-That Section 1 of Article XVIII thereof is amended to read:
SECTION 1. (a) The Legislature, by rollcall vote entered in the journal, two-thirds of the membership of each
house concurring, may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution and in the same manner may amend
or withdraw its proposal. Each amendment shall be so prepared and submitted that it can be voted on separately.

(b) (1) An amendment to this Constitution proposed by the Legislature shall be submitted to the electors at an election held
throughout the State on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November of an even-numbered year.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), an amendment to this Constitution proposed by the Legislature may be submitted to
the electors at a statewide election scheduled to be held on a date other than that specified in paragraph (1) if the Legislature
specifies in a section of the measure the date of the election and the Governor, by executive order, authorizes the placement of
the proposed measure on the ballot at that election. If the Governor does not grant that authorization, the proposal shall be
submitted to the voters pursuant to paragraph (1).
Eighty-Seventh-That Section 7 of Article XX thereof is amended to read:
SEC. 7. ~(a) Except as otherwise specified by this section, the limitations on the number of terms prescribed by
Section 2 of Article IV as amended November 6, 1990, Sections 2 and 11 of Article V, Section 2 of Article IX, and Section
17 of Article XIII apply only to terms to which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990, except
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that an incumbent Senator whose office is not on the ballot for the general election on that date may serve only
one additional term. ~ limitatiGBs

(b) The limitations on the number of terms prescribed by Section 2.1 of Article IV as added November 5, 1996, apply to
any term of office as a Senator or member of the Assembly that commences on or after January 6, 2003. For purposes of the
limitations prescribed by that section, terms of office include those terms of office as a Senator or member of the Assembly to
which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990, except that a person who has served more than two years,
but not more than six years, as a member of the Assembly between November 6, 1990, and January 2, 2005, is deemed to have
thereby served one term in the Assembly, and a person who has served more than six years as a member of the Assembly between
November 6, 1990, and January 2, 2005, is deemed to have thereby served two terms in the Assembly.
(c) The seats of the 40 members of the Assembly elected on November 5, 2002, from odd-numbered districts shall be vacated
at the expiration of the second year, so that one-half of the terms of office of the Assembly begin every two years.
(d) Except as otherwise provided by subdivision (b), the term limitations identified in subdivisions (a) and (b) shall not
apply to any unexpired term to which a person is elected or appointed if the remainder of the term is less than half
of the full term.
Eighty~Eighth-That Section 7.5 is added to Article XX thereof, to read:

SEC. 7.5. (a) Notwithstanding Section 9 of Article IX, the Regents of the University of California include the Superintendent
of Public Instruction, as an ex officio member, and 14 appointive members appointed by the Governor and approved by the
Senate, a majority of the membership concurring.
(b) This section shall remain in effect only until January 4, 1999, and as of that date is repealed.
Eighty-Ninth-That Section 8 is added to Article XX thereof, to read:

SEC. 8. (a) The amendments to Section 2 of Article VII that took effect November 6, 1996, shall not be deemed to reduce
the term of office as a member of the Personnel Board of any person who was a member of that board as of November 5, 1996.
(b) The amendments to Section 9 of Article IX that took effect November 6, 1996, including those set forth in Section 7.5
of this article, shall not be deemed to reduce the term of office as a Regent of the University of California of any person who
was a regent as of November 5, 1996.
Ninetieth-that the tenth paragraph of Section 22 of Article XX thereof is amended to read:
The ~ ~ Q{ EqualizatiGB state government entity designated by the Legislature pursuant to Section 18 of Article
XIII shall assess and collect such excise taxes as are or may be imposed by the Legislature on account of the manufacture,
importation, and sale of alcoholic beverages in this State.
Ninety-First-That the heading of Article XXI thereof is amended to read:
ARTICLE XXI
REAPPORTIONMENT OF SENATE, ASSEMBLY, AND
CONGRESSIONAL; AN9 BOARD eF EQUALIZATION DISTRICTS

Ninety-Second-That Section 1 of Article XXI thereof is amended to read:
SECTION 1. In the year following the year in which the national census is taken under the direction of Congress
at the beginning of each decade, the Legislature shall adjust the boundary lines of the Senatorial, Assembly, and
Congressional1 nn4 ~ Q{ Equalization districts in conformance with the following standards:
(a) Each member of the Senate, Assembly, and Congress, nn4 tRe ~ Q{ Equalization shall be elected from a
single-member district.
(b) The population of all districts of a particular type shall be reasonably equal.
(c) Every district shall be contiguous.
(d) Districts of each type shall be numbered consecutively commencing at the northern boundary of the state
and ending at the southern boundary.
(e) The geographical integrity of any city, county, or city and county, or of any geographical region shall be respected
to the extent possible without violating the requirements of any other subdivision of this section.
And be it further resolved, That the revisions to the California Constitution made by this measure shall become operative
on January 1, 1997, except as otherwise specified by the provisions being revised, and except as follows:
(a) Section 9.5 of Article V, as proposed to be added, shall become operative January 1, 1998, to apply to terms
of office to which persons are elected or appointed on or after November 3, 1998.
(b) The following shall become operative January 4, 1999:
(1) The proposed amendments to subdivision (b) of Section 14 of Article II; subdivision (l) of Section 8 of Article
III; Section 18 of Article IV; subdivision (b) of Section 5 of, Sections 10.5, 11, and 12 of, and subdivision (f) of Section
14 of, Article V; subdivision (i) of Section 4 of, and subdivision (a) of Section 10 of, Article VII; subdivision G) of
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Section 3 of, subdivision
of Section 11
and Sections 16,
tenth
of Section 22 of Article
and the
The pn)pC)Sed a'uunun
Article XIII.
The PfCIPOSed
and
Sections 8 and 9 of Article
of this measure shall become
Section 2.1 of Article IV, as

DfCIDOS€d

to be added

the twelfth and fourteenth

1, 2001.
Df<)D<)S€'d

1, 2002.
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